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Following the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, the Financial Stability Board identified 
several areas of weakness in the delivery of deposit insurance, among other interventions. 
One of the key recommendations related to the use of data by deposit insurers to make 
their coverage limits more robust. The purpose of this quantitative nonexperimental 
cross-sectional study was to test the impact of 4 data sets—aggregate bank risk, the 
aggregate value of insured deposits, the DIF size, and premium levy—on the deposit 
insurance coverage limit. The investigation comprised a pilot study and a survey of 
deposit insurers from the International Association of Deposit Insurers as an international 
(IADI) representative group. In the pilot study of one IADI member, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the multiple regression results indicated statistical 
significance for aggregate bank risk β = –0.102, t = –3.319, p < 0 .001; the aggregate 
currency value of insured deposits β = 0.997, t = 19.523, p < 0 .000; and the premium 
levy β = 0.117, t = 3.694, p < 0 .000. The Pearson correlation results were aggregate bank 
risk 0.476, the aggregate currency value of insured deposits 0.963, and the premium levy 
0.287, with statistical significance ranging from .000 to .007. The survey results of 29 
International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) members revealed no statistical 
significance for any of the 4 variables. Notwithstanding the nonsignificance in the IADI 
survey, these findings will set the framework for deposit insurers and financial authorities 
to use statistical industry data to compute or change their coverage limits. This study 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Deposit insurance coverage limits are one of the key design features of an explicit 
deposit insurance system that plays an important role in promoting financial stability 
within banking systems (International Association of Deposit Insurers [IADI], 2014). 
Coverage limits represent the amount of money that depositors of a troubled bank are 
reimbursed for relative to the amount of eligible deposits they hold when the troubled 
bank is resolved (IADI, 2014). Depending on its level relative to depositors’ total 
savings, coverage limits have the potential to either incentivize bank depositors to 
exercise oversight of a bank’s risk-taking behavior or inveigle other depositors to 
withdraw their deposits in the event of potential financial distress in a banking system 
(Wang, 2008). Generally, the higher value amount of bank deposits held by a depositor 
that is insured by a deposit insurance system, the lesser the depositor’s propensity to run 
on the bank. The obverse is also true. In this context, some governments have adopted 
explicit deposit insurance systems as a component of their overall financial safety net and 
their objective is to implement “disruption-mitigating financial policies” (Demirgüç-Kunt 
& Kane, 2001, p. 2) in their jurisdictional financial system. An explicit deposit insurance 
system is premised on the use of coverage limit, not blanket guarantees.  
Consistent with the derivation of health insurance policies in a competitive 
premium environment, setting a coverage limit for deposit insurance requires relevant 
industry data (Norouzzadeh, 2012). The inclusion of such data could provide a coverage 
limit with a greater sensitivity toward the factors that can impact its level on an ongoing 
basis while at the same time provide it with more resilience from political ad hoc 
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interventions. Health insurance actuaries may incorporate types and frequencies of 
illness, age, gender, and ethnicity among other factors to quantify the amount of money 
an insurance company is willing to risk to provide insurance for a given individual as 
well as the amount of premium an insured person is likely to pay for a specific policy 
(Norouzzadeh, 2012). The more health risk exposure an individual possesses compared to 
the criteria an insurance company uses in the pricing process, the greater the risk that an 
individual poses to make a claim; the probability they will pay increased insurance 
premiums is higher (Norouzzadeh, 2012). The same principle applies to property 
insurance when owners reside in high-risk areas associated with dangerous elements of 
nature, such as storms and flooding. In the field of competitive insurance, the inclusion of 
such statistics is not only used to price premiums but to determine an amount a potential 
policyholder is likely to be reimbursed should the probability of the insured event occur 
(Norouzzadeh, 2012).  
Deposit insurers’ fund managers should consider following a similar trend and 
use industry data to derive their coverage limits (Valentino, 1954). Deposits are a major 
source of funding for some banks, and depositors may be exposed to losses if their banks 
fail (IADI, 2014). However, because these institutions use the deposits as funding, higher 
coverage limits tend to incentivize bankers to take on more risk in their bank portfolios, 
which could expose their banks to failure (IADI, 2014).  
In this study, I evaluated the use of potential industry data by deposit insurers 
among members of the IADI to compute their deposit insurance coverage limits. I 
anticipated that a certain increase in a jurisdiction’s deposit insurance system’s insured 
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deposits could trigger an increase in the deposit insurance coverage limit. Perhaps such 
an increase in the aggregate value of insured deposits could lead to an increase in the 
value amount of the deposit insurance fund (DIF), assuming few or no resolution of 
troubled banks. This constitutes ways that fund managers of deposit insurance systems 
could use industry data to compute their coverage limits. The Financial Stability Board 
(FSB, 2012) made this observation following the global 2007–2008 financial crisis, 
noting that deposit insurance systems do not use industry data to compute their limits. 
This apparent absence of data usage provided the impetus for this study.  
In this study, I incorporated a multiple regression analysis for the pilot study of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from 1934 to 2019, accompanied by 
ordinal logistic regression analysis of a survey of IADI members (Velikova, 2006). 
Multiple regression analysis was performed to determine the influence of the four 
independent variables: aggregate bank risk, the deposit insurance premium levy, the DIF 
size, and the aggregate value of insured deposits on the dependent variables the deposit 
insurance coverage level of the FDIC (Velikova, 2006). The period for this analysis was 
85 years, from 1934 to 2019. Following this, a correlation analysis was executed to 
determine the strength of any of the predictive relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables (Warner, 2012). Ordinal logistic regression analysis was used to 
assess the predictability of each of the independent variables on the coverage level of the 
IADI members’ deposit insurance systems, the dependent variable, when any of the four 
independent variables are altered. The objective of these methodologies is to highlight the 
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possible changes in the coverage limits that could have occurred or been implemented 
had the DIF managers been using industry data to determine coverage limits.  
The inclusion of industry data in the computation of deposit insurance coverage 
limits can present social positive changes to the financial system. From a policy 
perspective, the coverage limit will provide a greater representation and actuarial 
valuation of the deposits in the banking system (Valentino, 1954). Data-supported 
coverage limit figures may be more resilient to financial crises, limiting the need for 
governments to adopt blanket guarantees and the associated fallout in removing such 
mechanisms later, as was the case with a number of deposit insurance systems during the 
2007–2008 global financial crisis. Bank depositors’ propensity to run on their banks 
could be reduced, perhaps making the financial system safety net more stable (Diamond 
& Dybvig, 1983). Data usage could lead to the development of statistical valuation 
models and by extension a more robust standard for coverage limits by deposit insurers. 
In this chapter, I cover the background of the study, the problem statement, 
purpose statement, research questions, and the theoretical framework. Subsequent to 
these elements, the nature of the study is discussed followed by definitions, assumptions, 
scope and delimitations, limitations, and the significance of the study. The chapter 
concludes with a summary and an overview of the structure of the study.  
Background of the Study 
Although deposit insurance systems have existed since the 1930s and the 
authorities changed their coverage limits—some more frequent than others—no research 
has been done to identify industry-specific factors that could be used or formulated into a 
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model to compute changes to deposit insurance coverage limits. This deficiency in the 
research became apparent after the 2007–2008 global financial crisis (FSB, 2012). 
During the crisis, some governments opined that the changes to the coverage limits were 
necessary to restore and instill consumer confidence in the banking system, which 
virtually came to a halt in the United States (Bitros, 2015; Calomiris & Jaremski, 2016). 
In some instances, the adjustments to the coverage limits were extreme; some 
governments implemented blanket guarantees representing 100% of total deposits in the 
banking system (Bitros, 2015). Removing the coverage limit during a crisis of such a 
global magnitude could neutralize depositors’ potential to simultaneously withdraw their 
funds and put their banks into a liquidity crunch and eventual failure.  
The downside risks associated with full coverage for deposits, particularly in 
response to the 2007–2008 crisis, could be significant and give rise to a number of 
questions. Are the financial stability authorities fully equipped to determine the 
appropriate end time for the crisis? How long should the authorities allow the blanket 
guarantees to remain in force during and after the crisis? Assuming the authorities have 
determined the crisis period has ended, what should the coverage level be going forward? 
Should the post crisis limit be restored to the same level it was pre crisis? Alternatively, 
should it be higher, and if so, what factors would inform such a decision for the increase? 
How are depositors’ expectations to be addressed to this new pre crisis level? More 
importantly, how are depositors’ expectations to be honed when new financial shocks 
occur in the future? And they will, according to Bitros (2015).  
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The occurrence of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis provided a learning 
opportunity. Following the crisis, the FSB (2012) highlighted the importance of standards 
for deposit insurance systems and noted the deficiency in administrators of deposit 
insurance systems regarding using statistical data to calculate deposit insurance coverage 
limits. Deposit insurers around the globe through the IADI took note of the coverage 
limit and other weaknesses that occurred and successfully moved to implement 
international standards for deposit insurance systems in November 2014 (IADI, 2014). 
Notwithstanding this effort, IADI’s Principle 8 Coverage illustrated weaknesses in the 
guidelines for computing deposit insurance coverage limits. While the development of 
this standard was a positive move on IADI’s part, it omitted the inclusion of relevant 
industry statistical data to derive coverage limits. 
While the usage of industry statistical data is considered an imperative in the 
derivation of deposit insurance coverage limits, the relevant authorities should appreciate 
the nexus between deposit insurance coverage as a tool and the intended benefits to 
depositors. Gan and Wang (2013) argued this point and noted that timing and frequency 
of coverage limit changes damage the bank-depositor relationship; regular changes to the 
coverage limit can undermine trust in a central bank effort to maintain stability as well as 
consumers’ expectations in terms of reimbursement.  
Major banking crises that started with the Great Depression in the United States 
from 1929 to 1933, have been dominated by depositors with small deposits engaging in 
simultaneous withdrawal of funds, culminating in a liquidity crunch in the U.S. banking 
system and the subsequent failure of banks (Shyy, Stenbackaz, & Yankovx, 2014). In 
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response, the FDIC system was created when the U.S. federal government, through the 
Banking Act of 1933, and introduced a partial deposit insurance system with a coverage 
limit of $2,500, which targeted the most vulnerable, small depositor (FDIC, 1998). 
However, this limit of $2,500 was not clearly defined. In one instance it was suggested to 
be based on the criteria of rent money (Greenspan, 2003). In another case, the suggested 
grounding was the value of deposits held by the Postal Savings System that had the full 
backing of the U.S. government in the 1930s (Hogan & Luther, 2014). The acceptance of 
the $2,500 coverage limit was not simple (Hogan & Luther, 2014). A compromise 
between bankers, who wanted a lower coverage limit, and depositors, who preferred a 
higher limit, had to be factored into the discussions to arrive at the $2,500 coverage limit 
(Hogan & Luther, 2014). The deciding point that won the argument was the fact that the 
$2,500 covered approximately 97% of the deposits held by banks (Hogan & Luther, 
2014). The derivation of the coverage limit was clearly unscientific, and it appears that 
not much has changed since; the FDIC limit was increased to $250,000 up from $100,000 
in response to the 2007–2008 crisis (Barth & Prabha, 2014).  
Governance may be a factor that led to the lack of development associated with 
the application of data and the introduction of financial models. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) has, over time, developed criteria to regulate banks using 
macroprudential and microprudential data to assess the possible exposure of banks to the 
financial system (BCBS, 2012; Madhani, 2017). These moves led to the implementation 
of the capital, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity system (CAMELS) in 
1988, as well as the 29 core principles or international standards for regulating banks in 
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1997 (BCBS, 2012). These interventions by bank regulators suggest that industry data 
specifically related to bank risks was available prior to the 2007–2008 crisis and raises 
the question as to why such available data have not been shared with the authorities of 
deposit insurance systems.  
Notwithstanding the gap in the absence of data usage by deposit insurance 
systems, as noted by FSB (2012), Markowitz’s (1952) modern portfolio theory, and 
Merton’s (1977) option pricing theory, rely on data inputs to maximize expected returns 
on stock investments, given the presence of risk and pricing European options, 
respectively. In this study, I used Markowitz’s and Merton’s premises to illustrate or 
support the need to use industry statistical data inputs to derive deposit insurance 
coverage limits, which may strengthen IADI international standards, provide IADI 
member and nonmember fund managers with a framework to compute crisis coverage 
limits less prone to ad hoc changes, sync with BCBS microprudential and 
macroprudential efforts, and enhance deposit insurance systems’ corporate governance 
and effectiveness to contribute to financial stability (Demirgüç-Kunt, 2015; Egbuna, 
Oduh, Ujunwa, & Okoyeuzu, 2018; Gârbo, 2016).  
The results of this study may form a framework for the enhancement of 
international standards for computing deposit insurance coverage limits. Policy 
development would be another benefit associated with the findings from this research. 




The FSB (2012) noted “that few explicit deposit insurance systems collect and 
assess statistics necessary for monitoring the adequacy of coverage levels” (p. 5). The 
FSB advocated that IADI’s core principles, which are the international standards for 
deposit insurance, could have a greater impact on financial stability if the standards 
included “an objective benchmark for the ongoing monitoring of the effectiveness and 
adequacy of coverage levels” (p. 5). This was one weakness cited by the FSB in its 
Thematic Review of Deposit Insurance Systems in February 2012; they emphasized the 
importance of “effective depositor compensation arrangements” following the 2007/2008 
global financial crisis (FSB, 2012, p. X). During the crisis, the relevant authorities feared 
the worst and resorted to an extreme position of implementing blanket guarantee 
coverage limits within their deposit insurance arrangements (Chu, 2011). In response to 
the crisis, the IADI (2013) noted “that nineteen (19) deposit insurers implemented full 
depositor guarantees, twenty-two (22) introduced permanent changes while 7 
implemented temporary adjustments to their deposit insurance coverage limits” (p. 20). It 
is unknown why the authorities in so many countries placed so much emphasis on the 
option to increase their deposit insurance coverage limits. Should another crisis, perhaps 
even of a lesser magnitude, arise in the future, it is not known how the bank depositors’ 
expectations will be addressed or calmed. 
The general problem of this study is that scholars are unaware of whether the 
deposit insurers in the international financial system as represented by the IADI 
members’ association fund managers use industry statistical data to derive their deposit 
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insurance coverage limits. The specific problem is that we do not know what data DIF 
managers’ use to compute coverage limits for deposit insurance systems, which can 
promote the ineffectiveness deposit insurance systems and instability of financial systems 
during banking crises or normal periods of financial distress (FSB, 2012). This study is 
focused on exploring the inclusion of industry statistical data to compute deposit 
insurance coverage limits as a measure of mitigating impromptu increases or blanket 
guarantees, which could potentially create more with difficulties for bank depositors 
(FSB, 2012). The deposit insurance field is under researched in computing deposit 
insurance coverage limits based on industry data similar to that used in the life insurance 
and health insurance industries (Valentino, 1954). Researchers have targeted other areas 
such as deposit insurance pricing (FSB, 2012; Velikova, 2006).  
The expedient decisions and actions pursued by governments during the 2007–
2008 global financial crisis (a) undermined the relevance of deposit insurance systems, 
(b) created psychological conundrums in the minds of bank depositors, and (c) placed a 
temporal but significant contingent financial burden on governments and taxpayers (Xie, 
2018). The findings of this study may contribute to further research in the application of 
statistical data to establish international standards for computing deposit insurance 
coverage limits.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine whether the usage of 
industry statistical data, such as the aggregate bank risk data, fund size, aggregate value 
of insured deposits, and premium levy applied by the deposit insurers fund managers in 
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the global financial environment, to derive their deposit insurance coverage limits could 
potentially lead to more objective, crisis-resilient coverage limits. Based on its 
institutional recognition as an international standard setter, I used IADI members as the 
deposit insurers for this research. I investigated significant relationships between four 
independent variables: (a) aggregate bank risk data, (b) fund size, (c) aggregate value of 
insured deposits, and (d) premium levy, and the dependent variable coverage limit. The 
findings could assist with the development of a standard for computing deposit insurance 
coverage limits and minimize the possibility of depositors engaging in bank runs. The 
results of this study should corroborate the FSB’s (2012) advocacy for the use of 
statistical data by DIF managers to calculate their respective deposit insurance coverage 
limits. Stability within financial systems around the globe could be enhanced, placing less 
psychological stress on depositors (Bitros, 2015). 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Based on the problem and purpose statements, the following research questions 
were created:  
RQ1:  What effect, if any, does the aggregate bank risk have on the predictor 
variable deposit insurance coverage limit? 
H01: There is no effect of the aggregate bank risk on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
Ha1: There is an effect of the aggregate bank risk on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
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RQ2:  What effect, if any, does a DIF’s fund size have on the predictor variable 
deposit insurance coverage limit? 
H02: There is no effect of a DIF’s fund size on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
Ha2: There is an effect of a DIF’s fund size on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
RQ3:  What effect, if any, does the aggregate currency value of the insured bank 
deposits protected by a DIF have on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit? 
H03: There is no effect of the aggregate currency value of the insured bank 
deposits protected by a DIF on the predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit.  
Ha3: There is an effect of the aggregate currency value of the insured bank 
deposits protected by a DIF on the predictor variable deposit insurance coverage  
RQ4:  What effect, if any, does a DIF’s premium levy on its member banks have 
on the predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit? 
H04: There is no effect of a DIF’s premium levy on its member banks on the 
predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit.  
Ha4: There is an effect of a DIF’s premium levy on its member banks on the 
predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit. 
The coverage limit will be the dependent variable. Data on the aggregate bank 
risk, the DIF size, the total value of insured deposits in the banking system, and the level 
of the deposit insurance premium were the independent variables. The aggregate bank 
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risk data were based on the Bank for International System (BIS) risk measures using the 
BIS rating scheme incorporating CAMELS (BCBS, 2012). The DIF size was based on 
the value size of the fund, and the insured deposits represented the aggregate value of the 
specific types of deposit instruments that the deposit insurance system is mandated to 
protect and/or insure. Intuitively, the higher the BIS CAMELS rating of a given bank, the 
higher the probability of bank failure and, by extension, the higher the likelihood that 
depositors may be reimbursed. The higher the value of the DIF, the greater the 
probability of the DIF to reimburse depositors and pay a higher coverage limit in the 
event of a bank failure. The higher the value of the insured deposits, the higher the 
likelihood of increased demands by depositors for a higher reimbursement amount or 
coverage limit in the event of a bank failure. Further, the higher the deposit insurance 
premium, the higher the likelihood that the DIF may grow and consequently make more 
funds available to reimburse depositors.  
Theoretical Framework  
Six main theories grounded this study: (a) option pricing, (b) modern portfolio, (c) 
deposit insurance, (d) resource dependence corporate governance, (e) insurance, and (f) 
bank regulations theories. Merton (1977) noted that “the properties of deposit insurance 
viewed as a security are isomorphic to those of a put option” (p. 4). In Merton’s view, 
deposit insurance is similar to an option pricing, more specifically, a European put 
option. In this scenario, the depositor will exercise their put option to be reimbursed in 
the amount of the deposit insurance coverage limit if the bank’s stock price was lower, 
signaling its possible failure. Through Merton’s lens, there is an intuitive parallelism 
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between deposit insurance as a reimbursement action and a European put option, which 
seemingly hints at the need for, and use of, data. 
The same principle applies to the concept of risk in an investment portfolio, as 
espoused by Markowitz (1952, as cited by Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, 2016). 
Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory laid the foundation for selecting an optimal 
portfolio containing stocks and bonds incorporating a relationship between the risk 
pursued and the returns obtained from investments. Explicitly, Markowitz’s modern 
portfolio theory enhanced the understanding of efficiency of markets, but implicitly 
assumes that market data are already reflected in prices of securities.  
One early study that signaled the need for the inclusion of data to compute deposit 
insurance coverage limits was led by Valentino (1954). Valentino attempted to apply the 
theory of insurance to the field of deposit insurance in the early 1950s, and while he did 
not explicitly advocate the need for data to price deposit insurance coverage limits, he 
perceived a nexus between the use of factors to price insurance as well as deposit 
insurance.  Insurance policy holders are covered for a level of protection that is reflected 
in their insurance premium derived by data (Valentino, 1954).  
With the passage of time and building on the concept of risk in finance theory, as 
advocated by Markowitz (1952), the BCBS established the Basel Capital Accord or Basel 
I in 1988, which was introduced in 1992 as a credit risk measurement for regulating 
banks (Benink & Wihlborg, 2002). In 1999, the BCBS advanced their efforts and 
introduced Basel II, which focused on certain aspects such as capital requirements and 
the effective disclosure to enhance market discipline (Benink & Wihlborg, 2002). In 
15 
 
response to the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, the BCBS introduced Basel III, which 
began implementation in 2013. This effort focused on corporate governance, risk 
management, increased common equity, liquidity ratio, and additional impositions for 
systemically important banks (BCBS, 2017).  
As a measure of building international best practices, the BCBS (2012) introduced 
29 core principles for effective banking supervision, representing the basic standards for 
sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks. These standards focus on risk-
based supervision and incorporated, among other items, market risk, liquidity risk, 
operational risk, credit risk, capital adequacy, and corporate governance (BCBS, 2012). 
The BCBS interventions through the Basel accords, the CAMELS, the banking standards, 
and the risk-based bank supervision methodology were all developed based on using 
bank industry data (BCBS, 2012). The adoption of the Basel bank supervisory 
frameworks (the Basel Accords) generated many bank data, which are executed by 
central banks, and the deposits of which are insured by deposit insurance systems—all 
comprising key financial safety net participants in many jurisdictions. These 
interventions suggest that industry data for deposit insurance systems are available but 
are not used by the practitioners. It remains unclear if a governance issue is stymying the 
process of data sharing. These frameworks underpin my study and set the basis to answer 
my research questions. 
The theory of deposit insurance posited by Diamond and Dybvig (1983, as cited 
by Hogan & Luther, 2014) noted that in certain periods, financial contagion can cause 
depositors to engage in simultaneous withdrawals of deposits from their banks, otherwise 
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known as bank runs. To maintain confidence during periods of systemic risk and possible 
runs on banks, Diamond and Dybvig proffered that governments could mitigate this risk 
without incurring cost through the cost-less provision of deposit insurance. Diamond and 
Dybvig played with the notion that too high a coverage limit would diminish market 
discipline, and bankers may take on more business risk, exposing depositors to loss. 
Diamond and Dybvig also noted that too low a coverage limit could potentially trigger 
depositors to panic and withdraw their funds simultaneously, possibly leading to a 
liquidity crunch for banks and their eventual demise. The appropriate coverage limit, the 
derivation of which demands industry data, was therefore considered important in 
Diamond and Dybvig’s view. 
Governance may be a contributor to DIF managers’ lack of application of data to 
derive coverage limits. While Diamond and Dybvig (1983, as cited by Hogan & Luther, 
2014) noted that deposit insurance systems are established by governments, there are 
cases of privately owned systems in Switzerland and Italy (Hogan & Johnson, 2016). 
Hogan and Johnson (2016) posited from international studies on deposit insurance that, 
“adverse effects of deposit insurance are stronger where government has greater 
involvement in the deposit insurance system” (p. 438). Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2002, as cited by Hogan & Johnson, 2016) held a similar view. Hogan and Johnson 
argued that countries with high coverage limits coupled with government participation in 
the deposit insurance system tended to cause increased bank failures and financial crises. 
In support of the governance argument for using industry data, resource-dependence 
theory of corporate governance, as posited by Madhani (2017), emphasizes that the board 
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should source key inputs by interacting with the external environment. Such contributions 
gained from accessing important elements can assist a firm in attaining optimal level of 
performance (Madhani, 2017).  
According to Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011) the microprudential orientation 
of the bank regulatory framework prior to the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, which 
focused on proactively averting the failure of financial institutions on a single entity 
basis, failed. This traditional approach incorporated aspects, such as capital adequacy 
mandates, reserve requirements, and bank examination (Shive & Forster, 2017). 
Following the fallout of the crisis, there was greater consensus toward the adoption of a 
macroprudential approach to financial regulation, which emphasizes the protection of the 
entire financial system (Hanson et al., 2011). In Hanson et al.’s perspective, bank 
regulators and supervisors legislative framework needs to be expanded to capture 
possible systemic risks and deficiencies. 
Merton’s (1977) option pricing theory together with Markowitz’s (1952) modern 
portfolio theory will support my study as both depend on the application of data to either 
assess the credit risk of corporate debt or to maximize returns on a portfolio 
simultaneously. Diamond and Dybvig (1983, as cited by Hogan & Luther, 2014), through 
the theory of deposit insurance, argued for the adoption of deposit insurance systems for 
preventing depositors’ runs on banks. Madhani’s (2017) resource-dependence theory of 
corporate governance offers a possible rationale for DIF managers to compute deposit 
insurance coverage limits on a fair basis as part of their fiduciary responsibility. Hanson 
et al.’s (2011) macroprudential theory of bank regulations adds value to the inclusion of 
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industry data to derive coverage limits because deposit insurance systems are part of the 
financial stability network adopted by the BCBS to regulate banks. These five key 
theories my study is built on will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
Nature of the Study 
The nature of this study was quantitative. As a statistical methodology, 
quantitative analysis was used to determine whether relationships exist between the 
aggregate bank risk data, the DIF size, the premium levy, the aggregate value of insured 
deposits, and the coverage limits of IADI members (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-
Guerrero, 2015). The study is comprised of two segments, a pilot study and a survey. 
Four hypotheses were tested in each component of the study. In the pilot study, the key 
independent variables and the dependent variable took a scale categorization. In the main 
study of the IADI members, the dependent and independent variables took an ordinal 
variable classification.  
The instrument used in this study followed a modified version of the approach 
adopted by Sheboy (2006) based on the similarities between the studies. Sheboy 
examined relationships between data usage through the concept of data-based decision 
making and district school administrators. In a similar vein, in this study, I focused on the 
search for significant relationships between statistical industry data and the computation 
of deposit insurance coverage limits. Drawing on the work of other similar studies, 
Velikova (2006) examined relationships between bank risk data and real deposit 
insurance coverage in the United States and to research the demographic, political, 
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economic, and financial factors that impact explicit deposit insurance systems’ coverage 
limits of countries around the world. Velikova used multiple regression analysis.  
As a precursor to the main study, I performed a pilot study incorporating a 
multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between the four independent 
variables, aggregate bank risk, DIF premium levy, the DIF size, and the aggregate value 
of insured deposits, and the dependent variables the deposit insurance coverage level for 
the FDIC in the United States. The period for this analysis was 85 years from 1934 up to 
and including 2019, and the data were collected from the FDIC’s published data on its 
website. The regression analysis results provide insights into associations between the 
variables I identified in the main study and the time series data points for purposes of 
forecasting.  
The main and second element of the study was the search for significant 
relationships between the IADI members’ use of industry data and significant 
relationships between the IADI fund managers and their use of same industry data, or 
specific variables, used in the pilot study. Assuming trends would be detected in the pilot 
study, ordinal logistic regression analysis was used in the main study to assess the 
predictability of the usage of each of the same independent variables to compute the 
coverage level for the IADI members’ deposit insurance systems, the dependent variable, 
when any of the four independent variables were altered. One minor addition to 
Velikova’s (2006) modality was introduced. The objective of using these methodologies 
was to highlight the possible changes in the coverage limits that could have occurred or 
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been implemented had the IADI fund managers been using industry data to derive 
coverage limits (Warner, 2012).  
The dependent variable, coverage limits, was measured as an ordinal variable. 
There were five independent variables analyzed, four of which highlighted specific data 
sets that can be used to determine the coverage limits. The questionnaire that members 
were asked to respond to on these four variables incorporated the following:  
 The aggregate risk profile of the DIF’s member banks to identify which 
members have the higher or highest probability of failure within a short-
term outlook. The higher the risk profile the higher the coverage limit may 
be; 
 The actual size of the DIF. The higher the DIF, the higher the coverage 
limit may be; 
 The aggregate value of the insured deposits within the banking system 
excluding corporate and government deposits. The higher the total value 
of insured deposits in the banking system, the higher the coverage limit 
may be; and 
 The DIF’s premium levy. The higher the premium levy, the higher the 
coverage limit may be. 
The usage of these statistical data or lack thereof by the members was based on 
the IADI members’ responses to a survey guided by the following: Controls were 
established for mediating variables that may influence the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. Mediating variables exist where Variable X can 
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causally influence the relationship between Variables Y and Z (Warner, 2012). It is 
possible that fund managers of deposit insurance systems may not have access to data on 
the risk profile of banks which may be held and not shared by the bank regulator or 
central bank due to legislative constrains. If the data cannot be shared, then this limitation 
could influence, and by extension restrict, the fund managers’ access to use it to compute 
their deposit insurance coverage limits (Warner, 2012). The business model could 
influence the size of the coverage limit (Warner, 2012). The type of governance structure 
adopted may be another mediating variable because DIF managers are guided by the 
board’s appetite for risk, transparency, robust business structure and so on (Madhani, 
2017). Limited investment options for the premium collected from members of the DIF 
may be another mediating variable because this circumstance can restrict the growth of 
the DIF. The mediating variables was entered in SPSS simultaneously to determine if a 
combination of mediators can explain the relationship between the coverage limit and the 
four factors (Wagner, 2016; Warner, 2012).  
Definitions 
Bank: Any entity that accepts deposits or repayable funds from the public and is 
classified under the jurisdiction’s legal framework as a deposit-taking institution (IADI, 
2014). 
Bank runs: A rapid and significant withdrawal of deposits from a bank by 
depositors following a loss of confidence, precipitated by the fear that the bank may fail 
and that depositors may therefore suffer losses or lose access to funds (IADI, 2014). 
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Bank regulation: The bank regulator that has the powers available under legal 
frameworks for the purposes of conducting on-site and off-site review of bank records 
without the consent of shareholders, creditors, and debtors in question (IADI, 2014). 
Coverage limit: The maximum amount a depositor can claim from or be 
reimbursed by a deposit insurer in the event of a bank failure (IADI, 2014). 
CAMELS rating: A system used to rate banks according to six factors represented 
by capital adequacy, asset quality, management capability, earnings, liquidity, and 
sensitivity to market risk (IADI, 2014). 
Contagion: The spread of the financial problems of one bank to other banks or 
financial institutions, usually within the same jurisdiction, or the spread of economic and 
financial disturbances within a jurisdiction or across jurisdictions (IADI, 2014). 
Coverage limits: The types of instruments covered, the methods for calculating 
depositor claims, funding arrangements, and other related matters (IADI, 2014). 
Deposit: Any credit balance that derives from normal banking transactions and 
which a Bank must repay at par under the legal and contractual conditions applicable; any 
debt evidenced by a certificate issued by a bank; and any other funds or obligations 
defined or recognized as deposits by the law establishing the deposit insurance system 
(IADI, 2014). 
Deposit insurance: A system established to protect depositors against the loss of 




Deposit insurance fund (DIF): A combination of premiums collected from 
member banks that are invested to enhance the capacity of an insurance system to meet 
its obligations associated with resolving member banks in financial distress, one of which 
could include depositor reimbursement in the event of a bank failure (IADI, 2014).  
Deposit insurance system: Refers to the deposit insurer and its relationships with 
the financial safety net participants that support deposit insurance functions and 
resolution processes (IADI, 2014). 
Deposit insurer: A specific legal entity responsible for providing deposit 
insurance, deposit guarantees, or similar deposit protection arrangements (IADI, 2014). 
Deposit reimbursement: A resolution method that involves the reimbursement of 
deposits to insured depositors (IADI, 2014). 
Eligible deposits: deposits that fall within the scope of coverage of a deposit 
insurance system (i.e., they meet the requirements for coverage under a deposit insurance 
system and are based typically on the type(s) of depositor and/or deposit; IADI, 2014). 
Explicit deposit insurance system: A system, expressly laid down by statutes or 
other legal instruments, that stipulates the amount of reimbursement that depositors can 
expect in the event of a bank failure (IADI, 2014)  
Financial safety net: A framework that includes the functions of prudential 
regulation, supervision, resolution, lender of last resort, and deposit insurance. In many 
jurisdictions, a department of government (generally a ministry of finance or treasury 
responsible for financial sector policy) is included in the financial safety net (IADI, 
2014). The Central bank, bank regulator, deposit insurance systems, other financial 
24 
 
regulators (insurance and securities) and a government ministry are the institutions that 
fall into this group. 
Indexed coverage: Limited coverage level that is determined or adjusted by the 
inflation rate or the change in another relevant price index of a jurisdiction (IADI, 2014).  
Insolvency: A situation in which a bank can no longer meet its financial 
obligations when due and/or the value of its assets is less than the total of its liabilities 
(IADI, 2014).  
Insured depositors: Holders of eligible deposits that do not exceed the maximum 
coverage level provided by a deposit insurance system (IADI, 2014). 
Insured deposits: Eligible deposits that do not exceed the maximum coverage 
level provided by a deposit insurance system (IADI, 2014). 
Loss minimizer: A mandate in which the deposit insurer actively engages in a 
selection from a range of least-cost resolution strategies (IADI, 2014). 
Mandate: A set of official instructions describing the deposit insurer’s roles and 
responsibilities. There is no single mandate or set of mandates suitable for all deposit 
insurers. When assigning a mandate to a deposit insurer, jurisdiction-specific 
circumstances must be considered. Mandates can range from narrow paybox systems to 
those with extensive responsibilities, such as preventive action and loss or risk 
minimization/management, with a variety of combinations in between. These can be 
broadly classified into four categories: (a) paybox, (b) paybox plus, (c) loss minimizer, 
and (d) risk minimizer (IADI, 2014). 
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Market discipline: A situation in which depositors, creditors, or investors assess 
the risk characteristics of a bank and can influence the bank’s risk-taking behavior by 
threatening to withdraw funds from the institution (IADI, 2014). 
Paybox: A mandate in which the deposit insurer is only responsible for the 
reimbursement of insured deposits (IADI, 2014).  
Paybox plus: A mandate in which the deposit insurer has additional 
responsibilities, such as certain resolution functions (e.g., financial support; IADI, 2014). 
Risk minimizer: A mandate in which a deposit insurer has comprehensive risk 
minimization functions, including risk assessment/ management, a full suite of early 
intervention and resolution powers, and in some cases, prudential oversight 
responsibilities (IADI, 2014). 
Scope of coverage: The types of deposits and depositors eligible for deposit 
insurance coverage (IADI, 2014). 
Statistical industry data: Regulated banks are required under legislation by bank 
regulators to prepare and submit returns that contain financial results of bank 
performance. These data usually include aspects of the banks’ capital, deposits, capital 
risk, the size distribution of deposits in both quantity of accounts and currency value of 
deposits, risk profiles of the member banks for premium levy, and liquidity. DIFs also 
generate elements of such data, including periodic reviews of the size of the DIF.  
Systemic risk: A risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an 
impairment of all or parts of the financial system and has the potential to have serious 
negative consequences for the real economy (IADI, 2014). 
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Systemically important financial institution (SIFI): A financial institution or a 
group that, because of its size, complexity, and systemic interconnectedness, would, in 
the view of the relevant authorities, cause significant disruption to the domestic or 
broader financial system and economic activity if it were to fail in a disorderly manner 
(IADI, 2014). 
Troubled bank: A bank that has, or will have, impaired liquidity or solvency 
unless there is a major improvement in its financial resources, risk profile, strategic 
business direction, risk management capabilities, and/or quality of management (IADI, 
2014). 
Uninsured deposits: The types or amounts of deposits that are not covered by a 
deposit insurance system (IADI, 2014). 
Assumptions 
I made the following assumptions in this study: 
 The banking system in many jurisdictions follows all the BCBS principles 
and is regulated by a bank supervisory authority empowered by a 
legislative mandate.  
 All banks are required by law to make submissions of financial reports of 
their balance sheets, income statements, and other data to their respective 
banking regulator. 
 The bank regulator adopts the international banking standards contained in 
the BIS’ 29 core principles for effective bank supervision. 
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 The bank regulator consistently exercises its legislative powers to collect 
and assess key statistical data of individual banks’ risks and performance 
over which the regulator has supervisory authority.  
 Bank regulators adopt the BIS CAMELS rating system to assess and rate 
bank risk profiles. 
 The bank regulator can share the key statistical data about bank risks and 
performance with the deposit insurance institutions. 
 The bank depositors are aware of the role of deposit insurance institutions, 
including the amount of the deposit insurance coverage limit that they may 
be entitled to in the event of a bank failure. 
 All bank depositors possess a propensity to engage in simultaneous 
withdrawals of deposits from their banks if information, whether true or 
false, about the uncertainty of the viability of their banks is known. 
 All participants in the financial services sector are aware that confidence is 
the economic lifeline of the financial system. 
 The financial services safety net participants work collaboratively toward 
maintaining financial stability;. 
 The financial systems in most jurisdictions have either an official or 




 DIF managers have the requisite knowledge, experience, and 
competencies to understand the import of using their industry statistical 
data to derive their deposit insurance coverage limits. 
 DIF managers are guided by the international standards contained in 
IADI’s 16 core principles for effective deposit insurance systems. 
 The assumptions of multiple regression analysis will hold given that this 
methodology would be used in this analysis;. 
 That no formal statistical model for deriving deposit insurance coverage 
limits using industry statistical data exists or is known by the DIF 
managers in the international arena.  
 Deposit funding makes up the majority of the supply of bank liquidity. 
These assumptions are considered important to illustrate the context in which the DIF 
managers function and the possible nexus between their lack of industry data usage and 
the factors that may promote or constrain their ability to use industry statistical data to 
derive coverage limits.  
Scope and Delimitations 
Delimitations are the characteristics that limit the scope and describe the 
boundaries of a study (Medrano, López-Perea, & Herrera, 2014). The scope of this study 
was restricted to examining the use of deposit insurance industry data by DIF managers 
using the IADI members’ association as the international target group to derive their 
deposit insurance coverage limits and suggest four variables that could be used in this 
computation. The scope also incorporated an investigation into the IADI’s four mandate 
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types and the capacity of these to allow access to and usage of the industry statistical 
data. Using elements of Velikova’s (2006) perspective on coverage limits as well as 
aspects of Valentino’s (1954) application of the insurance principle to deposit insurance, 
four constructs were used, namely, industry statistical data sets such as bank risk data, the 
size and growth of the DIF, the growth in the DIF’s insured deposits within the banking 
system, and the DIF premium data. There are no prior studies on deposit insurance 
coverage limits to support the use of these four specific factors, and I was guided partially 
by Vilevoka’s study on coverage limits and the actuarial lens for the application of the 
insurance principle to deposit insurance by Valentino.  
The scope limited testing to four variables as possible factors that can impact 
deposit insurance coverage limits. Intuitively, the following reasoning informs these 
choices: 
 Bank liquidity in many jurisdictions is dependent on the supply of deposit 
funding (Ngalawa, Tchana, & Viegi 2016). 
 The aggregate value of insured deposits may be associated with the need 
to increase the deposit insurance coverage limit. 
 As deposit insurance premium increase, assuming no demands on the DIF 
for treating with troubled banks, the DIF may grow. 
 The higher the risk profile of member banks of the DIF, a metric that can 
be measured by using regulatory accounting data (Pruitt, 2017), the higher 
the probability of for troubled banks and by extension the potential usage 
of the DIF. 
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Valentino (1954) noted that the criteria for insurance are: (a) a large, homogeneous group 
of exposure units, permitting accurate prediction of average loss through the use of the 
law of large numbers; (b) definite loss; (c) accidental loss; (d) avoidance of the 
catastrophe hazard; (e) large loss; and (f) economically reasonable cost.  
The scope was also restricted to focus on coverage limits related to explicit 
deposit insurance systems that are either government or private sector owned in 
jurisdictions around the world. I attempted to gather information in an impartial manner 
to answer my research question through a survey of IADI fund managers. SurveyMonkey 
was used to enhance objectivity and reach the target deposit insurance systems’ fund 
managers who are physically located in different geographic locations around the world. 
Limitations 
Limitations are potential study weaknesses that the researcher cannot address 
because they are out of the researcher’s control (Denscombe, 2013). My decision to use 
four independent data set variables for this study limited the depth of the analytical work 
as there may be other data set, perhaps more substantive or reliable, factors that could be 
used to calculate coverage limits. Given the absence of previous scholarly research 
efforts to identify possible industry statistical data as well as financial models to compute 
coverage limits, validity had to be addressed. I relied on Markowitz’s (1952) modern 
portfolio theory and Merton’s (1977) option pricing theory to support the inclusion of 
industry data. The selected four industry statistical data sets were (a) aggregate bank risk 
data, (b) the size of the DIF, (c) the aggregate value of insured deposits within the 
banking system, and (d) the DIF premium levy, which were considered to be the main 
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determining predictors that IADI members’ fund managers can use to derive their deposit 
insurance coverage limits.  
As scholarly research in the deposit insurance field in general is also limited, the 
results of this study may be affected by researcher bias associated with the sampling 
process and data collection (Lavrakas, 2011). The survey questions were designed to 
reduce the difficulty of participants to respond and follow-up calls were planned to 
ensure adequacy of responses (Lavrakas, 2011). These measures minimized the impact of 
bias. As no scholarly work on the derivation of coverage limits currently exists, I adopted 
the theoretical lenses of Markowitz (1952), Merton (1977), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
Valentino (1954), and Madhani (2017), plus practitioners in the bank regulation and 
deposit insurance fields, including the FSB, the IADI, the BCBS, the BIS, Hanson et al. 
(2011), and Velikova (2006) to guide this research. 
Significance of the Study 
This research will (a) contribute to the advancement in the theory, (b) enhance the 
relevance of deposit insurance systems, and (c) promote positive social change through 
minimizing political influence in financial processes. The main objective was to identify 
the relevant industry statistical data that IADI members can use to derive their coverage 
limits.  
Significance to Theory 
This study will contribute to Merton’s (1977) pricing theory of deposit insurance 
as a put option as deposit insurance coverage limits are the deposit amounts that 
depositors exercise in a bank failure, consistent with Merton’s put option. Each coverage 
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limit should contain an element or elements of risk such that the inclusion of the 
statistical data, as suggested by FSB (2012), will align more with Markowitz’s (1952) 
effort to establish a link between risk and return in modern portfolio theory. Building on 
this understanding, conformity with theories underpinning bank regulatory frameworks 
will be enhanced as the inclusion of data in the derivation of coverage limits will be 
consistent with the microprudental and macroprudential theories of bank regulation 
(BCBS, 2012; Hanson et al., 2011; Kashyap & Stein, 2011).  
Significance to Social Change 
The findings of this study have the potential to influence positive social change by 
allowing policymakers to be more informed about technical statistical data considerations 
that can be used to derive deposit insurance coverage limits. Such an effort can contribute 
more effectively to the development of coverage limit models and increase financial 
stability in the international arena, particularly during banking crises. The ad hoc 
decisions to change the coverage limits that are not informed by relevant industry 
statistical data can be minimized for the next financial crisis (Schoen, 2017; Xie, 2018). 
The data generated by this study could contribute to a system more likely to garner 
depositor trust, improve ethical behavior, produce more dependable and perhaps crisis-
resistant coverage limits that are supported by relevant industry statistical data, and 
stabilize the banking system over time in different regions around the globe. The results 
may limit political interference and may lead IADI members with explicit deposit 
insurance systems to consider the adoption of broader data sets to generate acceptable 
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deposit insurance coverage limits as part of IADI international standards for effective 
deposit insurance systems. 
Types and Sources of Data 
The possible types and sources of data will be used to address the research 
question will be subdivided into Primary and Secondary sources. 
Primary Sources  
The survey was a newly created survey of IADI members to collect information 
on the possible use of DIF member bank risk, fund size, insured deposits and premium 
data that may be used by the DIF Managers to calculate coverage limits; the different 
mandate-types and their access to statistical industry data. 
Secondary Sources  
 Information supporting the use of statistics in deposit insurance from 
deposit insurance literature produced by the Bank for International 
Settlements, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). 
 Insurance core principles produced by the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors to explore the guidelines on the statistical data sets 
for determination of life and general insurance coverage.  
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) annual reports plus 
their member banks annual reports. 
 Bank for International Settlements for guidance literature in computing 
deposit insurance coverage limits. 
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 International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI, 2014) which contain 
the deposit insurance standards and associated essential criteria based on 
IADI core principles for effective deposit insurance systems will show the 
gaps in the process to compute coverage limits.  
The guide for executing the survey was based upon the work of Check and Schutt 
(2012). The formative theory for deposit insurance was extracted from the literature of 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The guidance for using SPSS statistics in this study was 
guided by Wagner (2016) while the appropriate quantitative statistical methodology was 
based on the work of Warner (2012).  
Summary 
The application of data to determine deposit insurance coverage limits offers a 
framework for enhancing the international standards put forward by the IADI. It has the 
potential to make the deposit insurance systems coverage limits less prone to political ad 
hoc decisions. Despite the advantages that can be obtained from implementing the 
application of statistical data to compute coverage limits, concerns exist about 
governance with regards to the four different types of deposit insurance systems and their 
individual capability and resource capacity to adopt this methodology. This chapter 
illustrated basic knowledge of the deposit insurance coverage limit and the important role 
it plays in financial stability.  
To investigate the possible data sets that can be used to compute coverage limits, I 
conducted a quantitative study drawing on the following theories: Markowitz’s (1952) 
modern portfolio theory; Merton’s (1977) option pricing theory; the BCBS Basel Capital 
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Accords and CAMELS; Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) theory of deposit insurance; 
Madhani’s (2017) resource-dependence theory of corporate governance; and Hanson et 
al.’s (2011) macroprudential and microprudential theory of bank regulations. 
I used Velikova’s (2006) framework by first conducting a multiple regression 
analysis in the pilot study of deposit insurance coverage limit, the dependent variable, 
and four independent variables, namely, bank risk data, the DIF size and its growth rates, 
the DIF size and growth rates of insured deposits, and the level and growth in the DIF’s 
premium. The results may indicate some as possible variables that can be used to 
compute the coverage limit. Following this, I will conduct an ordinal logistic regression 
analysis of IADI members to assess the predictability of the independent variables 
(Warner, 2012). 
In Chapter 2, I present a detailed review of deposit insurance coverage together 
with the theories grounding this study. In Chapter 3, I highlight the research design and 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
While studies in the field of explicit deposit insurance systems have covered a 
broad spectrum of issues, such as premium pricing (Merton,1977), politics according to 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983, as cited by Hogan & Luther, 2014), and risk-based 
premiums (FDIC, 2006) among others, studies specifically related to deposit insurance 
coverage limits and their determination are limited. Manz (2009) focused on optimal 
coverage, and Velikova (2006) looked at coverage limits with regards to moral hazard. 
Based on the studies done by FSB (2012) and IADI (2014), coverage limits play a key 
role in limiting depositors’ propensity to make simultaneous and significant deposit 
withdrawals and at the same time constrain bankers’ risk-taking behaviors in how they 
conduct their business of banking. In Kleftouri’s (2015) perspective, the deposit 
insurance coverage limit is the most significant and technically challenging element for 
policy makers in the design and implementation process of an explicit deposit insurance 
system.  
From a broader topical perspective, explicit deposit insurance remains a 
contentious matter among scholars and policy makers (Hogan & Johnson, 2016). 
Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002, as cited by Hogan & Johnson, 2016) found that 
“explicit insurance makes banking crises more likely and that countries with highest 
coverage limits in the sample. … are five times more fragile than countries that impose 
the lowest coverage limits” (p. 438). When the coverage limit is factored into the analysis 
of explicit systems, the view is that a higher coverage limit is associated with higher 
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moral hazard where bankers take on more risk that leads to increased bank failures 
(Hogan & Johnson, 2016). Like explicit systems in general, there is apparently no 
consensus on coverage limits. In a subsequent study on moral hazard, Velikova (2006) 
suggested that while changes in the real coverage limit are related to insured bank 
deposits and the potential demands on the DIF, the changes are not associated with 
deviations in bank risks, which intuitively intensify the moral hazard debate.  
Although the deposit insurance system has existed since the 1930s, with the FDIC 
in the United States being the first established system spanning a period of approximately 
85 years, the application of industry statistics by past deposit insurance systems fund 
managers, and more recently by IADI members’ fund managers to compute their deposit 
insurance coverage limits appears to be lacking and needs to be addressed (FSB, 2012). 
This observation was noted following the involuntary actions taken by fund managers 
and governments to raise their deposit insurance coverage limits in response to the 2007–
2008 global financial crisis (FSB, 2012). The specific problem is that it remains unclear 
what data IADI members’ fund managers use to compute coverage limits for deposit 
insurance systems, which can promote the ineffectiveness deposit insurance systems and 
instability of financial systems during banking crises or normal distress periods (FSB, 
2012). The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine whether the usage of 
industry statistical data, such as aggregate bank risk data, fund size, aggregate value of 
insured deposits, and premium levy, by IADI members’ fund managers to derive their 
deposit insurance coverage limits could potentially lead to more objective, crisis-resilient 
coverage limits.  
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The availability of literature on the application of industry data to derive deposit 
insurance coverage limits is extremely sparse. Notwithstanding this limitation, I used the 
published material from the IMF and the BCBS. To clarify the importance of using 
industry data to derive coverage limits, I highlight the experiences of coverage limit 
changes by the FDIC, one of IADI’s members, from its inception to 2019. Information in 
the broader arena on deposit insurance coverage limits, where available, was used to add 
depth and balance. In this chapter, I provide a background on Diamond and Dybvig’s 
(1983, as cited by Hogan & Luther, 2014) theory of deposit insurance, incorporating 
illustrative changes in the deposit insurance coverage limits of the FDIC since its 
inception; linkages to the theory of banking supervision related to the BCBS 
microprudential and macroprudential bank regulatory guidance/practices as well as the 
BCBS 29 core principles for banking supervision and the data sets that these processes 
generate, which can be used to either establish or guide the determination of coverage 
limits; the resource-dependence theory of corporate governance which supports the 
argument that the board should source key inputs by interacting with the external 
environment (Madhani, 2017). Merton’s (1977) option pricing theory together with 
Markowitz’s (1952) modern portfolio theory were adopted to emphasize the application 
of data to either assess the credit risk of corporate debt or to maximize returns on a 
portfolio simultaneously. The findings could potentially lead to the derivation of more 
objective, politically neutral, and perhaps more actuarial representative deposit insurance 
coverage limits around the world, which may lower the probability of depositor panic 
runs and mitigate moral hazard. 
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Literature Search Strategy 
In my literature search, I used the following online databases to obtain peer-
reviewed articles and industry research papers published within the last 5 years: ProQuest 
Central, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global, Scholar Works, Business Source 
Complete, Dissertations & Theses Walden University, IMF, BCBS, FSI, FDIC, EBSCO, 
Thoreau Walden University Library, ERIC, and PsycINFO. The following search terms 
were used: deposit insurance, coverage limits, bank risk, bank runs, bank failures, 
banking crises, instrumentation, predictors of bank failure, corporate governance, 
modern portfolio, option pricing theory, statistics in insurance, theories of financial 
regulation, theories of financial regulation. BIS, CAMELS, risk based premium pricing, 
and optimal deposit insurance. 
The literature review incorporates seminal literature to build on the concept of 
data use in deriving coverage for life and general insurance as well as the compatibility 
with deposit insurance. Peer-reviewed journals were included and focused on theories of 
deposit insurance, options pricing, modern portfolio, bank regulation, and resource-
dependent governance. Research material on the derivation of deposit insurance coverage 
limits were limited and reliance was placed on dissertations and conference proceedings. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Deposit Insurance Theory 
Banks’ funding or liquidity is primarily sourced from depositors, which 
fundamentally exposes such an institution to panics or bank runs (Dijk, 2017). Diamond 
and Dybvig, (1983) argued that deposit insurance functions as a key mechanism for 
40 
 
mitigating depositor behavior associated with panic-based bank runs and by extension 
bank failures (as cited by Hogan & Luther, 2014). Alternatively, other scholars took a 
diametrically opposing perspective that deposit insurance increases moral hazard and 
consequently increases bank failures Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002, as cited by Hogan 
& Johnson, 2016). Bédard (2016) noted that using an option clause, “a bank could, at its 
discretion, pay the bearer of its notes within 6 months rather than immediately, 
compensating him by paying what was then the maximum interest rate allowed by usury 
laws” (p. 287–288). This perspective reflects an alternative to deposit insurance (Bédard, 
2016). The concept of a deposit insurance coverage limit underlies these two views 
because the presence of deposit insurance, whether in the form of an explicit amount or 
full coverage guarantees, does influence either depositor or banker behavior.  
Deposit insurance, as posited by Calomiris and Jaremski (2016), is premised on 
two theoretical constructs: an economic and a political framework. In both instances, 
theories have been put forward to explain the formation and growth of bank liability 
insurance. The liability in banks arises mainly from the borrowing of short-term funds 
from depositors at given interest rates.  Decisions are executed to lend the same funds 
long term at higher interest rates to generate income—a maturity mismatch or liquidity 
risk that is a fundamental feature of banking (Dijk, 2017). 
The economic slant is based on Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983, as cited by Hogan 
& Luther, 2014) theory that explains that deposit liability provides for a more cost-
effective source of liquidity to banks, which limits or restricts systemic liquidity risk 
(Calomiris & Jaremski, 2016). In Diamond and Dybvig’s view, deposit insurance 
41 
 
nullifies liquidity risk posed by depositors who may withdraw their funds in the event of 
a bank run and the losses bankers incur from liquidating their longer-term investments to 
satisfy the unexpected short-term large depositors’ demands. The use of deposit insurance 
makes the early depositors who withdraw their funds from their banks independent of 
other depositors eliminating their motivation to engage in a run. 
Scholars have critiqued the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model on the grounds 
that banks’ liability that makes up the short-term component can be substituted for 
longer-term liability in the form of bonds or equity to finance their investments, 
according to Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988, as cited by Calomiris & Jaremski, 2016). 
Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002, as cited by Hogan & Johnson, 2016) argued that deposit 
insurance increases the probability of bank failure and, by extension, depositors’ loss 
through increased risk taking on the part of bankers, otherwise known as the moral 
hazard principle. 
The political theory of deposit insurance, according to Calomiris and Jaremski 
(2016), is based on the principle that deposit insurance is designed to favor “a winning 
coalition of bankers, depositors, and also borrowers” (p. 7). This theory incorporates the 
principle that there is a strong association between deposit insurance and prudential 
regulation produced by the political equilibrium (Calomiris & Jaremski, 2016). Given 
that prudential regulation relates to the oversight of banks, the political theory 
necessitates that consistency must exist between prudential regulation and deposit 
insurance to ensure that risky lending to politically favored borrowers is not 
compromised (Calomiris & Jaremski, 2016). The persistent unsuccessful or ineffective 
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use of regulation in Calomiris and Jaremski’s view supports the political argument that 
deposit insurance is set up to provide a government grant. The IMF (2014) agreed with 
this perspective, noting that,  
Country authorities and financial regulators reacted to the extraordinary 
circumstances of the crisis (2007/2008) by expanding the coverage offered in 
existing deposit insurance arrangements or adopting deposit insurance where it 
was not already in place. This pattern of policy response the adverse distributional 
effects of generous schemes and underscored the strengths and weaknesses of 
different DIS features. (p. 3)  
Put Option Theory to Price Deposit Insurance Premium 
Merton (1977) saw parallels between the elements of pricing deposit insurance 
and those of a put option and pursued the opportunity to use option pricing theory 
together with the Black Scholes (1973) model (as cited by Chinwe, 2018) to derive the 
cost of deposit insurance premium. A put is an option contract that provides the writer 
with the choice, but not the commitment, to sell an underlying asset at a specific price, 
referred to as the exercise or strike price, at a precise time (Chinwe, 2018). The writer of 
a put option anticipates a decline in the price of the underlying asset, the exercise price, 
while the buyer of the put option expects an increase (Chinwe, 2018). If the price of the 
underlying asset increases relative to the strike price, then the value of the put option will 
decline (Chinwe, 2018). The same principle applies as the option approaches the 
expiration date. Alternatively, if the price of the underlying asset declines, then value of 
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the put option will appreciate (Chinwe, 2018). Put options are prepared or used for assets 
such as commodities and stocks.  
Scholars have raised the question in terms of the modality that should be used to 
price deposit insurance. A suggested approach was that “the price should reflect the risk 
that the bank presents to the deposit insurance system” (FDIC, 2000, p.6). The concept of 
the put option has embedded risks which suggest that its price can increase, decrease or 
remain unchanged depending on the direction certain factors in the environment take 
which supports the parallel for its use to price deposit insurance. Bank risks in terms of 
probable exposures to failure, loss of earnings, liquidity strains and so on like put option 
can follow a similar pattern necessitating the consideration of certain factors to determine 
the deposit insurance premium price.  
The Black Scholes (1973) model that Merton (1977) deployed to value an 
European put option on stocks required specific data namely an interest rate, the exercise 
price, the current stock price, the duration of time up to expiration, and the variance rate 
on the stock price (Merton, 1977). The main assumption of the Black Scholes model, 
which contributes to a weakness, is that the underlying stock volatility remains fixed 
throughout the duration of the option contract (Chinwe, 2018). Notwithstanding this 
limitation, practitioners, including the FDIC, applied the principle to deposit insurance. 
To establish the premium pricing for the FDIC using the option pricing methodology, 
considered several factors such as bank supervisory ratings based on CAMELS, bank risk 
differentiation profiles, financial reports, credit ratings and subordinated debt among 
others all of which constitute statistical industry data (FDIC, 2000). 
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From an insurance theoretical perspective in Valentino’s (1954) view, the deposit 
insurance premium price is connected to the deposit insurance coverage limit as the key 
funding source to meet pay-outs to depositors consistent with the overall design of the 
deposit insurance system (IADI, 2014). It is against this backdrop and following the same 
logic of pricing premium based on the concept of put options Merton (1977) that the 
deposit insurance coverage limit should be determined using the same principle of 
incorporating industry statistical data (FDIC, 2000). 
Yhere is some merit in Merton’s (1977) application of the Black Scholes (1973) 
model that allows for derivation of the deposit insurance premium. One mismatch with 
the model though is that deposits held in the banking system are not homogeneous as 
there is a myriad of variation in the deposit amounts as well as the respective maturity 
dates in any given bank which would be a constraint in the full application of the Black 
Scholes model (Merton, 1977). Apart from this disparity, the model necessitates the use 
of data to compute the premium and while there is no apparent model yet in the literature 
to derive coverage limits for deposit insurance, the process suggests a dependency on the 
use of data inputs. 
Modern Portfolio Theory  
Modern portfolio theory (MPT), as posited by Markowitz’s (1952) was built on 
the mean-variance model to guide risk-averse investors to construct their investment 
portfolios in a manner that will optimize expected returns while recognizing a certain 
level of market risk (as cited by Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, 2016). The Markowitz theory 
incorporated the philosophy that an efficient frontier exists containing an optimal 
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portfolio of assets selected risk-averse investors to generate maximum expected returns 
for a given level of risk (as cited by Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, 2016). Each asset in the 
portfolio has a history of variance of returns which investors use to estimate the securities 
risks. At the portfolio level, investors select the preferred assets and pursue a 
diversification strategy through a combination of the assets’ related variances and 
covariances. Put another way, investors treat with overall portfolio risk by considering 
the correlation and the impact of combined asset risk on the portfolio. 
Markowitz’s (1952) MPT came under major criticism during the 2007/2008 
global financial crisis notwithstanding the general identified limitations of assumptions of 
trades with no transaction cost, unimpeded liquidity, the persistent availability of risk-
free investment options in the market and the existence of investors who make decisions 
in the best interest of the system (Lyndeberg, 2016; Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, 2016). 
The buildup to the crisis conflicted with rational decision makers and during the crisis 
liquidity came to a halt exposing Markowitz’s MPT to questions (Lyndeberg, 2016; 
Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, 2016).  
While the deposit insurance coverage limit does not specifically represent an asset 
in a DIF portfolio, its coverage level and affordability in terms of capacity to meet 
depositors’ reimbursements when a bank fails is inextricably linked to the capacity of the 
fund to pay, returns generated from the collection of premium from banks; the investment 
income derived from the placement of such funds in specified assets; and the amount 
reimbursed to depositors in the event of member banks failure or financial distress. The 
major challenge with the application of Markowitz’s (1952) MPT to the IADI members’ 
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investment objectives is that diversification may be limited (Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, 
2016). The rationale for this is that the investment objects are defined in their legislation 
which has a tendency to be risk averse, focus primarily on protecting the principal of the 
DIF through investments in government paper (IADI, 2014).  
The capacity of a DIF to meet a specific coverage limit is therefore tied 
actuarially to the net growth of the fund (Valentino, 1954). This principle is not dissimilar 
to those associated with the actuarial science principle applied to other types of insurance 
such as the life and general insurance and their respective funds. 
Resource-Dependent Governance Theory 
Madhani’s (2017) resource-dependent governance theory is premised on board 
decisions that can be implemented to achieve optimal performance through the 
establishment of the appropriate links between a firm and the key resource requirements 
(Chidziva, 2016; Fauziah et al., 2012). The board should comprise directors that can 
provide the firm with options to collect data and build relationships to move the 
organization in to the realm of maximum performance (Chidziva, 2016; Fauziah et al., 
2012). Interaction with the external environment is deemed to be a key strategy that 
board members can deploy to gain access critical resources (Madhani, 2017).  
Interdependencies exist between organizations, a classic example being that of 
which exist between IADI members and their bank regulatory counterparts (IADI, 2014). 
The resource dependent theory allows IADI members to influence and control their 
interdependencies with bank regulators to access more industry data such as the 
CAMELS for purposes of deriving data-driven coverage limits. According to the FSB 
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(2012) Recommendation 2, there are two key elements that the boards IADI member 
deposit insurance systems can strategically tap into namely, “adjusting the DIA (Deposit 
Insurance Agency) governance arrangements to ensure adequate public oversight and to 
mitigate the potential for conflicts of interest,” (p. 36) and “formalizing information 
sharing and coordination arrangements between the DIA, other safety-net participants 
and foreign DIAs” (p. 36).  
The role of corporate governance in strengthening stability of the financial system 
has also not gone unnoticed by the BCBS. Following the 2007/2008 global financial 
crisis, BCBS (2017) recognized the import of incorporating governance into the revised 
core principles for effective bank supervision one element of which focuses the 
governance of supervisory stress testing. The objective is twofold: (a) to develop bank 
supervisory capability to develop a framework for stress testing supervisory execution of 
assessments of bank data, and (b) to use the bank supervisory role to impart stress testing 
knowledge to the banks so that the banks can develop their own models and do their own 
stress testing (BCBS, 2017).  
Explicit deposit insurance systems within the IADI grouping adopt different 
corporate governance modalities which tend to be linked to their mandates as well as 
ownership. According to IADI (2014), there are four different mandate-types of deposit 
insurance systems, namely pay-box, pay-box plus, loss minimizer and risk minimizer 
where only the latter two are more likely to have access to bank data to derive coverage 
limits through their respective mandates. Some IADI member deposit insurance systems 
are privately owned collectively by bankers in their respective jurisdictions while others 
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are government-owned (IADI, 2014). The pay-box and the pay-box plus deposit 
insurance systems with the IADI may have restricted access to key bank data held by 
central banks/bank regulators while the others, namely the loss minimizer and risk 
minimizer may have unrestricted access such as the FDIC (IADI, 2014). The FSB’s 
recommendations do not make a distinction between the IADI members which possess 
four different mandate types and as such this mechanism offers a strategic opportunity for 
the boards of the IADI members to leverage data that can be used to compute industry 
data-informed deposit insurance coverage limits (IADI, 2014). 
Theory of Insurance 
Although the theory of insurance may be absent from the application of deposit 
insurance in its current format, it does have some parallels which may allow for 
consistency in some or perhaps many aspects of its functionality. Valentino (1954) 
attempted to apply the theory of insurance to the field of deposit insurance as an insurable 
risk using the following criteria to determine insurable risks: 
 A large, homogeneous group of exposure units, permitting accurate 
prediction of average loss through the use of the law of large numbers 
 Definite loss 
 Accidental loss 
 Avoidance of the catastrophe hazard 
 Large loss 
 Economically reasonable cost  
Utilizing the FDIC as a case for his study, Valentino (1954) concluded that 
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Our examination of the Federal deposit insurance program’ reveals that it is an 
insurance system which conforms with most of the requirements of an insurable 
risk at least as well and in some cases better than other widely-accepted insurance 
systems, thus, placing the program in a more favorable light relative to the State 
deposit guaranty funds. (p.261)  
Based on these findings which revealed parity with other types of insurance such as life, 
fire, accident and health, the effort of IADI fund managers to use coverage limits in 
deposit insurance field without the application of appropriate industry statistics suggest a 
major weakness in the industry. 
Bank Regulation Theory 
Following the pioneering work of Markowitz (1952), several measures of risk was 
introduced into the literature (Amarante, 2016; Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, 2016). One 
such example was the measures developed by the BCBS through the use of CAMELS. 
Theoretically, the BIS has advocated that bank capital plays a key role in bank regulation 
(Aiyar, Calomiris, & Wieladek, 2015). This has led to the development of BASEL I, a set 
of international core principles that central banks use to regulate banks. John, Saunders, 
and Senbet (2000) argued that bank regulation that is based on capital ratio needs as well 
as asset constraints identified in Basel I, does not adequately control bankers’ risk-taking 
behavior. The BIS’ CAMELS mechanism for assessing bankers’ risks possess limitations 
since asset restrictions, for example, may negatively affect bankers’ options to invest. In 
John et al.’s (2000) opinion, greater results in terms of mitigating bankers’ risk-taking 
behavior will be obtained by targeting the bank management compensation schemes. 
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 The Basel I accord was one of the initial building-block theories of banking 
regulation/supervision which was based on the ideology that bank capital was considered 
as a major buffer to a bank’s potential demise. In the BCBS’s (2017) perspective, the 
higher a bank’s capital, the lower the probability of failure. Capital adequacy was a key 
metric that was and continues to be used by bank regulators.  
The Basel I accord was subsequently superseded by Basel II and III accords as 
different epics of financial distress occurred at varying levels of magnitude in separate 
regions/jurisdictions around the world. During the period 1970–2017, there were 151 
banking crises including the Tequila crisis (Mexico, 1994–2000), the Asian crisis 
(Thailand 1996–2001) and the United States crisis (2007–2009), among others 
(Anderson, 2016; Laeven & Valencia, 2008). The Basel II Accord, which was an 
expansion of Basel I, was centered on three main points: minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory review of an institution’s capital adequacy and internal assessment process, 
and the effective use of disclosure as a lever to strengthen market discipline and 
encourage sound banking practices including supervisory review (BCBS, 2012).  
Immediately following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, the BCBS opted to 
improve the accords based on certain areas of perceived contributory weakness namely 
poor governance and risk management, inappropriate incentive structures and an 
overleveraged banking industry. In the Basel III Accord, the very large banks that were 
considered to have systemic implications for a financial system sometimes referred to as 
“too big to fail” was the main focal point. Basel III has gone through several stages. The 
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implementation of Basel III has been gradual and began in January 2013. It is expected to 
be completed by January 1, 2019. 
One of the fundamental off-shoots of the Basel accords was the access to and 
retrieval of bank data from the banking system by the bank regulators/central banks 
supported by the efforts of the BCBS, consistent with its release of 29 core principles for 
effective banking supervision (BCBS, 2012). These standards which represent the basic 
standards for sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks have been, and 
continue to be, used to assess and monitor the viability and exposures of the regulated 
banks (BCBS, 2012). The main focus of these standards is risk-based supervision and 
incorporates, among other items, market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, credit risk, 
capital adequacy and corporate governance (BCBS, 2012). Bank regulatory tools include 
the use of on-site and off-site bank supervision plus risk-based bank supervision. In these 
regulatory interventions key data is generated on the banking sector which, if accessible, 
can be used by the deposit insurance systems to not only price the insurance premium but 
derive deposit insurance coverage limits. There is evidence to support this proposition: in 
1994, the FDIC introduced risk-based premium pricing using the CAMELS system and 
financial ratios as its basis (FDIC, 2000). 
The theory of banking regulation as advocated by the proponents of the Basel 
accords came under further stress and this led to the introduction of microprudential and 
macroprudential theories. Microprudential theory focused on regulating banks with 
greater emphasis on protecting against the potential for costly financial distress that can 
be caused by the very large asset-based financial institutions referred to as systemically 
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important financial institutions (SIFIs) or globally systemic important banks (G-SIBs) 
(Hanson et al., 2011). Alternatively, macroprudential theory is more broad based which 
provides regulatory protection related to threats to banks of any asset size that emanate 
from policy decisions pursued by governments and how such choices could expose the 
banks to failure or financial distress (Hanson et al., 2011). Following the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis there was apparent consensus among scholars that the pre-2007-
2008 crisis microprudential approach to bank regulation was lacking and should be 
replaced by the macroprudential methodology. It appears that the protracted low interest 
rate policy adopted by the government to expand home ownership in the United States 
which scholars and policy makers admitted was the main contributor to the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis set the ideology and framework for this change towards the 
macroprudential regulatory practice (Bitros, 2015; Calomiris & Jaremski, 2016; Hanson, 
et al., 2011). 
This philosophical shift suggests the need for the policymakers, bank regulators to 
consider new data in their supervisory dimension/efforts. The BCBS microprudential 
CAMELS’ system emanating from the Basel Capital Accord or Basel I, Basel II and 
Basel III from 1988, 1997 and 2013 respectively as well as the 29 core principles or 
international standards in 1997 for regulating banks appear to be lacking (BCBS 2012; 
Hanson et al., 2011).  
Deposit Insurance Coverage Limits 




The diagram indicates that the real value of coverage was much lower during the 
first 30 years or so of the FDIC’s operation, but the CPI’s (consumer price index) 
only one guage, and other measures show a different result. For example, 
although I don’t have a picture for this, the $5,000 coverage limit in 1935 was 
almost 10 times per capita income at that time, while the $100,000 limit today is 
just over three times per capita income. (Tanoue et al., 2000, p. 48)  
Prior to the increase to $100,000 in 1980, the FDIC’s coverage limit stood at $40,000 and 
when the question why such an increase arose in the discussions, no supporting data was 
provided. The discussions made reference to measures such as the consumer price index 
(CPI) and the number of times per capita income.  
The IMF (2014) in its review of deposit insurance noted that coverage limits 
following the occurrence of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis were consistently above 
the pre-crisis levels which seemingly appeared to be potentially problematic. These post 
crisis coverage levels suggest some disconnection between the limits and the data to 
support the limits. Approximately 14 years prior to this IMF report, there was apparent 
concerns about the coverage limit, the effects of changes in the coverage limit, and the 
need to use data to adjust and track its levels such was the case with the FDIC.  
During the FDIC’s Roundtable discussions on April 2, 2000, the third item tabled 
focused on how to provide the right level of insurance coverage (FDIC, 2000). The 
consumer price index (CPI) was the main criterion used in the deliberations to assess the 
real coverage limit, an inflation principle grounded in economic theory as stated by Carns 
(Tanoue et al., 2000). As a measure of comparison, the average level of coverage relative 
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to other jurisdictions in the world that had explicit deposit insurance systems was 
included in the analysis (Tanoue et al., 2000). The consumer perspective in terms of how 
the limit impacted their decisions to place their retirement funds into one or more banks 
was considered (FDIC, 2000). There was an admission that the change from $40,000 to 
$100,000 in 1980 was an error (FDIC, 2000). As a departure from the CPI inference, it 
was posited that coverage is related to the pricing of collected bank balances (FDIC, 
2000). To project the coverage limit, Smith (2000) supported the view that the coverage 
limit should be indexed for future inflation. There were some concerns about the fallout 
associated with the increase in the limit to $100,000. 
The $100,000 coverage limit triggered the S&L crisis in the 1980s (FDIC, 2000) 
as thrifts could not compete with banks for deposits as a source of funds given the rapid 
rise in interest rates (FDIC, 2000). There were some opposing views on the causality of 
the S&L crisis. Other contributory factors were postulated as a change in the tax laws, 
crisis in the oil industry, the decline in the real estate market and in agriculture (Smith / 
FDIC, 2000). Chairman Tanoue, (FDIC 2000) admitted there was uncertainty of savers’ 
and consumers’ behavior in their response to an increase in the coverage limit. Although 
it was admitted that there was no collected statistical information to prove that depositors 
moved their deposits around from the small community banks to the larger “too big to 
fail” banks during periods of uncertainty, it was admitted that there was a sense or 
awareness that depositors did transfer their deposits to the larger banks when depositors’ 
perceived the presence of increased risk to the banking system (FDIC, 2000). It was 
confirmed that enough information on deposits existed in various databases to do analysis 
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but the statistical analyses were not done at that point (FDIC, 2000). In light of the ad hoc 
change in the coverage limit to $250,000 during the 2007/2008 crisis it appears that since 
the FDIC Roundtable discussions in 2000, the FDIC has not tapped and or used statistical 
data to derive changes in its deposit insurance coverage limit.  
In a study of 105 countries spanning the period 1981 to 2008, Guo (2012) 
examined the extent to which deposit insurance generosity leads to financial systemic 
risk. The generosity in this instance is a metric derived by the formula of “the effective 
deposit coverage limit to GDP per capita ratio”(p.4). While this measure does not 
represent a method to derive the coverage limit, intuitively it provides insights into the 
coverage limit level. Comparatively, this method is consistent with the IMF’s approach to 
setting the coverage limit in the absence of a scholarly model. 
The findings revealed that a reasonable and fair increase in the deposit insurance 
coverage generosity could possibly mitigate systemic risk while an excess in the 
generosity can potentially lead to a rise in systemic risk. This metric while workable as 
metric to set coverage limits it does appear to have some weaknesses. GDP per capita 
may have income distribution distortionary effects which may not adequately encompass 
the ‘small unsophisticated depositor. The metric does not include specifics about the 
scope of the coverage including the types of deposit that are eligible for coverage. 
Apart from the concept of generosity, coverage limit can be viewed from the 
perspective of mitigating inefficiencies in the banking system. Manz (2009) postulated 
that there is an optimal coverage limit that can overcome bank runs, bank managers’ 
excessive risk-taking behavior and tendency of depositors to make substandard or 
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choices. In Manz’s view notwithstanding the existence of several stages of equilibria, the 
coverage limit can reach an optimal level. To support his argument, Manz considered a 
“global game model of a bank that is financed by a continuum of small depositors subject 
to (partial) deposit insurance, by a large uninsured lender, and by a bank owner” (p. 2). In 
a similar stance to the FSB (2012), Manz contended that scholar papers on deposit 
insurance coverage levels are quite limited and current theories provide little or no 
assistance in the determination of an ideal partial deposit insurance coverage.  
Diamond and Dybvig (1983, as cited by Hogan & Luther, 2014) claimed that the 
presence of government deposit insurance systems nullifies bank runs as it can impose a 
tax on the system to meet depositor withdrawals and this guarantee creates a disincentive 
for depositors to run – the costless argument. If this supposition is taken at face value 
then it negates the existence of an optimal coverage limit as espoused by Manz (2009). 
Only one of the equilibria in Manz’s model exists which is the sole positive equilibrium. 
In reality though, there is some contradiction as the FDIC has had several coverage limits 
and encountered bank runs since its establishment in 1933.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) conducted a study on explicit deposit 
insurance systems during the period 1980-1997 that covered 61 countries. While the 
investigation did not focus specifically on coverage limits the scholars opined that the 
implementation of deposit insurance can possibly lead to banking crises (Demirguc-Kunt 
& Detragiache, 2002). The proximity of their findings to coverage limits rests with the 
further extrapolation of their conclusions when they pointed out that the higher the 
coverage limits the greater is impact of instability on the banking system particularly 
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where the deposit insurance system is operated by the government (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 2002). Banking fragility follows a similar trend with increases in the 
coverage limits. Ngalawa, Tchana, and Viegi (2016) disagreed with this position and 
noted that full deposit insurance tends to neutralize depositors’ inclination to run. Bradley 
(2000, as cited by Hogan &Luther, 2014) agreed with this perspective and posited that 
the increase in the FDIC’s coverage limit from US $40,000 to $100,000 was the main 
factor that contributed to the US Savings and Loans crisis in the 1980s and 1990s. During 
the period 1980-1994, as many as 2,912 federally insured depository institution with a 
total asset base amounting to $924 billion failed (FDIC, 1998). U.S. taxpayers were 
required to meet the back-up funding gap which amounted to $153 billion (Curry & 
Shibut, 2000; Tanoue et al., 2000).  
Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) raised the question: “can partial deposit 
insurance be effective in mitigating the severity of bank runs?” (p. 2). The authors used a 
dynamic model, a four period bank-run model, in their study to determine the minimum 
level that deposit insurance can be used to reduce the pace at which bank runs take effect. 
This effort represented another search for an optimal level of coverage for deposit 
insurance. 
The Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) application of the game model produced 
three outcomes: (a) entities that have information can trigger laboratory bank-run 
behavior, (b) bank deposits remain in the banking system over a longer period if insider 
information is present, (c) the existence of partial deposit insurance can restrict the rate at 
which depositors withdraw their funds from their banks and by extension neutralize the 
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extremity of bank runs, and (d) the forces at work and magnitude of depositors’ 
withdrawals is closely linked to the condition of the economy at the time of a crisis. The 
use of game theory in Schotter and Yorulmazer’s study did not generate a coverage limit 
in the policy application of deposit insurance. While the outcomes may appear limited in 
terms of its application to compute coverage limits, the results did possess underlying 
data inputs. 
Cooper and Ross (2002) hinted at the depiction of an optimal coverage limit for 
deposit insurance which was based on putting the depositor in a realm of indifference 
between monitoring and not monitoring their banks. The banks had the option to invest in 
safe liquid or risky illiquid and the optimal coverage limit and the greater the adequacy of 
the bank’s capital the less there is a need for government deposit insurance (Cooper & 
Ross, 2002). While Cooper and Ross’s approach does not identify with the need to use 
statistical data for computing the coverage limit, it does however intuitively points to a 
balance between the provision of deposit insurance and the concept of moral hazard. In 
simple terms, partial deposit insurance is required to reduce depositors’ propensity to run 
on their banks. Coupled with the presence of partial deposit insurance, Cooper and Ross 
argued that banks should be required to hold adequate capital to mitigate the moral 
hazard that comes with deposit insurance.  
The notion of adequacy of bank equity capital according to Cooper and Ross 
(2002) should be adjusted to as the economic environment changes. The idea seems 
consistent with the need for the banks to have access to capital equity to treat with their 
potential exposure in the event of changes in the economic environment. Although not 
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explicit, Cooper and Ross hinted at the need to incorporate the risk exposures of banks to 
derive deposit insurance coverage limits suggesting the need for statistical data to arrive 
at a better coverage limit figure and arrangement.  
The idea posited by Cooper and Ross (2002) demonstrate two apparent 
weaknesses. In the first case, the capacity of banks to adjust equity capital could be 
onerous since raising equity capital funds on a stock market may not be an easy and 
simple undertaking. Another related point is the cost to approach the capital market and 
raise equity funds. The cost could be burdensome and act as a disincentive to banks. Not 
all banks are publicly owned and this could restrict privately owned banks from 
approaching the stock market to raise equity capital. 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) examined the effects of deposit insurance 
coverage limits on bank stability. They argued that the greater the expansion in the 
deposit insurance coverage the higher the possibility that banking stability can become 
more fragile and perhaps negatively impacted. Pushing this argument further, Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache contended that systemic banking crises can occur at increased 
frequencies when bankers in different banks engage in business ventures that are highly 
interrelated and interconnected. This view appears consistent with the factors that led to 
the 2007/2008 global financial crisis as espoused by Bitros (2015). Reduced market 
discipline was deemed to be the main conduit for banking distress (Demirgüc-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 2002). The conclusion drawn by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) 
was supported by a study they conducted on explicit deposit insurance systems that 
covered 61 countries that spanned the period 1980 to 1997. 
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Velikova (2006) took a stakeholder view to explain the differences in coverage 
limits that exist in different countries. The distinctions related to the proportion of high 
risk banks in a banking system (Velikova, 2006). According to Velikova, “coverage is 
higher in countries where banks with relatively low capital-to-asset ratios constitute a 
larger share of the banking system” (p. 60). Banks with low capital-to-asset ratios fund 
their assets using mainly debt and this ratio is used by bank regulators to assess to assess 
banks’ capacity to absorb losses. Velikova investigated the impact of various variables on 
the coverage limit in 64 countries with explicit systems across the globe including 
demographic, social, economic, financial, and political. The model used by Velikova’s 
(stated that coverage limit was a function of income across countries in terms of GDP per 
capita (U.S. dollars), bank size in terms of total assets as a percentage of GDP, political 
rights ratings, life expectancy, the percentage of urban population, the international rating 
applied to the ten largest banks, the average number of years of political institutions’ 
openness during the period 1990-1999, and interbank deposits as a dummy variable. 
The findings revealed the following: personal income level had a substantial 
influence on coverage limits in that high personal income countries had higher coverage 
limits. Bank size was deemed to statistically significant with negative results which 
showed that countries in which the contribution by banking sector to GDP was greater, 
the higher the coverage limit. Countries with bank-based systems carried lower coverage 
limits relative to countries with capital market-based systems. Countries with longer life 
expectancy displayed higher coverage limits. The political ratings variable indicated 
statistical significance which showed that the more democratic a country profile the lower 
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the coverage limit. The income and bank size variables were both statistically significant 
which indicated that countries with more developed banking systems coupled with 
increased wealth the higher their coverage limits. The variable life expectancy showed 
that countries which had a longer life expectancy possessed higher coverage limits. The 
political rights ratings showed statistical significance with regards to coverage limits. The 
countries that had more democratic systems had lower coverage limits and the obverse 
was true for countries that were more autocratic. Velikova (2006) set the framework for 
the inclusion of statistical data to derive deposit insurance coverage limits. 
The FDIC’s Historical Coverage Limit Changes 
The FDIC was established in 1934 and started with a coverage limit of $2,500 
with a commencement date of January 1, 1934 (FDIC 2000). This limit, according to 
Bradley (2000, as cited by Hogan & Luther, 2014) was guided and supported by two 
criteria: (a) the U.S. Postal Savings System which had the backing of the U.S. 
government with a savings limit of savings of $2,500; and (b) the proposition of $2,500 
was a form of settlement between two strong opposing views, namely the bankers who 
did not want, and more likely could not afford, full coverage and depositors who wanted 
full protection for their deposits. It appears that in 1933 a crude and unsophisticated 
approach was adopted: to count the number of deposit accounts in the banking system 
which had the same value. The investigation revealed that 97% of deposit accounts held 
balances that were less than $2,500 (Hogan & Luther, 2014). Given the close 
approximation to the 100% in terms of coverage, this apparent fact drove the policy 
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decision to commence with the ‘temporary’ deposit insurance coverage limit of $2,500 
(FDIC, 2000).  
Table 1 
 
FDIC’s Coverage Limits 1933–2018 
Year Insurance coverage 
limit dollar amount 
Insurance coverage 
limit change dollar amount 
2009 250,000 150,000 
1980 100,000 60,000 
1974 40,000 20,000 
1969 20,000 5,000 
1966 15,000 5,000 
1950 10,000 5,000 
1935 5,000 2,500 
1934 2,500  
Source: FDIC 2016 Annual Report, VII Appendices. 
 
Since that exercise in 1933 to establish FDIC’s coverage limit, not much has 
changed for many deposit insurance systems around the world. Some effort was made to 
get and use bank industry data to derive a coverage limit figure. However, one major 
short-coming with the FDIC’s methodology in 1933 was that the $2,500 was derived at 
the back end of financial crisis of epic proportion, namely the great depression (Hogan 
and Luther, 2014). The process to arrive at the $2,500 appears not to have been based on 
the risk profile of the banks in the industry, the FDIC’s Fund balance and its capacity to 
make reimbursements to depositors, the rate of growth in deposit liabilities over the 
previous 5-year cycle perhaps 1928-1933, and the insurance premium to be applied to the 
FDIC member banks and that premium capacity to build the FDIC’s fund.  
The FDIC fund commenced with a total of $289 million representing a 
subscription of $150 million from the US Treasury Department plus a Federal Reserve 
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Bank fund injection amounting to $139 million (FDIC, 2000). It is possible that had the 
policymakers applied such industry statistics, the then starting coverage limit figure of 
$2,500, even though a temporary one, may have been not only different but more 
representative of key bank industry variables. This perspective is supported by the fact 
that on August 31, 1935 the temporary system was extended and the coverage limit was 
increased to $5,000 (Hogan & Luther, 2014). 
Hogan and Luther (2014) examined changes in the FDIC’s coverage limit 1934 – 
2008, the inflationary trends and the impact on the GDP per capita, growth trend in 
insured deposits and total deposits over the period 1934-2010. The results illustrated that 
“upward adjustments to the nominal maximum amount insured per depositor have 
outpaced both inflation and growth in GDP per capita” (Hogan & Luther, 2014, p. 154). 
These findings highlight the disparity between crude and ad hoc changes to the deposit 
insurance coverage limit and the usage or reliance on bank industry statistical data to 
derive such coverage limits. 
After 15 years, the Congress increased the FDIC coverage limit from $5,000 to 
$10,000 in 1950 and this upward adjustment appears to have been supported using some 
industry data (FDIC, 2000). The increase was buoyed by the Federal Reserve Board 
claims of the increase in wholesale prices and the increase in the number of depositors 
(FDIC, 2000). The Treasury Department added its support for the increase based on their 
opinion of the FDIC’s fund capacity to support the additional expenses (FDIC, 2000). 
The FDIC’s rationale for the increase was based on their assessment of the protection 
afforded to depositors in 1950 relative to 1935 and the FDIC argued the increase in the 
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coverage limit to $10,000 would make percentage of insured depositors indifferent 
between both time points (FDIC, 2000). 
While the 1950 increase in the FDIC’s coverage limit to $10,000 seemingly 
includes elements of industry statistical data, the dependence on protecting the same 
percentage of depositors in 1950 relative to 1935 appeared to be wanting in many 
regards. The FDIC’s inclination to synchronize protection suggests that any errors in 
1935 coverage limit would be automatically carried over to 1950. The question that 
arises: what are the real grounding factors that can or should trigger an increase in the 
coverage limit? Part of the answer to this question according to (U.S. Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency, 1935, 29) is linked to the FDIC’s Chairman’s comments who 
noted that “the greatest risk to the Corporation (FDIC) does not necessarily lie in these 
(small) institutions…It has been demonstrated frequently in recent years that the 
consequences of the failure of a large bank may be more disastrous that the failure of a 
number of small institutions” (FDIC, 2000, p. 10). The term risk was used in 1935 by the 
FDIC Chairman in reference to member banks of the FDIC as an adjunct to increasing 
the coverage limit which intuitively, at a minimum, suggests that such an industry 
statistic, either conscious or unconscious, was a possible consideration for inclusion in 
determining the then limit.  
Approximately 16 years had passed when the Congress raised the FDIC’s 
coverage limit from $10,000 to $15,000, up by $5,000 (FDIC, 2000). The arguments in 
support of the increase were associated with claims that family incomes increase twofold 
from 1950-1966, the U.S. national income in 1966 had surpassed the 1950 metric by 
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more than 100 percent, and personal savings had grown significantly from 1950-1966 
(FDIC, 2000). These are key statistical industry data sets which could have been 
incorporated into a financial model to either derive or send a signal to change the FDIC’s 
coverage limit. No reference is made to the existence of such modelling. 
The following 3 years, 1969, the FDIC coverage limit was increased by another 
$5,000 to $20,000 and the premise put forward by the Congress was to restore confidence 
in the thrift savings and loans institutions (FDIC, 2000). Between 1965 and 1966, savings 
in thrift institutions declined significantly by $5.1 billion which appeared to have linked 
to a transfer funds from the thrift industry to the securities markets in response to a 
sudden and substantial increase in interest rates (FDIC, 2000). Consequently, the 
corollary led to a substantial decline in housing loans. The major apparent weakness with 
this approach was the effort to use the deposit insurance coverage as a tool to woo funds 
back into the thrift industry. 
The next FDIC’s coverage limit change by the congress was executed in 1974 and 
supported by one factor namely a substantial increase in inflation (FDIC, 2000). During 
the run up to the 1974 coverage change the Congress saw the move to increase the limit 
as a mechanism to stave off a potential developing crisis in the banking system (FDIC, 
2000). The increase was conducted to re-instill confidence in the banking system and to 
stimulate personal savings (FDIC, 2000). The foregoing premises appear to be a weak 
framework for not only increasing the FDIC’s coverage limit but to double it from 
$20,000 to $40,000–the first significant change beyond the $5,000 increment. The 
arguments for the increase put forward by the FDIC seem to be not only bereft of 
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industry data to derive the new coverage limit but also conflict with its (the FDIC’s) 
position in 1935 which then advocated greater emphasis on the risk posed by the larger 
institutions. According to the FDIC (2000), “the Corporation (FDIC) viewed the increase 
as a way of putting small bankers on a more equal footing with their competitors” (p.17). 
The questions here are: what did the $40,000 coverage limit represent in terms of the 
number and value of insured deposit balances held by depositors across the banking 
system from 1935 to 1974? What has transpired with regards to both the profiles of 
bankers’ risks and the changes in the capacity of the FDIC’s fund to afford higher 
coverage limits in the context of the then volatile, crisis period? Was it prudent to 
increase the FDIC deposit insurance coverage limit at a time when fears of a banking 
crisis was building in the United States and recognized by the authorities? 
Subsequently, the succeeding increase in the coverage limit came in 1980 from 
$40,000 to $100,000, a time lapse of 6 years (FDIC, 2000). This change had surpassed 
the previous $5,000 and the $10,000 increments and registered the highest historical 
change. According to congress, the increment was significant in terms of value but 
somewhat unscientific, unempirical, irrational and very repetitive with regards to 
countering inflation trends and the need to control the inflows and outflows of deposit 
funds to and out of deposit-taking and noninsured financial institutions (FDIC, 2000). 
The other startling similarity with this coverage increase is that it came coupled with 
congress’s expressed intent to remove the limits that were applied to the maximum 
interest rates and dividends related to the Savings and Loan thrift institutions could use to 
attract deposit funds (FDIC, 2000). It appears that congress was anticipating a major 
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fallout for the removal of the limits and tried to buttress the potential impact with the 
largest increase in the deposit insurance coverage limit since the establishment of the 
FDIC. 
By 2008, the global financial crisis, which originated with the near collapse of the 
US real estate market, had taken a foothold and subsequently morphed into the financial 
markets grounding to a virtual halt in transactions (Bitros, 2015). When Lehman Brothers 
failed, one of the previously categorized too-big-to-fail financial institutions, and other 
large banks, insurance companies came under threat of bankruptcy confidence was 
shaken to the core (Bitros, 2015). To unfreeze the financial markets and to revive lending 
or the availability of money in the system, the U.S. government through the Federal 
Reserve engaged in quantitative easing (Bitros, 2015). This measure was coupled with an 
initial temporary increase in the FDIC’s coverage limit, the single largest increase in the 
history of the FDIC, up by $150,000 from $100,000 to $250,000 in September 2008 with 
a provision to re-instate the previous $100,000 level at some time in the future (FDIC, 
2000). The $250,000 coverage limit, however, was made permanent with the passage of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in July 2010. 
Given the historical changes in the coverage limit since its establishment, it is 
apparent that the FDIC did make reference to an index, the consumer price index (CPI), 
as a means of assessing the position of the depositor at different points in time after the 
changes were made to its coverage limit. This effort seems to suggest that the FDIC’s 
application of industry data to scientifically determine the coverage limit prior to the 
actual implementation of the changes were not done and should be considered going 
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forward. Notwithstanding the FDIC’s application of the CPI, the decision appears to have 
two main shortcomings.  
The CPI appears to be an inadequate measure since it relates to purchasing power 
of the consumers’ income over different time periods and its usage seems to be 
inconsistent with the principles of insurance suggested by Valentino (1954). The usage of 
the CPI is a backward looking indicator and it was not used to forecast the anticipated 
future changes. The FDIC used the CPI to assess the purchasing power of the coverage 
limit position of the consumers several years after the coverage limit was changed. 
Supporting factors in this determination were: the FDIC’s significant change in the 
coverage limit from $40,000 to $100,000 in 1980 may have amplified the level of moral 
hazard possibly increasing bank failures (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 2001; Hooks & 
Robinson, 2002); the coverage limit increase was deemed to exceed what was required to 
protect small depositors (Thomson, 2001). 
An important observation to note is that the FDIC has operated as a risk 
minimizer since its inception (FDIC, 1984: IADI, 2014). This governance model allowed 
the FDIC full legislative access to statistical industry data generated by the insured banks 
that were protected by the FDIC’s fund. The FDIC had the key broad powers to both 
supervise and resolve its financially distressed fund member banks. Notwithstanding 
Valentino’s (1954) contribution the FDIC seemed to have explored the CPI as the main 
single intervention to compare, not compute, their coverage limit. Access to statistical 




Other Jurisdictional Coverage Limit Changes 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) conducted a study on coverage limits that 
covered the period 1980 to 1997 involving 61 countries showed that “results uniformly 
suggest that explicit deposit insurance tends to increase bank fragility, and the more so 
the more extensive is the coverage” (Hogan & Johnson, 2016, p. 438). Another study 
executed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) incorporating 30 countries during the 
period 1990-1997 revealed that “explicit deposit insurance is found to reduce market 
discipline” (p. 397) and also that “a higher coverage limit significantly reduces interest 
rates [paid on deposits] and weakens market discipline” (p. 393).  
Gan and Wang (2013) examined the derivation of an optimal deposit insurance 
coverage limit to mitigate both the moral hazard challenges associated with deposit 
insurance as well as the failure of banks. The study incorporated a partial equilibrium 
model with a FDIC context that considered three specific factors namely the banking 
regulation of capital standards, the market discipline in the form of oversight exercised by 
depositors and the existence of a deposit insurance system (Gan & Wang, 2013). 
Utilizing the theoretical work of Gropp and Vesala (2004) and Manz (2009), Gang and 
Wang formulated a model incorporating full, partial and no deposit insurance with factors 
such as social welfare, optimal coverage limit, risk premium expected return to 
depositors, expected withdrawals, expected return to banks, probabilities of bank failures, 
the FDIC and risky assets. 
The findings revealed the following: that depositor-monitoring is a key necessity 
for an optimal coverage limit; to mitigate bankers’ risk-taking behavior necessitates the 
70 
 
application risk-sensitive premia to member-banks and the adoption of market discipline 
or oversight; the import to recognize the connectivity between changes in the coverage 
limit and the member bank premium to preserve the viability of the DIF; and that low 
income countries have a preference for implementing high coverage limits. 
Gan and Wang’s (2013) references to variables such as the control of bankers’ 
risk-taking behavior, the application of risk sensitive-premia, and the preservation of the 
sustainability DIF points in the direction for the need to apply industry data to change the 
coverage limit changes. Although the Gan and Wang’s model is based on the theories put 
forth by Gropp and Vesala (2004) and Manz (2009), it does offer value for the use of 
industry data to derive coverage limits. The inclusion of bankers’ risk-taking business 
endeavors may add value to the use of data and the application of the appropriate calculus 
to compute the coverage limit as it may illustrate which banks are more exposed to 
failure coupled with the related insured deposits and the amount that the FDIC as the 
deposit insurer may pay-out as deposit insurance. The same principle may apply to the 
risk-premia whereby banks that are charged the higher premia can be deemed to be the 
higher risk banks and by extension the banks that carry a higher probability of failure. 
Gropp and Vesala’s contribution to the theory related to depositor monitoring, market 
discipline and moral hazard does synchronize with computation of coverage limits as it 
supports the partial, explicit deposit insurance systems (Gan & Wang, 2013).  
The support for the use of industry data in the derivation of coverage limits is 
strengthened by Gan and Wang’s (2013) cross-country findings in their study. They 
noted that wealthy countries with GDPs should have moderate coverage limits. 
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Alternatively, Gan and Wang contended that countries with low GDPs should have 
higher coverage limits. The findings incorporated income distribution deficiencies 
illustrating that countries with high income inequality should have a limit that 
compensates depositors with more generous coverage (Gan & Wang, 2013). In 
circumstances where countries enjoy long periods of growth and stability, depositors 
should be afforded higher coverage limits as their tendency to monitor banks switches off 
(Gan & Wang, 2013).  
Although the Gan and Wang’s (2013) study was theoretical based as appose to 
industry statistical data, it did provide a coverage limit figure of $124,000 for the FDIC 
and supplemented this limit with a guide that the United States, as a country, should 
adopt a higher coverage limit. Although this guide may be viewed as nebulous, in Gan 
and Wang’s view, the U.S. country profile fitted one that has the tendency to go through 
long periods of growth and maintains stability.  
Although the Gan and Wang’s (2013) study was theoretical-based as appose to 
industry statistical data reliant, it did provide an optimal FDIC coverage limit of $80,000 
when all three criteria are applied. However, when the cross-country analysis is used 
incorporating a country’s monitoring cost regarding depositors’ oversight of bank-risk 
behaviors, the FDIC’s coverage limit should be $124,000 especially if such costs are 
deemed to be high for depositors. The cross-country results in Gan and Wang’s view 
categorizes the U.S. country profile as one that should carry a higher coverage limit as it 
has experienced long periods of economic growth coupled with financial stability and 
depositor inertia to monitor banks.  
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The question that arises here is: how does the Gan and Wang’s (2013) coverage 
limit ranges between $80,000 and $124,000 stack up against the FDIC’s (2000) coverage 
limit of $250,000? If the Gan and Wang’s theoretical study is used, then the FDIC’s 
coverage limit of $250,000 may be considered too high. The same would apply if the 
U.S. country income profile is used as the actual limit is approximately twice as high as 
the Gan and Wang’s model-generated limit. The main item to note when the Gan and 
Wang’s limits are paired with the FDIC $250,000 coverage limit, is that it appears to be 
out-of-sync with the banking industry statistical bases. 
Gan and Wang’s (2013) cross-country findings suggest the need for another 
statistical data application process regarding coverage limits namely the use of coverage 
limits’ data on a country by country basis to establish comparative coverage limit 
benchmarks. This metric could assist DIFs to be intuitively mindful when their limits are 
either too low or too high, and by extension how exposed their countries are to bank runs.  
Bank Regulation as a Data Source for Deposit Insurers 
While the link may not be direct and or apparent, innately bank regulators and 
supervisors role in the oversight, monitor, and control of the behaviors of bankers can 
limit the quantum and modality of the resolution of financially distressed banks (IADI, 
2014). The more robust and responsive the regulatory framework, the lower the potential 
for bank failures, the lower the frequency of deposit insurance pay-outs and the lesser the 
concerns surrounding the coverage limit regarding depositor reimbursements. To 
emphasize the interconnection between these issues, two key questions must be 
addressed: what were the bank regulatory and supervision factors that may have 
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contributed to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis; and why did governments resort to 
increasing their deposit insurance coverage limits?  
The role of bank regulation and supervision and its contribution to the crisis 
remain highly contentious though as scholars have put forward different perspectives on 
this matter. Hanson et al. (2011) posited that in the 2007-2008 global financial crisis was 
evidence of bank regulatory failure in different jurisdictions around the world. They 
noted that the precrisis regulatory framework was deficient based on the principle that it 
was biased towards a microprudential orientation (Hanson et al., 2011). According to 
Kan and Bagheri (2015), notwithstanding the presence of global banks in many 
jurisdictions, their regulatory frameworks paid little or no attention to the potential 
knock-on effects in the global banking and economic systems. The supervisory 
authorities did not share their experiences and challenges as well as harmonized their 
efforts towards a global solution (Kan & Bagheri, 2015). 
Kim (2016) posited that in the United States there is a change in the bank 
regulatory philosophy following the 2007/2008 crisis. Like Hanson et al. (2011), Kim 
noted that there is a shift from the microprudential regulatory methodology which 
focused on banks holding capital to withstand the pressure of failure to a macroprudential 
approach which attempts to curtail the occurrence of another systemic failure. To 
accomplish this objective, Kim noted that new philosophy, that focuses on the 
larger/largest banks in particular, is much more data-driven which requires banks to hold 
a much higher levels of capital, living wills and data on stress tests.  
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Banking supervisors have relied on the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) CAMELS rating system which is primarily based on financial data extracted 
from banks’ to monitor the banks’ financial condition (BCBS, 2012). Capital Adequacy, 
Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk. 
Scholars have explored the usefulness of CAMELS. According to Barker and Holdworth 
(1993), CAMELS ratings were considered to be a powerful tool to capture and forecast 
the probability of bank failure (as cited by Baek, Balasubramanian & Lee, 2015). As a 
measure of reliance and support, Baek et al. (2015) noted that “during the bailout of the 
U.S. financial system after the 2008 financial meltdown, the U.S. Treasury used the 
CAMELS as a yard stick to identify banks that qualified for the bailout” (p. 96). The 
major challenge though is that while CAMELS provide a valuable data source on banks 
financial condition its shelf life is very short (Cole & Gunther, 1998). Although the 
relative temporal nature of the CAMELS data is linked to the infrequency associated with 
the execution of bank on-site examinations that are tied to bank supervision budgetary 
constraints as espoused by Baek et al., its relevance and usefulness as a data source for 
several areas of bank monitoring including the potential to, combined with other 
elements, determine coverage limits cannot be discounted. From a rational standpoint, the 
likelihood of bank failure based on the application of the BCBS’ CAMELS rating system 
together with selected macroprudential factors can collectively produce the exposure of 
the banks’ insured deposits. Assuming that this analysis can be done as proposed by 
Barker and Holdworth, then the possibility exists to estimate the optimal deposit 
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insurance payable and by extension the related deposit insurance coverage limit (Baek et 
al., 2015). 
Alongside the CAMELS, bank supervisors are also guided by the BCBS 29 Core 
Principles for Effective Bank Supervision referred to as the “de facto minimum standard 
for sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks and banking system” (BCBS, 
2012, p. 1). Following the 2007/2008, supervisors and regulatory authorities recognized 
gaps associated and the microprudential oriented standards were expanded to include 
macroprudential elements (BCBS, 2012). Based on the macroprudential updates to the 
BCBS Standards, supervisors are now required to consider “the prevailing 
macroeconomic environment, business trends, and the build-up and concentration of risk 
across the banking sector and, indeed, outside of it” (BCBS, 2012, p. 6). This move on 
the part of the BCBS is positive to some extent as the capacity to reap real benefits can 
only be derived from the appropriate enforcement. 
According to IADI (2014), a country’s bank regulatory framework, being one of 
the key pre-requisites and design features of explicit deposit insurance systems, has a 
major role to play in the determination of coverage limits. Klomp and Haan (2014) noted 
that higher levels of bank capital together with stronger bank supervision tend to reduce 
the level of risk banks pose to the financial system.  Bank capital acts as a first line of 
protection to cushion the institution during a period of financial distress.   
Post-2007–2008 Financial Crisis Review 
In 2012, the FDIC Office of the Inspector General (FDIC OIG) conducted 50 
Material Loss Reviews to ascertain misgivings if any, by the FDIC related to the impact 
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of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis on America Garcia (2010). The findings of the 
audit revealed that the FDIC had regulatory flaws which in the estimation of the FDIC 
OIG did play a role in impact of the crisis on America Garcia. While overall the 
examination/review contained a number of shortcomings, for purposes of this analysis 
one major breach would be highlighted, that is, the FDIC failed to enforce the legislative 
provisions contained in the FDIC Improvement Act 1991including discretionary powers 
associated with prompt corrective action.  
There were instances of failing banks which the regulators failed to place into 
undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, or critically undercapitalized groupings. 
This was the same regulatory forbearance which contributed to the demise of the thrift 
institutions in the 1980s (Savings and Loan Debacle) that subsequently led to the 
enactment of the FDICIA 1991. Based on the non-implementation of prompt corrective 
action there was no incentive for these weak banks to recapitalize and stave off 
insolvency. Calomiris (2011) argued that bank supervisors incorrectly relied on two 
undependable sources in an effort to assess and measure banks’ risks accurately namely 
the rating agencies’ debt profiles of banks and banks internal risk assessment systems. 
Taking the point of non-enforcement further, the supervisory agencies did not penalize 
the failed institutions for violating restrictions outlined in the Prompt Corrective Action 
provisions (Garcia, 2010; Masciandaro, Pansini, & Quintyn, 2011; Schoen, 2017).  
Regulatory Nonenforcement 
The FDIC OIG in its 2012 review suggested reasons for the nonenforcement of 
the regulations by the FDIC as: bankers’ rejection of the FDICs’ supervisors’ findings, 
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political criticism targeted at supervisors’ actions, and the poaching of FDIC supervisory 
staff by the bankers that the FDIC regulate.  
The bankers’ rejection argument appears weak. The bank regulatory function is 
filled with conflict which the FDIC regulators are trained to handle. Bankers are driven 
by the profit motive to reward their shareholders and earn a bonus for themselves in the 
process. Regulators are mandated to maintain financial stability through constant 
monitoring and controlling the excessive risk-taking behavior of bankers. Regulation is 
perceived by bankers as a cost to the industry and this drives the bankers to take all 
necessary measures to minimize its impact. It conflicts with their profit motive. Another 
area where conflict would arise is in the interpretation of the banking legislation, its 
understanding and application by both the regulators and the regulated, namely the 
insured banks. Often the wording of legislation inherently lacks clarity and it is this 
ambiguity that sets the basis for various interpretations and dispute by extension.  
To counter these arguments though, it is possible that the FDIC may have suffered 
from a staff reduction program that was introduced in 1995 which may have led to a 
depletion of their highly trained human resource. The FDIC offered their employees 
enticements to retire or seek other employment willingly based on the premise that there 
was a reduction in the workload following the aftermath of the Savings and Loan debacle 
in the 1980-1990. This is one of the idiosyncrasies that bank regulators experience - ebbs 
and flows in work flow/volume closely associated with the financial stability levels in the 
banking sector. When instability is high bank failures follow the same pattern or trend, 
that is, bank failures increase. The opposite is true when the sector is strong and stable - 
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bank failures decline. When instability rises and there is an uptick in bank failures the 
FDIC hires more staff to deal with greater demands placed on their human resources to 
resolve distressed banks. When the financial system recovers, as usually obtains, the 
FDIC would be left with surplus staff nudging the management to consider staff 
reduction programs. The major challenge with these ebbs and flows unique situation is 
that there would be a loss in staff expertise which would leave the FDIC exposed when 
the next period of instability arises at some time in the future, an expectation with a high 
level of certainty.  
Political criticism targeted at supervisors’ actions was another factor cited by the 
FDIC OIG that contrived to disrupt the FDIC’s regulators from enforcing the FDICIA 
1991. This suggestion may have some merit. The genesis of the 2007-2008 crisis was 
placed at the doorstep of the American government when it pursued a policy of home 
ownership expansion with low interest rates over a protracted period. Given that many 
regulated banks were involved in the execution of this policy which were forced to lower 
their lending standards to increase affordability to low income earners and make the 
policy a success in the process, it appears unfair for the bank regulators to be the target of 
criticism. In light of this conflict it may be that the regulators either lost enthusiasm to 
enforce the FDICIA 1991 or accepted the banks’ exposure to penalties if they did not 
finance the home ownership of many individuals who would not have been able to 
purchase a house under normal circumstances (Calomiris, 2011).  
Staff poaching by regulated bankers of the FDIC supervisory staff was another 
reason cited in the FDIC OIG (2004) report for the nonimplementation of the FDICIA 
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1991 by the FDIC regulators. On the surface, this sounds as a reasonable explanation 
since the package offered by the private sector banks would be more generous than 
government FDIC compensation schemes. When highly trained FDIC supervisors are 
offered more competitive packages including bonuses by the bankers it is possible that 
the Supervisors would be bought out. The immediate impact of such a move on the FDIC 
would be the loss of staff with the appropriate competencies to understand and enforce 
legislation. This raises an issue of conflict of interest in the system though. 
FDIC supervisors would come into contact with highly confidential bank data in 
their day to day work activities. The retention of such confidential data of the many 
different banks would give a supervisor a fair understanding of their lines of business, 
products offered, markets served as well as the strategies they use and so on. This may be 
a reason why they appear so attractive to the bankers and sought after by the banking 
community. An FDIC supervisor in possession of bank data can take up a job at one of 
the regulated banks he/she previously supervised and subsequently provide information 
on the competitors as well as the FDIC’s operational secrets. 
The foregoing arguments put forward by the FDIC OIG (2012) to support the 
non-enforcement of the regulations contained in the FDICIA 1991 by the FDIC 
regulators do possess a systems thinking orientation (Garcia, 2010). Having gone through 
the Savings and Loan crisis in the 1980s and the FDIC Fund went into negative territory 
legislation was passed, specifically the FDICIA 1991, to avoid a repeat of the pressures 
placed on the public purse, the taxpayers. The impact of the 2007-2008 global financial 
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crisis on America was a repeat of the 1980s debacle but of a more significant magnitude. 
The rationale for these events may be associated with the concept of governance.  
Moral Hazard and Optimality 
In Gan and Wang’s (2013) view, partial deposit insurance has three objectives 
namely to depositors who do not possess the knowledge to monitor banks, to main a 
consistent level of liquidity and to curtail depositors propensity to run on their banks in 
panic mode and make withdrawals. The real challenge though or downside to the deposit 
insurance coverage limit is that when it is too high the coverage limit reduces market 
discipline and simultaneously increases moral hazard (Gan & Wang, 2013). Scholars 
have argued that too much risk-taking by bankers was the main contributor to the Savings 
and Loans crisis in the United States 1980-1990 (Kim, Kim, & Han, 2014). Kim et al. 
(2014) showed that in the ASEAN countries moral hazard rose when deposit insurance 
was established. Alternatively, the study revealed that moral hazard is minimized or 
restrained when the quality of bank regulation and supervision increases to higher levels 
(Kim et al., 2014).  
The challenge that arises with the process of deriving coverage limits even if 
industry data is available and accessible to fund managers is that there may not be a 
consensus on a measurable metric to assess an increase or decrease in risk-taking. Kim et 
al. (2014) intuitive adopted the ratio of bank’s capital to total assets deploying the BCBS 
(2017) principle that higher capital serves as a cushion to absorb losses. In light of this a 
higher and or an increasing ratio of capital to total assets suggests reduced risk-taking by 
bankers while a lower or decreasing ratio illustrates increased risk-taking behavior.  
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To manage and or control the level of moral hazard therefore necessitates the 
monitoring of bankers’ risk-taking behavior as the deposit insurance coverage limit 
changes over time. Optimality of coverage limits therefore suggests the need for 
authorities to leave some proportion of deposits uninsured as a mechanism to persuade 
depositors to monitor their banks (IADI, 2014). In an attempt to protect those depositors 
that do not possess the skills and competencies to understand banks’ data to take 
appropriate action, IADI fund managers should adopt the practice of tracking the risk 
behavior of bankers on an on-going basis. The CAMELS data on banks extracted through 
supervisors’ on-site and off-site examination provides a good data source to get an 
appropriate balance between the optimal coverage limit and the level of moral hazard 
within the banking system.  
Panic Runs and Coverage Limits 
Bank runs are deemed to be self-fulfilling events (Brown, Trautmann, & Vlahu, 
2016; Chabot & Moul, 2014; Davis & Reilly, 2016; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Almost 
any circumstance can prompt a bank run (Djik, 2017). In Iyer and Puri’s (2012) view, 
depositors with balances that are larger than the deposit insurance coverage, the 
uninsured depositors have a greater inclination to run on their banks Kiss, Rodriguez-
Lara, and Rosa-Garcia, (2012) examined the behavior of depositors based on the 
observation of the actions of other depositors. Consistent with the findings of similar 
studies, Kiss et al. noted that bank runs are triggered by banks’ fundamentals including 
solid liquidity or problems with severe illiquidity as well as coordination problems 
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between depositors. Loss-aversion was exhibited by depositors which ignited panic 
behavior to run on their banks (Kiss et al., 2012). 
Despite the broad context of panic runs, Ngalawa, Tchana, and Viegi (2016) 
argued that while the uninsured demand deposits supplied banks with liquidity, this form 
of funding can alternatively leave banks exposed to panic runs and by extension 
insolvency. This perspective seems to support the view that a coverage limit that is too 
low can inveigle depositors to engage in panic runs.  
The Deposit Insurance Fund 
The value or size of the DIF may impact depositors’ decisions to make rapid 
withdrawals. Peia and Vranceanu (2017) saw a link between the DIF size and the 
frequency of deposit withdrawals and argued that the higher the dollar value of the DIF, 
the greater the tendency that depositors are likely to increase the regularity of 
withdrawals. O’Keefe and Ufier (2017) posited the importance of having an ex-ante fund 
as appose to an ex-post fund since the ex-ante fund can strengthen public confidence in 
the banking system. Some DIF managers took a further step by introducing a target fund 
ratio. O’Keefe and Ufier noted that the FDIC established its target ratio based on “an 
analysis of historical FDIC losses, income and insurance fund levels” (p.26)  
Corporate Governance’s Role 
To stimulate the application of the industry data that may be held by a bank 
regulator which the DIF can use to compute deposit insurance coverage limits, the notion 
resource dependence governance theory becomes applicable. Madhani (2017) argued that 
corporate boards, including those of DIFs, are obligated to: (a) organize and control those 
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dependencies such as relationships with bank regulators that may be outside of DIFs’ 
mandates, (b) minimize the possible risks of bank runs in the banking industry context, 
and (c) decrease the potential for DIFs to duplicate cost to gather industry data that is 
produced by the bank regulatory process which DIFs can use to compute coverage limits. 
Networking with social and business contacts by boards is considered a key 
attribute that allows board members to build relationships to strategically take advantage 
of opportunities for improved access to information among others (Madhani, 2017). The 
boards of IADI members can use this mechanism or philosophy to play a greater role in 
their jurisdictional financial safety nets which could trigger appropriate data sharing 
arrangements (FSB 2012). This gap was one of the key recommendations cited by the 
FSB (2012) that arose from the 2007/2008 global financial crisis.  
There are four different mandates under which IADI fund managers function, 
namely the pure pay-box, pay-box plus, loss minimizer, and risk minimizer (IADI, 2014). 
Each of these systems has dissimilar governance arrangements as some may be privately 
owned by the banking system or publicly owned by governments (IADI, 2014). Some of 
IADI members, such as the FDIC which has a risk minimizer’s mandate, conduct both 
bank regulatory functions including on-site and off-site examinations as well as deposit 
insurance operations (IADI, 2014). The lower down the mandate scale that DIFs operate 
like the pure pay-box and the pay-box plus, the less connected these systems tend to be to 
the bank regulatory functions and by extension less access to key industry data related to 
the banking system (IADI, 2014).  
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Statistics to Determine Deposit Insurance Coverage Limits 
Statistics have an important role in the insurance industry, including deposit 
insurance. Drekic (2011) argued that “there are many deterministic and stochastic 
influences at play, and the precise prediction of the future claims experience necessitates 
that all such influences and their effects be identified” (p.1). In the general insurance 
industry for example, assuming detailed data is collected, probability distributions such 
as the Poisson distribution can be deployed to respond to many queries (Derkic, 2011). 
The law of large numbers coupled with the application of the Central Limit Theorem 
provides the foundation for creation of insurance (Cummins, 1991). Integration in 
Cummins’ (1991) view given the “highly specialized and technical” differences in key 
elements of the insurance industry that has slowed the application of models and data in 
the industry (p.261). Ajemunigbohun, Aduloju, Sogunro and Azeez (2017) investigated 
specific socioeconomic and demographic variables plus the impact on the availability and 
needs of health insurance in Nigeria. The researchers collected and analyzed data using 
multiple regression the findings of which revealed that education, income gender and age 
were the main triggers for the demand for health insurance (Ajemunigbohun et al., 2017). 
Given the foregoing, it appears that Cummins’s view, in terms of lack of integration 
holds and the deposit insurance industry has not been integrated with other elements of 
the insurance industry. Should this continue though? 
Deposit insurance coverage limits can be impacted by several variables and there 
is a clear need, according to FSB (2012) for IADI fund managers to search for the 
relevant data that can influence the level of the deposit insurance coverage. Although the 
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banks pay the premium and not depositors directly, inherently if no banks fail then the 
reimbursement of deposit insurance as a coverage limit will not come into question. The 
same principle should apply to the capacity or size of the fund, the total insured deposits 
in the banking system, and the payment of premium as well. The search for the impact of 
these and perhaps other variables on the deposit insurance coverage limit is therefore 
necessary not only for the next financial crisis as suggested by Bitros (2015) but for the 
normal level of financial distress that shows up in the banking system in many 
jurisdictions around the world. 
While from one perspective the application of industry statistical data by IADI 
fund managers may be limited by their access to industry information depending on the 
deposit insurance mandate-type or business model, another view is that the lack of 
industry statistical data usage may be stymied by the broad institutional appreciation for 
data use as a driver for decision making. The data-driven decision-making (DDDM) 
concept although grounded in education (Schroeder, 2012), may be at play as a factor that 
constrains industrial data use by IADI fund managers which perhaps may be inextricably 
linked to Madhani’s (2017) resource dependence governance issue (West 2019).  
Summary and Conclusions 
There are ample industry data that the IADI fund managers can use to compute 
deposit insurance coverage limits which can satisfy a number of potential outcomes 
namely the pacification of depositors propensity to engage in panic runs on their banks, 
limit politicians’ influence to make ad hoc changes that suits their agendas, and mitigate 
bankers’ inclination to take on more business risk, the moral hazard conundrum. The 
86 
 
bank regulatory process which employs the BCBS’s CAMELS and core principles tends 
to compliment deposit insurance systems in many jurisdictions financial systems’ 
architecture does generate a broad set of bank data that DIF managers, with the 
appropriate legislative backing, can use to compute industry data-driven coverage limits.  
The deposit insurance industry has been in existence for approximately 86 years 
and, according to Valentino (1954), is consistent with the mainstream insurance that 
employs data and actuarial science to derive insurance premium, policies and other 
aspects of insurance business. Deposit insurance theory as espoused by Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983, as cited by Hogan & Luther, 2014), is in some measure connected to the 
finance theories such as Merton’s (1977) options pricing theory and Markowitz’s (1952) 
modern portfolio theory since the banks pay a premium for deposit insurance which are 
invested to build the DIF.  
This is the first research study to survey IADI members which will focus of an 
examination of the applicability of certain data such as bank risk, the DIF size and 
growth, the DIF’s insured deposits and growth and the premium to derive the deposit 
insurance coverage limit. My study involved a search for and application of industry 
statistical data to derive deposit insurance coverage limits that are more representative of 
key trigger variables plus more resistant to political interference. I anticipate that this 
study will be useful to policymakers in the financial services sector. 
The use of quantitative methods for this study provided the support for the 
theoretical approaches linked to the searches for the derivation of an optimal coverage 
limit. A quantitative study was suitable for this study because it offered the option to 
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empirically identify industry related data that cab be associated with the derivation of 
deposit insurance coverage limits.  In Chapter 3, I will detail the quantitative 
methodology for this study. It will usher in a new dynamic into the deposit insurance 
field coupled with the elements for initiating social change. The IADI, the Financial 
Stability Board and the international multilateral lending agencies such as the IMF and 
World Bank IADI’ will appreciate data-driven coverage limits. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate the relationship between 
the use of statistical data, specifically aggregate bank risk data, fund size, aggregated 
insured deposits, and the premium levy rate by the IADI Members’ Fund Managers and 
the changes in their deposit insurance coverage limits. As discussed in previous chapters, 
as a follow up to the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, the FSB (2012) noted the 
deficiency of IADI members to use data to derive their coverage limits. Although 
researchers have assessed coverage limits in different spheres (FDIC, 2000; Manz, 2009; 
Velikova, 2006), little is known with regards to the use of industry data to compute 
deposit insurance coverage limits (FSB, 2012). The exploration of the use of such data 
could potentially lead to more objective and crisis-resilient coverage limits.  
In this chapter, I define the research variables, highlight the hypotheses, and 
present the methodology used to gather and analyze the data. I critically analyze the 
instrument to capture and analyze the data and the process to assess my findings. I outline 
the design procedures used to provide comprehensive coverage of this study’s population, 
the ethical procedures to safeguard the privacy of the research participants, and the 
measures that I will adopt to strengthen the lucidity of my study.  
Research Design and Rationale 
I followed a traditional quantitative research methodology to examine whether 
relationships exist between the independent variables, aggregate bank risk data, fund size, 
aggregate insured deposits, and the premium levy rate, and the dependent variable 
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coverage limit (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2015). The lack of the use of 
industry statistical data by DIF managers to derive and or change their deposit insurance 
coverage limits brought about this study (FSB, 2012). I used a cross-sectional research 
design in this study. This methodology is used by empirical researchers at one designated 
time to record information to describe attributes of the population, including data such as 
their education levels, weight, and ethnicity (Allen, 2017). In a cross-sectional research 
design, the variables are not manipulated (Allen, 2017).  
The independent variables are the data on the aggregate bank risk, the DIF size, 
the aggregate currency value of insured bank deposits, and the DIF premium levy rate. 
The aggregate bank risk data were guided by BCBS Core Principle 16, Capital 
Adequacy, which emphasizes the role of capital to absorb losses as a mechanism to 
prevent or slow down the process of bank insolvency (BCBS, 2012). The DIF size was 
conceptualized as the values expressed in the currencies of the deposit insurance systems, 
and the aggregate insured deposits represent the currency value of the specific types of 
deposit instruments that the deposit insurance system is mandated to protect or insure. 
Intuitively, the higher the risk rating of a given bank, the higher the probability of bank 
failure and, by extension, the higher the likelihood that depositors may be reimbursed. 
The higher the dollar value of the DIF, the greater the capacity may be of the DIF to 
reimburse depositors and pay a higher coverage limit in the event of a bank failure. The 
higher the currency value of the insured deposits, the higher the likelihood may be of 
increased demands by depositors for a higher reimbursement amount or coverage limit in 
the event of a bank failure. The higher the deposit insurance premium, the higher the 
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likelihood that the DIF may grow and consequently make more funds available to 
reimburse depositors in the event of a bank failure. 
Research Design 
This study followed the traditional quantitative research approach and 
incorporated a cross-sectional survey design methodology to examine the usage of 
industry statistical data by DIF managers in the international arena to derive their deposit 
insurance systems coverage limits. The benefit of this approach is that I could investigate 
the impact of possible data usage on the value of the coverage limits of the DIF managers 
at one period and conserve on resources associated with longitudinal research (Allen, 
2017; Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2015; Salkind, 2010).  
The cross-sectional survey design was implemented to examine the relationship 
between each of the four independent variables and the dependent variable. The 
independent variables’ data set comprised aggregate bank risk, the DIF size, the currency 
value of the aggregate insured deposits, and the premium levy rate on member banks. The 
dependent variable was the deposit insurance coverage limit. A cross-sectional survey 
design allows researchers to gather data and make inferences with some level of 
confidence about the IADI fund managers of explicit deposit insurance systems’ larger 
population at a specific point in time (Allen, 2017). This approach provided the 
framework to test the possible subsequent adherence to the use of data to compute 
coverage limits since the FSB’s (2012) post-2007–2008 global financial crisis review. 
The cross-sectional approach is more feasible for this study than experimental or quasi-
experimental designs due to time and cost savings (Ruel, Wagner, & Gillespie, 2016). 
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The experimental design was not considered appropriate for this study because this study 
has neither randomized experimental nor controlled groups (Mujis, 2013). The quasi-
experimental design was also eliminated because nonrandomized, experimental, nor 
controlled groups exist in this study (Mujis, 2013).  
A quantitative, predictive approach is deemed to be more appropriate, as the 
purpose of this study was to determine whether the predictor variables predict the 
coverage limits at a statistically significant level and, by extension, advance the 
knowledge in deposit insurance (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2015). Multiple 
regression was used to assess the predictability of the application of aggregate bank risk 
data, the DIF size data, the aggregate currency value of insured deposits data, and the 
premium levy rates on member banks data of the FDIC in a pilot study. The survey of the 
IADI members were followed up with ordinal logistic regression to determine the 
influence of the four independent factors on the dependent variable based on survey of 
the IADI members (Warner, 2012).  
As this study of the IADI members was conducted using a cross-sectional design, 
both time and resources was positively impacted in terms of savings (Cummings, 2018). 
The cross-sectional design can facilitate the identification of patterns, correlations, and 
the frequency in the extent of results from the data collected at one point in time (Allen, 
2017). The one-time intervention would minimize the completion time for the research 
and by extension reduce the costs to gather data (Allen, 2017). The cross-sectional design 
does cater to the collection of data through the Internet. The survey questions for this 
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study were distributed to the IADI fund managers who are in different jurisdictions 
around the world through the online SurveyMonkey survey system.  
The emphasis of this study was to seek the potential relationships between the 
four independent variables and the dependent variable. To this end, a nonexperimental 
research design was deemed suitable. Based on the approximate 17 years of experience I 
possess in the deposit insurance industry, I sensed that the independent variables, the 
aggregate bank risk, the fund size, the aggregate currency value of insured deposits, and 
the level of the premium levy rates, could influence the dependent variable deposit 
insurance coverage limits. Cross-sectional research provides the opportunity to measure 
these variables that are seemingly related and expand the theoretical development in this 
field of study (Allen, 2017).  
The sample in this study was random based on the quantum of the IADI members 
disclosed by the members in the IADI Annual Survey in 2017 (IADI, n.d.). The cross-
sectional design allowed for insights into the use of statistical data by these members. 
Given the range of legislative powers between deposit insurance systems with limited and 
expanded mandates, as exist between paybox and risk minimizer modalities, patterns in 
the usage of statistical industry data may differ across the subgroups. Knowledge of these 
differences in the application of data by mandate type could provide the financial 
authorities in jurisdictions around the world with insights to enhance their systems’ fund 
managers’ capacity to apply industry data to derive their coverage limits. 
The cross-sectional design optimizes a researcher’s capability to detect patterns, 
relationships, frequent occurrences of a matter investigated within a population (Allen, 
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2017). Khorossani (2000, as cited by Velikova, 2006), in a cross-sectional study of the 
US commercial banks during the period mid-1980s to 1990s, revealed the existence of 
greater sensitivity between depositors and bank risk. Drawing from Khorossani’s (2000) 
study, U.S. depositors, depending on the coverage limit at a point in time, may or may 
not respond to protect their savings should knowledge of bank collapse get into the public 
domain. It is these results that informed my exploration for a relation between aggregate 
bank risk and the deposit insurance coverage limit in this study. 
Methodology 
I used the traditional quantitative research method which incorporated a cross-
sectional design to investigate the potential impact of specific industry data on the deposit 
insurance coverage limits of the IADI members. No effort was made to support and or 
develop any computational model to derive coverage limit figures. The cross-sectional 
design allowed for cost and time savings since it focuses on research at one point in time 
to describe the IADI member population (Cummings, 2018; Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Leon-Guerrero, 2015). 
A pilot study, utilizing the FDIC’s experience from 1934 to 2019 was adopted to 
assess the applicability/relevance of the four independent variables namely the aggregate 
bank risk, the DIF size, the aggregate currency value of the insured deposits protected by 
the DIF and the DIF premium levy data on the independent variable, the deposit 
insurance coverage limit through the application of time series analysis. This inquiry was 
complimented with a survey of the IADI members’ fund managers to examine the 
relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable. Multiple 
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regression analysis was incorporated to determine the existence of predictability of each 
of the independent variables on the dependent variable in the pilot study.  
This was followed up with the application of multiple correlation to determine the 
strength of any of the predictive relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables (Warner, 2012). The main study of the IADI members incorporated ordinal 
logistic regression to predict the IADI members’ usage the same four variables adopted in 
the pilot study. This overall approach is consistent with the framework of Velikova 
(2006) in a similar study. 
Target Population for the Study 
A population comprises the complete group of people or items of which a 
researcher seeks to formulate generalizations (Warner, 2012). The cost in terms of time 
money and effort limit researchers’ capacity to survey an entire population and this often 
leads to reliance on a sample (Warner, 2012). The sample consists of a subset of the 
members of the population (Warner, 2012). The target population comprising 91 
members that will consist of the IADI members’ fund managers who function in deposit 
insurance systems in different geographical regions around the world. The IADI members 
have different mandates and powers to resolve banks as and when they encounter 
financial distress. The deposit insurance systems will be restricted to explicit deposit 
insurance systems that are either government or private-sector owned in the IADI defined 
geographical jurisdictions around the world. The estimated population of deposit 
insurance systems consist of 143 systems around the world (IMF, 2014) of which an 
estimated 91 insurance systems are members of the IADI a portion of which would be 
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explicit deposit insurance systems. According to the IADI (2014), an explicit deposit 
insurance system is defined as “a system, expressly laid down by statutes or other legal 
instruments, that stipulates the amount of reimbursement which depositors can expect in 
the event of a Bank failure, with rules concerning Coverage Limits, the types of 
instruments covered, the methods for calculating depositor Claims, Funding 
arrangements and other related matters” (IADI, 2014; p.x).  
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
In the process of conducting a study, researchers are often incapable of observing 
all the entities or units that make up the population of interest (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Leon-Guerrero, 2015). To ascertain whether a correlation exist between the four 
independent variables namely aggregate bank risk of a DIF’s member banks, a DIF size, 
the aggregate currency value of insured deposits protected by the DIF in the banking 
system, DIF premium levy on member banks and the independent variable, the deposit 
insurance coverage limit, I conducted a random survey of a sample of IADI fund 
managers based on the four mandate types as defined by IADI. The targeted respondents 
will comprise expert fund managers of explicit deposit insurance systems that are 
members within the IADI (IADI, 2014).  
The paybox and paybox plus mandates are generally limited in terms of the 
resolution powers to empower officials to treat with banks during financial distress or an 
eventual bank failure (IADI 2014). In light of this circumstance, it is possible that the 
IADI fund managers in these mandate types may not have access to data on the aggregate 
risk profile of the banks which may be confined to the bank regulator or central bank due 
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to legislative constraints. The limited access to data may potentially restrict the powers of 
the IADI fund managers who oversee paybox and paybox plus systems perhaps limiting 
their capacity to use industrial statistical data to compute their deposit insurance coverage 
limits  
I used SurveyMonkey as the main tool to reach retrieve data utilizing a random 
systematic survey of the intended participants from the SurveyMonkey Audience service 
pool. SurveyMonkey allows researchers access to a global pool to collect survey 
responses which facilitated my reach to the IADI fund managers located in different 
geographical regions around the world (SurveyMonkey.com, n.d.). The survey underwent 
internal filters by the SurveyMonkey which guided the researchers through the survey 
process (SurveyMonkey.com, n.d.). 
The names and e-mail contacts of the current 91 IADI fund members were 
included in the SurveyMonkey audience to optimize the responses from the intended 
survey participants and to mitigate possible data quality risks that could potentially arise 
from low or incomplete responses (Ruel, Wagner III, & Gillespie, 2016). The IADI fund 
members represent the senior officers of the target population of the deposit insurance 
systems in the world, who would have either conducted research or have the 
responsibility to supervise research work.  
Prior to the commencement of the survey, the participants were required to read, 
fill out an online consent form and submit it to the SurveyMonkey Audience system. The 
survey was estimated to take approximately 20 minutes to complete. The IADI website 
was accessed to get the names of the deposit insurance systems and the mandate type of 
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each system. The names of the deposit insurance systems and the mandate type will be 
submitted to SurveyMonkey. The SurveyMonkey system and invited the participants via 
email.  
Some of the IADI members are Associates and Partners. Associates with deposit 
insurance systems, even though the systems may be a department within a central bank 
were included in the survey and those that do not were excluded. Associates that did not 
yet have established deposit insurance systems were excluded. All Partners were 
excluded since these institutions do not have deposit insurance systems and by extension 
deposit insurance coverage. 
The required sample size was determined by the G*Power 3.1.9 software (Tassin, 
2019). The selected benchmarks incorporated a conventional power of 0.80, a two-sided 
test, a significance level of α = 0.05, the number of predictors 4, and a medium effect 
size, ρ = 0.30. Based on the aforesaid factors, a minimum number of 23 participants was 
required for the sample size.  
In the preparation stages of my Proposal, the initial selected benchmarks 
incorporated a conventional power of 0.90, a two-sided test, a significance level of α = 
0.05, the number of predictors 4, and a medium effect size, ρ = 0.15. Based on the 
aforesaid factors, a minimum number of 74 participants would be required for the sample 
size. However, given the fallout from the COVID-19 Pandemic and its global impact, the 
anticipated responses had been negatively impacted. The start date of my survey was 
March 7, 2020 and the responses have been slow. As at June 21, 2020, I had received 35 
responses from the total population of 91 members. It was apparent that the senior 
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officers of the deposit insurance systems in the international arena were and still are 
working remotely which affected their capacity to access their office e-mails which was 
my survey strategy. In light of the uncertainty and further delays, I sought and obtained 
approval from my Committee to work with the sample size of 23 participants.  
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
The application of quantitative research methods necessitates the adoption of 
procedures to collect data, apply statistical methodologies to investigate relationships and 
then utilize the results to draw inferences (Warner, 2012). A cross-sectional survey was 
used as the method for data collection in this study. I administered the survey questions 
through SurveyMonkey to collect the appropriate research data needed to investigate and 
evaluate IADI fund managers’ application of industry data to derive their deposit 
insurance systems’ coverage limits. This approach was preferred based on the need to 
collect unbiased data to accurately measure the responses for the eventual application of 
quantitative statistical methods such as multiple regression. The benefit associated with 
these interventions is that it will make this study replicable for future researchers. The 
IADI members’ funds managers, the target population for this study, are located in many 
different countries around the world and SurveyMonkey offers an excellent medium to 
gain possible access to the highest potential reach. The fund managers were drawn from 
the IADI members who have full and associate member status with explicit deposit 
insurance systems for banks. 
Prior to the start of the survey through the SurveyMonkey, the participants, the 
IADI members’ fund managers, were informed about the intent of the study and the need 
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for them to complete a consent form. The consent form alerted participants about the 
risks and potential advantages of this study to the IADI membership including the 
protection protocols which I implemented to protect them from loss of privacy 
psychological distress and physical harm. Some of the stated protocols included the use 
of password protected measures to safeguard the collected data, the nondisclosure of the 
IADI member institutions, the use of coding of collected data in the SPSS among others. 
Participants were requested to sign the form prior to their participation in the survey. The 
consent form advised the participants that the study would be voluntary; that no personal 
information concerning their identification should be disclosed; and that they could either 
avoid and or end their participation in the survey if they are not comfortable with the 
study (Darley, Latane, Milgram Webb, Campbell, & Zimbbardo, 2009; Israel 2015; 
Salkind, 2012).  
The data for this cross-sectional study was collected through the issue of survey 
questions through the SurveyMonkey audience system to the IADI members’ fund 
managers who are located in different jurisdictions around the world. The intended 
participants were targeted based on specific criteria such as their skills or education levels 
to extract and analyze data; authority level in their deposit insurance system; and their 
capacity to initiate, produce and or review research work among others. The survey 
participants’ were required to respond to a number of questions, including but not limited 
to, the number of years that their deposit insurance system has been in operation; the type 
of fund that their system is legislated to oversee; their knowledge and or experience in 
changing their systems’ coverage limits; the use of data to compute changes in their 
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deposit insurance coverage limits; and the types of business mandates in which their 
deposit insurance system operates such as paybox, paybox plus, loss minimizer and risk 
minimizer.  
The survey questions explicitly provided the option to either participate or decline 
participation with reference to the yes or no responses. Participants that selected yes, 
were expected to complete the survey. Alternatively, the participants that selected no, 
were allowed to end the survey immediately. Some open-ended questions were 
incorporated in the survey that permitted the participants the option to indicate the 
specific data that are used to compute their systems’ coverage limits outside of the four 
identified for investigation in this study namely aggregate bank risk data, the DIF’s fund 
size, the aggregate dollar value of insured deposits and the DIF premium levy.  
Pilot Study 
The deposit insurance industry is under-researched in the area of using industry 
statistical data to compute deposit insurance coverage limits similar to the approaches 
used in the life and general insurance industry (Valentino, 1954). I explored the 
application of certain variables that are considered appropriate to use to compute deposit 
insurance coverage limits based on my experience in the industry. To examine the 
relevance of these inputs, I utilized a pilot study of the banks in the United States of 
America supervised by the FDIC during the period 1934 to 2019. 
A pilot study is a small-scale version of the investigation involving the use of a 
small sample as a forerunner to the execution of the main study (Allen, 2017). The pilot 
study was adopted to provide greater insights about the core study given the absence of 
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prior exploratory research in the area of applying industry data to compute coverage 
limits (Allen, 2017). No previous studies exist in the application of industry statistics to 
derive deposit insurance coverage limits. 
A pilot study allows a researcher the opportunity to identify probable difficulties 
or challenges prior to the main study (Allen, 2017). By applying multiple regression 
analysis utilizing the four independent variables namely aggregate bank risk, the DIF’s 
fund size, the aggregate currency value of insured deposits, and premium levy rates of the 
banks supervised by the FDIC any unanticipated measurement issues can arise and be 
mitigated.  A comparison between the findings of both the pilot study and the main study 
would offer insights into the selection of the variables (Allen, 2017). 
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
A comprehensive and thorough review of the existing literature in data usage to 
compute deposit insurance coverage limits revealed the absence of an appropriate 
instrument for this study. The research instrument used for this study was a modified 
version of the Administrator Data Use Survey (ADUS) instrument originally developed 
in Sheboy’s dissertation (2006; Appendix A), which has been used as a valid and reliable 
instrument to accurately collect data on the perceptions of school administrators. The 
Sheboy’s (2006) ADUS survey instrument focused on three themes namely building level 
administrator, data-based decision making, and school district administrators. While the 
ADUS survey instrument is premised in data use for educational administrators, it has a 
broader appeal for data use by administrators in different fields. This is supported by the 
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more recent adoption of the DDDM concept in other fields of endeavor including 
organizational performance (Bishop, 2018; West, 2019).  
Bishop (2018) argued that “organizations understand the importance of data and 
technology, but now it is about finding a way to leverage this and adopt data-driven 
processes of decision-making that can improve organizational performance’ (p. 10). 
Foley (2007) focused on the collection and use of data to strengthen organizational 
competencies and support academic programs applied the DDDM model. The data-
driven decision making concept is a multifaceted and broad model that is used in many 
aspects of research such as education, information technology, business intelligence, 
social services, engineering and institutional capacity building to name a few (West 
2019). In light of this development, and for purposes of my study, the Sheboy’s (2006) 
survey instrument was modified to focus on data use by DIF managers.  
The survey instrument was modified to assess the strict application of industry 
data as well as the factors that may hinder or promote the IADI fund managers’ ability to 
gather and use the data that could impact the derivation of the coverage limit. Such 
factors may include the internal or external access to the necessary skills to research, 
analyze and use the data as well as the managerial appreciation or lack thereof for the 
value in the use of data to improve their decision making to change coverage limit. I have 
modified the educational admission questions used by Sheboy (2006) to align it with my 
deposit insurance coverage limit research survey questions (Appendix A). Based on the 
alterations, permission and or prior consent was sought via email dated September 23, 
2019 to use the modified survey questions and approval was granted by Sheboy via e-
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mail dated September 24, 2019 (Appendix D I and D II). The adapted Sheboy data-driven 
decision-making survey questions were sub-divided using similar components adapted by 
Schroeder (2012). These sections synchronized with the purpose of this study as a 
mechanism to test the IADI fund managers’ application of industry data to derive 
changes in their deposit insurance coverage limits.  
The first section of the instrument focused on the importance of data for staff and 
institutional performance. The next section targeted data use/tasks by officials. The 
following segment emphasized data use and the assessment by deposit insurance 
administrative preparation/training programs. The fourth section focused on data use and 
the requisite skills to apply the data. Section focused on the four research questions in 
terms of data use for computing/changing deposit insurance coverage limits. The sixth 
segment targeted demographic questions to collect information on the participants’ job 
titles, basic information on the profile of their deposit insurance systems. The final 
segment comprised four open response questions. Sections 1-5 of the instrument utilized 
Likert-scaled 5-point questions (ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree). The 
IADI Members’ fund managers’ usage of statistical industry data to compute and or 
change their coverage limits were assessed via a single Likert-scale question.  
An altered research instrument for any study would generate issues relating to 
validity and reliability which must be addressed. This is symptomatic of research 
whereby measuring instruments must be tested to improve the validity and reliability of 
investigations to cater for precision as well as usage by other researchers (Drucker-
Godard, Ehlinger, & Grenier, 2001). Based on my modification of the survey questions to 
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focus on data usage to compute coverage limits, I conducted several layers scrutiny to 
boost quality (Ornstein, 2013).  
Reliability 
Reliability related to a research measurement instrument is built on the notion that 
different observers can measure the same object with the same instrument at similar or 
different times and arrive at the same results (Drucker-Godard et al., 2001). To achieve 
reliability, this study used a modified version of the ADUS instrument adopted by 
Sheboy (2006) to examine the relationship between the usage of data and data-based 
decision making. 
Validity 
Although several measures can be deployed to test for validity, construct validity 
was deployed to assess the operationalization of the measurement variables. This 
instrument is intended to measure exactly what it purports to measure and at the same 
time provide accurate measures of the object under study (Drucker-Godard et al., 2001). 
To this end, I confirm that the variables used in this study to measure the same concept 
namely industry data usage converged and differed from variables that measure different 
concepts (Drucker-Godard et al., 2001).  
Sufficiency to Answer Research Questions 
The survey questions were divided into components which were used to collect 
demographic information, data driven decision making influences, the data collection 
skills-sets and the data used to compute coverage limits related to IADI members’ fund 
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managers. The survey was random. The survey questions contained the independent 
variables and the dependent variable to answer the research questions namely: 
RQ1:  What effect, if any, does the aggregate bank risk have on the predictor 
variable deposit insurance coverage limit? 
H01: There is no effect of the aggregate bank risk on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
Ha1: There is an effect of the aggregate bank risk on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
RQ2:  What effect, if any, does a DIF’s fund size have on the predictor variable 
deposit insurance coverage limit? 
H02: There is no effect of a DIF’s fund size on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
Ha2: There is an effect of a DIF’s fund size on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
RQ3:  What effect, if any, does the aggregate currency value of the insured bank 
deposits protected by a DIF have on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit? 
H03: There is no effect of the aggregate currency value of the insured bank 
deposits protected by a DIF on the predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit.  
Ha3: There is an effect of the aggregate currency value of the insured bank 
deposits protected by a DIF on the predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit.  
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RQ4:  What effect, if any, does a DIF’s premium levy on its member banks have 
on the predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit? 
H04: There is no effect of a DIF’s premium levy on its member banks on the 
predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit.  
Ha4: There is an effect of a DIF’s premium levy on its member banks on the 
predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit. 
The survey included a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) to assess participants’ skills in using data, the importance of data usage 
to influence decisions, the types of data usage tasks undertaken with regards to working 
with data to compute the coverage limit. The participants were allowed to indicate 
different data-driven intensities/application of the IADI members’ fund managers to 
compute their coverage limits.  
One limitation of the survey methodology is that the investigation’s results have a 
high dependency on the participants’ honesty. Another limitation is that some IADI 
Members’ fund managers’ first language is not the English language, the language in 
which the survey will be worded. Notwithstanding this limitation though, all the IADI 
written and or published material is done in English on its website. The application of the 
appropriate validity and reliability metrics would strengthen the modified research 
instrument to adequately answer the research questions in this study (Warner, 2012). 
Operational Definitions 
In this study, I attempted to measure four independent variables that can impact 
the computation of coverage limits. The independent variables are aggregate bank risk, 
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the currency value of aggregate insured deposits, the DIF value and the premium levy 
rates. The dependent variable is the deposit insurance coverage limit. 
Coverage Limit: The maximum amount which a depositor can claim from or be 
reimbursed by a Deposit Insurer in the event of a Bank failure. Changes in the coverage 
limit are influenced by a number of factors. The four independent variables selected for 
this study are the factors identified for exploring the possible impact on the coverage 
limit. Intuitively, the larger the DIF and the higher the premium rates the lower may be 
the coverage limit. Alternatively, and innately, the higher the level of insured deposits 
and the higher the aggregate level of bank risk, the higher may be the coverage limit.  
Currency value of aggregate insured deposits: the Eligible Deposits in the DIF 
jurisdictional currency that do not exceed the Maximum Coverage Level provided by a 
Deposit Insurance System. Higher levels of insured deposits may warrant the need for a 
higher level of deposit insurance coverage as the potential for bank runs by depositors 
could increase given the fact that depositors may have more to lose in the event of a bank 
failure. While this dichotomy may support the moral hazard argument, if the uninsured 
portion of eligible deposits is too low due to low coverage limits, stability in the banking 
system could decline (IADI, 2014). In this study insured deposits is an independent 
variable. 
Premium levy rates: The prescribed amount of fees that are levied by the deposit 
insurer on the member institutions which are paid in a manner and time frames specified 
in the DIFs’ legislation (IADI, 2014). Higher deposit insurance premium rates, assuming 
no bank failures, no deposit insurance payouts and the presence of good investment 
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options, could provide the opportunity for a DIF to grow. In deposit insurance systems 
where differential premium arrangements are enforced, banks are encouraged to manage 
and control their risks as an incentive to pay lower premium. The premium rate is an 
independent variable in this study. 
Aggregate bank risk: The risk profile or the nature and scale of the risk exposures 
pursued by a bank (BCBS, 2014). The BCBS conceptualization of bank risks “include 
both qualitative and quantitative aspects of a bank’s financial performance financial 
position, risk management strategies and practices risk exposures aggregate exposures to 
related parties transactions with related parties accounting policies and basic business 
management governance and remuneration” (p.70). Under the Basel III, Principle 16 
Capital Adequacy bank capital is considered as a key measure in a bank’s capacity to 
absorb losses and minimize the risk of failure (BCBS 2014). Consistent with this 
principle, I used the ratio of bank equity to total assets as a proxy for bank risk similar to 
Velikova (2006). The higher the quotient of this ratio, the greater the capacity of banks to 
absorb losses and by extension the lower would be the aggregate bank risk of failure to 
the system. Lower levels of aggregate bank risk could potentially reduce the need to pay 
out deposit insurance and this could signal the need for a lower coverage limit. I have 
classified aggregate bank risk as an independent variable.  
The DIF represents a combination of the premium collected by the DIF from the 
member banks plus the earnings generated from the DIF’s investment of the premium 
and interest earned to meet the future obligations associated with resolving banks in 
financial distress one of which includes reimbursing depositors in the event of a bank 
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failure. The fund is also used to meet the deposit insurance system’s operational and 
related costs. A DIF can take two forms, either an ex ante or an ex post form. The ex ante 
reflects the establishment of the fund that is managed by designated authorities and exists 
under a deposit insurance system that offers explicit protection. The ex post fund, 
however, is generally collected from surviving banks to meet deposit reimbursements 
after a bank has failed.  
With regards to the DIF, this study focused on the ex ante fund given its emphasis 
on explicit deposit insurance systems. An ex ante DIF provides a fund manager with the 
resource capacity to reimburse depositors at a coverage level that can maintain the 
solvency of the fund. Intuitively, the higher the value of the fund and assuming no bank 
failures or relatively low-value bank failures as well as strong growth, the greater may be 
the capacity of the fund to reimburse depositors with a higher coverage limit while at the 
same time conforming to the moral hazard principle.  
The survey participants’ responses to the four ordinal independent variables 
namely aggregate bank risk, premium rates, the currency value of aggregate insured 
deposits and the DIF size would be regressed on the one dependent variable, coverage 
limits, to explore any relationship and by extension answer the research questions. The 
overall findings of the survey responses would then be compared with the pilot study 
findings for consistency.  
Data Analysis Plan 
SPSS Version 25 was used in the analysis segment of this study. With this 
software I identified a clear representation of the connections between the use of data and 
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the derivation/computation of IADI fund managers deposit insurance coverage limits. 
This study was divided into two components a pilot study of the U.S. banking system 
coupled with an investigation in to the IADI Members fund managers application of data 
to compute their coverage limits. The pilot study of the U.S. banking system incorporated 
multiple regression analysis to examine the possible relationships between aggregate 
bank risk in the U. S. banking system, the FDIC’s fund size, the insured deposits using 
the FDIC’s coverage limits, the FDIC’s premium rate, and the FDIC’s coverage limits. In 
this instance, I used a cross-section of data from 1934-2019.  
The data were obtained from the FDIC’s Insured Institutions Statistics at a glance 
and the FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile provided on the FDIC’s website. Approval to 
use this data was sought and the FDIC confirmed that no authorization was required as 
the data was placed in the public domain (Appendix B). Access to the data can be found 
at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/. 
To determine aggregate bank risk in the pilot study, I used a bank risk proxy 
incorporating a ratio of bank equity to total assets that considers all the banks that have 
been supervised by the FDIC (Velikova 2006). This metric is reasonable based on the 
BCBS (2012) reliance on bank equity or capital to absorb losses as noted in BCBS Core 
Principle 16 Capital Adequacy. The higher the level of bank capital, the greater is the 
capacity of a bank to absorb losses and such a bank is deemed to have a lower risk 
profile. The obverse is true in that the lower the capital/equity of a bank the lower is the 
bank’s capacity to absorb losses and is deemed to have a higher risk profile. The greater 
the overall aggregate bank risk profile the more exposed would be the DIC’s fund to 
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potential depositors’ reimbursement (IADI, 2014). In circumstances such as the latter, 
coverage limits should be lower placing a larger burden on depositors to exercise 
oversight, the moral hazard concept. 
The investigation in to the IADI Members fund managers application of data 
incorporated a random sampling approach based on the IADI defined mandate-type. I 
used the IADI annual survey data of its Members located on their website to identify 
which systems fall into the mandate categories of paybox, paybox plus, loss minimizer 
and risk minimizer as shown in Table 2, I sought the IADI’s approval to use these data 
but was advised that no authorization was required since this specific data set was placed 
in the public domain (Appendix C). Access to the data can be found at 
https://www.iadi.org/en/core-principles-and-research/deposit-insurance-surveys/. 
The 49 survey questions to the IADI Fund Managers were adapted to emphasize 
the use of statistical industry data to derive and or change coverage limits. SPSS Version 
25 was used in this component of this study to search for possible relationships and the 
potential strengths of theses between the IADI members fund managers use of the four 
independent variables and the dependent variables. The four independent variables are 
the aggregate bank risk, the DIF’s fund size, the aggregate currency value of insured 
deposits, and the DIF’s premium levy rate, while the dependent variable is the coverage 
limit. 
After entering the data on the SPSS certain checks were done utilizing the 
descriptive statistics under the explore feature to assess the data for normality, accuracy 
of the data as well as missing or completeness of the data. The normality plots with tests 
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together with the descriptive histogram and factor levels were deployed to generate the 
output to assess the survey response issues with normality. The scores for skewness and 
kurtosis were examined and analyzed. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk 
test results would be used to determine the expected or normal range of score in the data.  
Ordinal logistic regression was used to assess the predictability of the usage of 
bank risk data, the DIF data, the currency value of aggregated insured deposits data and 
premium rates data by the fund managers. After the data sets were collected and cleaned, 
ordinal regression analysis was used to assess the predictability of the IADI fund 
managers usage of each of the four independent variables to determine their coverage 
levels, the dependent variable. The four independent variables are the aggregate bank 
risk, the DIF size, the currency value of the aggregate insured deposit as well as the 
premium levy rate/(s). The key independent variables took an ordinal categorization; and 
the dependent variable took an ordinal variable classification.  
Prior to the determination of the existence of possible relationships exist between 
the four independent variables namely the aggregate bank risk, the DIF size, the currency 
value of the aggregate insured deposits and the premium levy rate and the dependent 
variable, the coverage limit specific tests were performed to determine whether the data 
would meet the assumptions required for the application of multiple regression 
hypothesis testing.  
The assumptions for using multiple regression in this study: 
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 Dependent variables should be measured on a continuous scale (interval or 
ratio variable). The coverage limit will be used in this analysis as a scale 
variable. 
 Need two or more independent variables, which can be continuous or 
categorical. This study has four independent variables which would be 
categorical.  
 Must have independence of observations. The Durbin-Watson statistic will 
be used to test for independence of observations. 
 Linear relationship should exist between (a) the dependent variable and 
each independent variable. Scatterplots will be used to test for linearity 
between the dependent and the independent variables.  
 Homoscedasticity should be present in the data. Homoscedasticity will be 
tested through scatterplot and the differences or distances of the residual 
values from the line of best fit. The distances could be scattered on either 
side of the line but remain consistent or linear. The presence of a funnel or 
cone indicates that Homoscedasticity is not present.  
 Multicollinearity should not exist in the data. The variance inflation factor 
for all the independent variables are expected to be well away from the 
danger zone of close to and above 10.  




 The residual errors should be approximately normally distributed. Cooks’ 
distance statistic will be used to assess residual errors (Warner, 2013)  
Threats to Validity 
The growth and development of modern social systems are inextricably linked to 
research (Frey, 2018). The issue of the quality research or the lack thereof, plays a critical 
role in determining whether there is progression, stagnation or regression in social 
systems (Frey, 2018). As a strategy to reap the benefits of this quantitative study the 
appropriate measures were deployed to ensure that the findings are construed and 
discerned in a precise manner. Salkind (2012) contended that validity attempts to ensure 
that the substance remains consistent during the process of transitioning from premise to 
conclusion.  
External Validity 
Investigators attempt to ensure that the findings of their research efforts are 
generalizable to other participants, settings and materials (Warner, 2012). Assuming the 
results can be replicated or applied outside of a study then external validity would hold 
(Ruel et al., 2016). While this study incorporated a pilot study, the pretesting of the 
survey questions was tested on experts outside of the target population of IADI fund 
managers. To neutralize testing reactivity, I utilized staff from the IMF and World Bank 
with high level expertise and competencies in deposit insurance.  
Decisions within the IADI member deposit insurance systems with regards to 
coverage limits may extend upward to government level as was demonstrated during the 
2007/2008 global financial crisis. This fact raises the concern in this study about the 
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interaction effects of selection and experimental variables. Notwithstanding this threat, 
the IADI fund manager in this study was either the organization head or a member of the 
board of directors. Based on my experience in the industry, the staff at the senior 
managerial level was considered the most appropriate to respond to questions 
surrounding the problem statement in this study.  
Testing reactivity. Testing reactivity refers to the impact on a study that 
originates from either the instruments or the individuals who execute the study in a 
manner that leads to variation in the results (Lavrakas, 2008). The instrument that was 
used in this study was a questionnaire which as tested rigorously with industry experts 
under a pilot study prior to the actual use in my study. SurveyMonkey was the interface 
between the researcher and the subjects in my study reducing the potential for individual 
influence on the results. 
Interaction effects of selection and experimental arrangements. The 
interaction effect of selection biases and experimental arrangements refers to the effects 
that of a selection factor associated with a group may have or generate when it interacts 
with the experimental treatment (Salkind, 2010). This effect was mitigated through the 
random selection of participants. In this study, while the groups were established by their 
mandates, the selection of the participant IADI members’ fund managers was randomly 
selected.  
Specificity of variables. A researcher’s ability to generalize the results from 
his/her study was affected by the uniqueness of the variables, the measuring instruments, 
types of subjects and other aspects under study (Salkind, 2010). If the characteristics are 
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too exclusive about the population that is being studied, then my ability to generalize 
outside this group would be compromised (Salkind, 2010). The obverse is true whereby 
the broader the aspects of the components of the study the greater the opportunity for 
generalization of the findings (Salkind, 2010). Although the elements of my study were 
restricted to the field of deposit insurance, the characteristics of the variables, subjects, 
measuring instruments and other aspects were not narrowly defined to restrict 
generalizability of the results. 
Reactive effects of experimental arrangements. The reactive effects of 
experimental arrangements represent the effects that are associated with subjects’ 
awareness of their participation in an experiment may have on the results (Frey, 2018.). 
This effect is also known as the Hawthorne effect. There were no experimental 
arrangements in this study and therefore the possibility of such an impact of this nature 
was nil. 
Multiple-treatment interference. Multiple treatment interference refers to the 
impacts where repeated testing is done on similar participants and these resulting effects 
are transferred from one treatment to another limiting the capability to generalize the 
results to a single treatment (Salkind, 2010). As there was only one survey arrangement 
in this study there was no opportunity for carry-over effect or negative related effect on 
the generalization of the results. 
Internal Validity 
Internal validity according to Campbell and Stanley (1963), focuses on causal 
relationship between the independent variables namely aggregate bank risk data, the DIF 
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size, currency value of aggregate insured deposits and premium levy and the dependent 
variable, the coverage limit (Frey, 2018). Certain internal validity threats such as 
ambiguous temporal precedence, history, regression effect, selection, and mortality were 
expected in this study. The cause and effect challenge in terms of determining which 
variable is the cause and which is the effect was minimized through the use of randomly 
assigning sample participants to each of the four strata paybox, paybox-plus, loss 
minimizer and risk minimizer business models. In this way, participant biases were 
equally distributed in each of the four groups (Salkind, 2012).  
History. History threat refers to an event that is not related to any of the specified 
variables of interest in this study that occurs between the pretest and posttest time period 
and impacts the dependent variable (Salkind, 2012). My investigation into industry data 
independent variables that can impact the dependent variable, coverage limit, is a new 
area of research limiting the probability of such an occurrence. To add another layer of 
protection, the survey instrument allowed potential participants to specify any 
independent variable outside of the four to be tested in this study. The time difference 
between the pretest and posttest was restricted to minimize any possible non-related event 
occurrences that can impact the participants. 
Maturation. Maturation threat refers to the effect on the dependent variable that 
is triggered by physical or mental developmental changes in the participants over time 
(Salkind, 2012). The participants in my study were surveyed at one specific time interval. 
This one-time approach eliminated the potential for such changes in participants to 
influence the dependent variable. 
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Testing instrumentation. The threat of testing instrumentation refers to the 
impact that participants’ familiarity may have on the dependent variable when they 
become aware it after multiple uses (Salkind, 2012). The modified survey instrument 
chosen for my investigation was vetted by industry experts who are retirees from their 
employment posts as former fund managers of deposit insurance systems that are 
members of the IADI. This group is different and separated from the population reducing 
the prospects for familiarity that could enhance participant performance (Pett, Lackey, & 
Sullivan, 2011). 
Statistical regression. Statistical regression threat refers to the statistical impact 
that participants’ pretest scores may have on posttests results after manipulating the 
treatment variable in a one group design (Salkind, 2012). In such a circumstance, a 
researcher may in error attribute the change in the posttest to changes in the treatment 
variable when the change may have been attributed to the pretest survey design. The pilot 
test group and the actual target population were different restricting the potential for such 
an occurrence in my study. The targeted population staff in each IADI member 
organization was equally tested to negate the threat of statistical regression.  
Selection-maturation interaction. The threat of selection-maturation interaction 
refers to the effect that the differences in groups maturation rates coupled with their 
interaction can have on the dependent variable (Salkind, 2012). This possibility exists 
with the IADI that comprises several deposit insurance systems from around the world.  
Given that the participants were surveyed at one specific point in time, the threat of 




It is imperative that researchers comply with the adoption of proper ethical 
standards (Salkind, 2012). These standards are defined in the form of ethics’ codes 
produced by professional organizations to guide individuals who participate in research 
and academic study (Bradford, 2018). Some of the guidelines place emphasis on 
protecting research participants from different forms of potential ill-treatments, abuse, 
harm, or injury among others (Bradford, 2018). My study was a cross-sectional 
investigation the collection of data from individuals of the IADI member population, 
human respondents, at a single point in time (Cummings, 2018). The interaction with the 
intended IADI participants created the potential for the occurrence of breaches of 
research ethics.  
During the conduct of my investigation, I managed the data procurement, control, 
safety, confidentiality, and analysis requirements in tandem with Walden University’s 
IRB guidelines. I obtained IRB approval prior to the data collection process. In the 
interest of maintaining proper ethical standards in this study I protected the participants 
by applying proper ethical controls such as disclosure of objective of the study for 
purposes of protecting and securing the participants’ data; indication of the rights to 
consent and or withdraw. I also applied ethical procedures such as alerting the 
participants of their rights in a consent agreement which I asked each participant to sign 
before the survey commences.  
To demonstrate deference to the IADI participants, I indicated to the population 
that they are free to participate voluntarily and or decline should they opt. I was forthright 
120 
 
and honest about purpose of the pilot study and the survey. I applied the principle of 
justice and ensured that the IADI participants are treated equally (Israel, 2015).  Although 
my effort to reach the IADI participants was done through a relatively harm-free 
mechanism, to minimize the risk and maximize the benefits to the IADI participants, I 
indicated that there is no threat of physical injury or mischief (Israel, 2015).  
To protect the intended participants, I implemented the following measures 
consistent with the ethical statements laid out in Belmont Report (1979) and incorporated 
within the Walden University’s IRB statements of ethics. All the documents that would 
be used to collect and store data from the IADI fund managers would meet all aspects of 
confidentiality through encryptions and password-protected files. Neither the 
participants’ names nor other information were disclosed or revealed in any form. This 
process involved the use of codes and not names to ensure that no part of the study will 
shed any light on the identity of the participants. 
I gave my intended participants adequate advance notice and time to respond to 
the survey questions and material was provided to clarify the purpose of the research 
study (Israel, 2015). I ensured that my professional work experience in the field of 
deposit insurance will not influence any bias on the responses of the intended participants 
(Israel, 2015).  I used the Walden University’s IRB disclosure form that incorporates the 
provisions to protect participants’ confidentiality through the non-recording of names and 
avoid using subordinates to participate in my study; The data collected from the survey 
will neither be used for purposes of anything related to the development of the 
organization for which I work nor for any other intervention or activity other than the 
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investigation (Israel, 2015). I remained alert during the data collection process to detect 
any discrete adverse events plus general or unanticipated problems which should such 
occur, the IRB would have been informed within one week of such occurrence (Israel, 
2015).  
Summary 
I adopted a quantitative cross-section design that covers the study of the 
application of industry data by IADI Fund managers in the derivation of their deposit 
insurance coverage limits. Drawing on the literature that identified experiences involving 
the use of data in the insurance industry in the broadest sense coupled with the ideology 
that deposit insurance was no different to other types of insurance, this chapter has 
provided a scholarly framework to explore the first and distinctive suggestions of the data 
usage in deriving coverage limits. Although scholars have explored the possible existence 
of an intuitive optimal coverage limit, no investigations focused on the types and extent 
of specific industry data to quantify the coverage limits. This study attempts to set the 
groundwork for initiating industry data usage in the derivation of deposit insurance 
coverage limits. 
In this study, I appraised the application of four specific data types using the 
FDIC’s data related to some banks in the United States. The findings will assist in the 
identification of a standard data set application process to compute coverage limits in the 
deposit insurance industry. Chapter 4 will present a detailed analysis and discussion of 
the results of the study. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative cross-sectional study was to evaluate the use of 
banking and deposit insurance industry and statistical data by deposit insurers in the 
international arena to compute their deposit insurance coverage limits. The research 
questions focused on four banking and deposit insurance industry statistical data factors 
comprising the independent variables: (a) aggregate bank risk, (b) premium levy, (c) the 
size of the DIF, and (d) aggregate currency value of insured bank deposits and the 
premium levy. The purpose of the study was to measure the use of the independent 
variables by the IADI members compute their deposit insurance coverage limits, the 
dependent variable. I established four hypotheses to answer these questions (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2015). In this chapter, I highlight the findings of the pilot 
study, participants’ demographics, the steps to execute and procure the survey material as 
well as the SPSS statistical outputs of the research data of the IADI members.  
Pilot Study 
Pilot studies perform a key role in the design of quantitative studies (Allen, 2017). 
Such studies offer researchers the opportunity to conduct a preliminary or exploratory 
study to obtain better insights about the main study (Allen, 2017). Due to the lack of 
empirical evidence related to causative factors that influence deposit insurance coverage 
limits, I executed a multiple regression analysis using four independent variables: 
aggregate bank risk, DIF size, the aggregate value of currency of insured deposits, and 
the premium levy. The pilot study sample data were extracted from the FDIC from 1934 
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to 2019. The findings of this pilot study were intended to provide direction to the choice 
of factors to include in my sample survey to unearth the causative factors that may 
influence coverage limits.  
Multiple regression analysis was used in this pilot study. The variable used for 
prediction in the model was the dependent variable, coverage limit, while the variables 
used to predict its value or outcome are the independent variables. namely, aggregate 
bank risk, DIF size, the aggregate value of currency of insured deposits, and the premium 
levy (Warner, 2013). I explored possible predictability of a deposit insurance system’s 
coverage limit using four variables from bank and deposit industry data.  
The follow assumptions for using multiple regression were met: Dependent 
variables should be measured on a continuous scale (interval or ratio variable). Coverage 
limit was used in this analysis. It is a scale variable and therefore conforms with this 
assumption. I needed two or more independent variables, which can be continuous or 
categorical. The variables reported aggregate bank risk, DIF size, the aggregate currency 
value of insured deposits, and the premium levy are also continuous. There must be 
independence of observations. The Durbin-Watson statistic shown for aggregate bank 
risk, DIF size, the aggregate currency value of insured deposits, and the premium levy 
respectively was 0.736, which fell within the acceptable range of 0.0 to 4.0 and supports 
the view that there was independence of observations in the survey process. 
Linear relationships should exist between the dependent variable and each 
independent variable. Scatterplot 1 in Appendix A illustrates some linearity between the 
dependent variable, coverage limit, and the independent variables, aggregate bank risk, 
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DIF size, the aggregate currency value of insured deposits, and the premium levy. 
Homoscedasticity should be present in the data. Homoscedasticity is present when the 
dependent and independent variables are plotted on a scatterplot and the differences or 
distances of the residual values from the line of best fit show a tendency toward 
consistency, not the formation of a cone or funnel shape. In simple terms, the distances 
could be scattered on either side of the line but remain consistent or linear. The presence 
of a funnel or cone indicates that homoscedasticity is not present. The distances of the 
residuals from the line of best fit on either side show consistency in each case, which 
suggests that homoscedasticity is present in the data, thereby conforming with this 
assumption.  
Multicollinearity should not exist in the data. The variance inflation factor (VIF) 
ranged in values from 1.480 to 4.051 for all the independent variables. The variables are 
well away from the danger zone of close to and above 10, indicating compliance with this 
assumption. There should be no significant outliers, high leverage points, or highly 
influential points. The residual errors should be approximately normally distributed.  
Given the foregoing results, there appears to be no undue influence and as such 
the residual errors are approximately normally distributed. A thorough review of the 
assumptions underpinning the execution of the multiple regression analysis to ensure 
acceptance for usage was conducted. Accordingly, no violations of the assumptions of 
normality or linearity were discovered. The model summary results illustrate an R square 
= 0.948, an adjusted R square = 0.945; F(85, 368.163); p < .000. Based on the criterion α 
= .05 two-tailed for statistical significance, the summary results illustrate significance for 
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the predictor variables. An R square value greater than 0.3 is considered acceptable. The 
R square amounted to 0.948, which indicates that 94.8% of the variation in the coverage 
limit, the independent variable, is explained by variation in the four independent 
variables. When the four independent variables are examined individually, the following 
results were revealed: DIF size, β = 0.004, t = 0.087, p < 0 .931; aggregate currency value 
of insured deposits, β = 0.997, t = 19.523, p < 0 .000; premium levy, β = 0.117, t = 3.694, 
p < 0 .000; and aggregate bank risk, β = -0.102, t = -3.319, p < 0 .001. Overall, the 
predictor variables, aggregate currency value of insured deposits, premium levy, and 
aggregate bank risk, indicated statistical significance, which is less than the α = .05. The 
DIF size, however, appears to demonstrate no significance. The residuals indicate a mean 
coverage limit of $71,831.40, which is well below the current coverage limit of $250,000, 
which suggests that the FDIC’s authorities did not apply bank and deposit insurance 
industry data to derive the coverage limit. A Pearson correlation analysis was conducted 
using the coverage limit as the dependent variable against/for each independent variable 
to test their individual contributory strengths as predictor variables.  
As shown in Table 2, the aggregate currency value of insured deposits appears to 
be the most significant data set for usage in computing the deposit insurance coverage 
limit with a factor of 0.963. This is expected in a material sense since the insured deposit 
data is the target for establishing and changing the coverage limit. Aggregate bank risk 
was moderate with a factor of 0.476 suggesting some worth as a possible data set for 
influencing the coverage limit. Premium levy was the weakest influencer with a 
correlation factor of 0.287 and although somewhat soft, it was positive again supporting 
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the need for consideration as a data set. All the correlation factors were significant at the 
alpha 0.05 level. Overall, the four independent variables appeared to have been a 





Independent variables Correlations Test of 
significance 
Aggregate bank risk 0.476 .000 
Aggregate currency value of insured deposits 0.963 .000 
Premium levy 0.287 .007 
 
Data Collection 
IADI Members’ Study 
The survey questions for this cross-sectional study of the IADI Members were 
administered through the SurveyMonkey’s online target audience tool to collect the 
research data required for evaluating their use of data to compute their deposit insurance 
coverage limits. Organization Membership within IADI was the main criteria for the 
survey participants and based more specifically on work status, job function, IADI 
geographic zones and organizational fund type among other factors. The participants 
were requested to chooses between five responses specifically, strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree.  
I followed the Walden’s IRB compliance requirements for survey participants by 
issuing invitation and consent letters through SurveyMonkey. The participants were 
advised of the risks, benefits, protections protocols to prevent against loss of privacy, 
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psychological distress, and physical harm. The survey participants were advised via the 
consent letter that their responses were anonymous and that their relationships with the 
researcher through previous interactions at the IADI events were protected whether or not 
they participated in the survey.  
In the consent letter, participants were provided with a sample of the survey 
questions to build their familiarity with type and level of questions that they would be 
required to answer. If they encountered any issues or concerns requiring redress during 
the survey, participants were advised to make contact with either the researcher, the 
Walden IRB, or my supervising committee whose contact information were made 
available in the consent letter. In keeping with the IRB requirements no incentives were 
offered to encourage participation. Participants were also informed that they could end 
and or withdraw from participating in the survey at any time they so choose. 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
My research inquiry was triggered by the recommendations of the FSB and I 
developed these five questions and hypotheses:  
RQ1:  What effect, if any, does the aggregate bank risk have on the predictor 
variable deposit insurance coverage limit? 
H01: There is no effect of the aggregate bank risk on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
Ha1: There is an effect of the aggregate bank risk on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
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RQ2:  What effect, if any, does a DIF’s fund size have on the predictor variable 
deposit insurance coverage limit? 
H02: There is no effect of a DIF’s fund size on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
Ha2: There is an effect of a DIF’s fund size on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit.  
RQ3:  What effect, if any, does the aggregate currency value of the insured bank 
deposits protected by a DIF have on the predictor variable deposit 
insurance coverage limit? 
H03: There is no effect of the aggregate currency value of the insured bank 
deposits protected by a DIF on the predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit.  
Ha3: There is an effect of the aggregate currency value of the insured bank 
deposits protected by a DIF on the predictor variable deposit insurance coverage  
RQ4:  What effect, if any, does a DIF’s premium levy on its member banks have 
on the predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit? 
H04: There is no effect of a DIF’s premium levy on its member banks on the 
predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit.  
Ha4: There is an effect of a DIF’s premium levy on its member banks on the 
predictor variable deposit insurance coverage limit. 
In addition to the research questions and hypotheses, I will highlight a 
comprehensive review of the data collection processes for both the pilot study and the 
deposit insurers’ survey responses, including data cleaning and accurate representation of 
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the surveyed data. The results will illustrate the critical assumptions made in data 
analyses, descriptive statistics, tables with figures, statistical outputs produced by SPSS 
and its interpretation.  
Participants’ Demographics 
Data were collected from a sample of 91 IADI deposit insurers’ member 
institutions (now 86 members) from different jurisdictions around the world via the 
SurveyMonkey online audience. The SurveyMonkey data collection was launched on the 
March 7, 2020, and closed on June 23, 2020. I sought and obtained approval from my 
supervising committee to extend the survey due to the initial slow survey responses. 
Given the need to respond online, many participants had limited access to their office 
computer systems as they were working remotely at home because of the implementation 
of the COVID-19 measures worldwide.  
The initial benchmarks of this study incorporated a conventional G power of 0.90, 
a two-sided test, a significance level of α = 0.05, the number of predictors 4, and a 
medium effect size, ρ = 0.15. Based on the aforesaid factors, a minimum number of 74 
participants would be required for the sample size. Given the occurrence of the COVID-
19 and the negative impact on the survey responses, I subsequently made alterations to 
the survey sample size. The altered benchmarks incorporated a conventional G power of 
0.80, a two-sided test, a significance level of α = 0.05, the number of predictors 4, and a 
medium effect size, ρ = 0.30 (Tassin, 2019). Based on the aforesaid factors, a minimum 
number of 23 participants would be required for the sample size (Tassin, 2019). The 
selected statistical test was the linear multiple regression. 
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At closure of the survey, I obtained 37 responses of which two were not useful 
and were rejected based on a relatively large number of incomplete responses. The 
remaining 36 were further cleaned and due to a lack of responses, were reduced to the 
working volume of 29 responses. Analyses were executed using the 29 responses through 
the different segments of the IADI survey. The responses accounted for 33.7% of the 
population which currently stands at 86 members.  
To test the four hypotheses, an ordinal logistic regression, based on proportional 
odds model, was conducted to determine if a correlation exist between the independent 
variables, (aggregate bank risk, the DIF size, the aggregate currency value of insured 
deposits and the DIF premium levy) and the dependent variable (coverage limit).  
The initial four independent variables were increased by two representing the 
IADI’s members’ aggregate bank risk, a DIF’s fund size, the aggregate currency value of 
the insured bank deposits, the DIF’s premium levy on its member banks, the modal 
domestic currency value of insured deposits, and the average domestic currency value of 
insured deposits. The additional variables were included to broaden the industry 
statistical data set that participants could choose from to change and or compute their 
coverage limits A 5-point Likert scale was used with scores ranging from 1 as strongly 
agree to 5 as strongly disagree for the independent variables (Sheboy, 2006).  
Before the execution of the ordinal logistic regression, the four key assumptions 
were examined including the following: 
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 There should be one dependent variable that is measured at the ordinal 
level. The dependent variable, coverage limit, is measured as an ordinal 
with categories such as never, minimal, moderate and frequent. 
 There should be one or more independent variables that are continuous, 
ordinal or categorical. The four independent variables are measured as 
ordinal, strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and 
strongly disagree. 
 There should be no multicollinearity.  
 Proportional odds. 
The logit link model was used to test the model adequacy. The initial five Likert 
scale responses were adjusted down to a three Likert response from strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree to agree, neither agree nor 
disagree and disagree. The out produced a warning that 12 (42.9%) cells (dependent 
variable levels by observed combinations of predictor variable values) with zero 
frequencies.  
Results 
There were 29 clean responses to the four thesis questions in the survey. The case 
processing summary illustrated that six members never changed their limits while 23 
made changes to their coverage limits. As shown in Table 3, 31% of the participants 
agreed to include aggregate bank risk in the computation of coverage limits while 37.9% 
neither agreed nor disagreed and 31% disagreed. When added the neither agree nor 
disagree together with the disagree decision were above 50%, indicating a preference for 
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non-inclusion of the variable. The same pattern followed for the research questions the 
size of the DIF and the premium levy. The research question, aggregate domestic 
currency value of insured deposits had responses at 58.6%.    
Table 3 
 
Frequency and Percentages of Deposit Insurers 
Variables  Agree Neither agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
RQ1: Aggregate 
bank risk 
5 31.0 11 37.9 9 31.0 
RQ2: Size of 
DIF 
13 44.8 8 27.6 8 27.6 
RQ3: Aggregate 
domestic 
currency value of 
insured deposits 
17 58.6 10 34.5 2 6.9 
RQ4: Premium 
levy rate 
12 41.4 9 31.0 8 27.6 
 
The SPSS outputs illustrated the following information. Two key metrics 
indicated a good fit of the model for this analysis: The deviance goodness-of-fit test 
indicated that the model was a good fit to the surveyed data, X
2
(5) = .000, ρ =1.000. The 
Pearson goodness-of-fit test indicated that the model was a good fit to the surveyed data, 
X
2
(5) = .000, ρ =1.000. The likelihood ratio is another measure of the model fit. The 
spread between the-2 log likelihood provides some indication of the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables (Laerd, n.d.). The larger the spread, the stronger 
the explanatory links between the independent and dependent variables (Laerd, n.d.). The 
final model statistically significantly predicted the dependent variable over and above the 
intercept-only model, X
2





 -Square is a measure of variance in ordinary least-squares linear 
regression (Laerd, n.d.). The results displayed the Nagelkerke of 0.679, Cox and Snell 
0.434 and McFadden 0.559 (Warner, 2013). The parameter estimates sums all the 
variables and their significance. In all cases the results of the ordinal logistic regression 
analysis were not significant and indicated no relationship between the perceptions of the 
use of statistical industry data such as aggregate bank risk, the DIF size, the aggregate 
currency value of insured deposits and the premium levy and the computation of the 
deposit insurance coverage limit.  
As shown in Table 4, the findings indicate that the omnibus test results for the 
aggregate bank risk profile, the size of the DIF, the aggregate domestic currency value of 
insured deposits and the premium levy rate using the Wald test statistic. In the opinion of 
the participants, the use of four independent variables (data sets), namely the aggregate 
bank risk profile, the size of the DIF, the aggregate domestic currency value of insured 
deposits and the premium levy rate have no statistical significant effect on the prediction 
of the computation or changes in the deposit insurance coverage limit, Wald X2(2) = 
.000, ρ =1.000.  
Table 4 
 
Tests of Model Effects 
Source Wald Chi-Square df Sig. 
Aggregate risk profile of fund member banks .000 2 1.00 
Size of deposit insurance fund .000 2 1.00 
Aggregate domestic currency value of insured deposits .000 2 1.00 
Premium level rate .000 2 1.00 
Dependent variable: Number of times DIF Coverage Limit changed model: (threshold), 
Aggregate risk profile of fund member banks, Size of deposit insurance fund, Aggregate 
domestic currency value of insured deposits. Premium levy rate 
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I looked at the possible influence that the DIF Funding type as a factor may have 
had on the derivation of the coverage limit. There are three main funding types in the 
deposit insurance industry namely ex ante, ex post, and hybrid. According to IADI 
(2014),  
 Ex ante funding: The regular collection of Premiums, with the aim of 
accumulating a fund to meet future obligations (e.g. reimbursing 
depositors) and cover the operational and related costs of the Deposit 
Insurer. 
 Ex post funding: A system in which funds to cover deposit insurance 
obligations are only collected from surviving Banks after a Bank failure. 
 Hybrid: A system that combines elements of both the ex ante and ex post 
funding arrangements.  
The ordinal logistic regression analysis showed that fund type had no statistical 
significant effect on the prediction of the computation or changes in the deposit insurance 
coverage limit, Wald X2(1) = .916, ρ =.338 and Wald X2(1) = .000, ρ =1.000 for the ex 
ante and the ex post funding types respectively. The result for the ex post funding type 
was not unexpected since such a model does not indicate or commit to a specific 
coverage limit prior to the failure of a bank. The hybrid funding type had no impact on 
the ordinal logistic model. Based on the foregoing results the DIF funding type had no 
influence on the use of statistical data to compute the deposit insurance coverage limit.  
Although the research questions showed no evidence of statistical significance, an 
examination of the IADI members by region was conducted. The ordinal logistic 
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regression analysis showed that regional members (Euro Asia, Latin America, Asia, 
Europe, Africa, Americas and the Caribbean) had no statistical significant effect on the 
prediction of the use of statistical industry data to compute and or change the deposit 
insurance coverage limits, Wald X2(6) = .872, ρ =.990. The IADI regional members’ 
opinions to use industry statistical data did not show any preference by region. 
A similar inquiry was done for the factor IADI mandate type notwithstanding the 
research questions showed no evidence of statistical significance. The ordinal logistic 
regression analysis showed that the IADI mandate types (paybox, paybox plus, loss 
minimizer, and risk minimizer) had no statistical significant effect on the prediction of 
the use of statistical industry data to compute and or change deposit insurance coverage 
limits, Wald X2(3) = .206, ρ =.997. The IADI members’ opinions to use industry 
statistical data did not show any preference by the IADI mandate type. 
Using the ordinal regression analysis to assess the international deposit insurers’ 
perspective on the use of statistical industry data predictability of each of the independent 
variables on the coverage level, the findings are not statistically significant. These results 
illustrate that deposit insurers do not opine that the four independent variables tested as 
predictors of the statistical industry data that can be used to compute and or change their 
deposit insurance coverage limits. Except for the variable the DIF size, the FDIC’s pilot 
study results conflict with the findings of the survey study. The four independent 
variables were statistically significant supporting the need for inclusion in determining 
the coverage limits. In the correlation analysis, the aggregate currency value of insured 
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deposits posited the strongest predictability as an independent variable at 0.963 followed 
by the DIF size at 0.697 that could be used as a factor to compute the coverage limit.  
Descriptive statistical analyses were adopted to assess the frequency of the 
participants’ responses. The first segment of the survey attempted to get the respondents’ 
opinions on data use; the importance of data. In this section on the question related to 
deposit insurance systems that effectively use data to improve staff and institutional 
performance or achievement to become high performing deposit insurance systems, the 
respondents’ opinions ranged between 82.1% to 92.9% to the four questions as shown in 
Table 5. Overall, the majority of responses were in agreement with the view that data use 




Data Use: The Importance of Data 
 Deposit insurance systems 
which effectively use data to 
improve staff/institutional 
performance/achievement 
are better able to become 
high performing systems 
One of the most 




is data use 




Data use has become 
more important for 
staff/institutional 
performance/achievement 
over the past 5 to 7 years 




7.1% 7.1% 14.3% 10.7% 
Disagree 0.0% 10.7% 0.0% 3.6% 
 
The segment of survey questions related to data use: data tasks the trend followed 
a similar pattern to the first segment of the questionnaire. As shown in Table 6, the 
participants selection to agree were substantially larger (69.0% to 75.9%) than the 
alternates supporting the view that the execution of tasks requires the use of data within 





Data Use: The Importance of Data 
 In my current position, I 
work with fellow-staff to 
analyze statistical industry 
assessment data to 
develop prescriptive plans 
In my current 
position, I interpret 
data frequently 
In my current position, I 
interpret data from 
industry/institutional 
sources 
In my current position, I 
analyze data from 
industry/institutional 
sources 




10.3% 24.1% 6.9% 24.1% 
Disagree 13.8% 6.9% 17.2% 3.4% 
 
The responses to the survey questions that fell into the segment Data Use: 
Assessment of Deposit Insurance Administrative Preparation Programs was much weaker 
in terms of agreement and much stronger with regards to disagreement than the responses 
to the previous groupings. Table 7 showed that the agreed responses ranged from 28.6% 
to 65.5% while the disagreed responses were lower than the previous groups ranging 
from 10.3% to 42.9%. The neither agree nor disagree responses also showed an uptick, 
significantly ranging from 24.1% to 34.5%.  These responses indicate consensus on 
views related to the organizational training/preparation to analyze data and to interpret 
data.   
Table 7 
 
Data Use: Assessment of Deposit Insurance Administrative Preparation Program 
 Organizational 
training/preparation 
in deposit insurance 
administration 
prepared me for 







allowed me to learn 
to use statistics 
software programs 
to analyze data  
Organizational 
training/preparation in 
deposit insurance prepared 
me to effectively use data 
for computing the deposit 
insurance coverage limit 
Organizational training/preparation 
in deposit insurance administration 
allowed me to learn to interpret 
data reports from industry sources 




24.1% 28.6% 34.5% 24.1% 




The questions related to organizational training/preparation on communication, 
planning, and learning on the job illustrated that participants were in agreement in all 
instances. As shown in Table 8, the agree responses ranged from 58.6% to 89.3% while 
the neither agree nor disagree and the disagree options ranged from 7.1% to 27.6% and 
3.6% and 13.8% respectively.  The participants’ views support the use of programs as 
well as learning on the job to build their competencies to conduct the analysis of industry 
data for computing the deposit insurance coverage limits.  
Table 8 
 
Data Use: Assessment of Deposit Insurance Administrative Preparation Program 
 Organizational 
training/preparation 
in deposit insurance 
administration 
prepared me for data 
analysis interpretation 
and communication 
challenges related to 





me to effectively 




deposit insurance prepared 
me to communicate data 
analysis  
In order to meet the data use 
requirements of my current 
position, I had to learn on the job 




27.6% 24.1% 13.8% 7.1% 
Disagree 13.8% 13.8% 13.8% 3.6% 
 
With respect to coursework in statistics and or data analysis, the participants’ 
responses were collectively higher for neither agree nor disagree and disagree.  The 
responses as illustrated in Table 9 indicate that the organizational training/preparation did 
not place an emphasis on this particular skill set as a requisite for data analysis.  The 
findings suggest that the organizational training and preparation programs appear to be a 
contributory factor to staff members’ soft opinions regarding the use of the four variables 





Data Use: Assessment of Deposit Insurance Administrative Preparation Program 
 Organizational training/preparation in deposit 
insurance required that I take coursework in 
statistics and or data analysis 
Organizational training/preparation in deposit 
insurance administration, took one or more 
courses in statistics and or data analysis 
Agree 44.8% 34.5% 
Neither agree nor disagree 24.1% 20.7% 
Disagree 31.0% 44.8% 
 
The responses to the survey questions that fell into the segment Data Use: 
Requisite Skills were different to the grouping on training and preparatory programs but 
consistent with the segments on data use: the importance of data and data use: data tasks. 
As shown in Table 10, the participants agree responses ranged from 75.9% to 85.7% 
while the neither agree nor disagree and the disagree responses ranged from 10.7% to 
20.7% and 3.4% to 3.6% respectively. These opinions indicate that the participants place 
greater emphasis on statistical analysis, data analysis, data use and communication of 
data analysis as key skills to prepare them to use data for the coverage limit computation.    
Table 10 
 























Data use for deposit insurance 
coverage limit evaluation 
should be taught in deposit 
insurance programs 
Communication of data analysis for 
deposit insurance coverage limit 
evaluation should be taught in deposit 
insurance programs 




20.7% 14.3% 14.3% 10.7% 




The participants’ agree responses to the requisite skills to present the data analysis 
and data use for coverage limits were both at 85.7%.  As shown in Table 11, the 
participants opined that these two areas were key areas related to the coverage limit 
evaluation and that such programs should be taught in their deposit insurance systems.  
These opinions suggest that having the requisite skills to compute the coverage limit may 
not be the only aspect of the computation of coverage limit effort but the skills to present 
and plan are other relevant areas.      
Table 11 
 
Data Use: Requisite Skills 
 Presentation of data analysis for deposit insurance 
coverage limit evaluation in multiple formats 
should be taught in deposit insurance programs 
Data use for deposit insurance coverage limit 
planning should be taught in deposit 
insurance programs 
Agree 85.7% 85.7% 
Neither agree nor disagree 10.7% 10.7% 
Disagree 3.6% 3.6% 
 
An examination was conducted on the participants’ acknowledgement of their 
educational degrees that best prepared them to use data in the deposit insurance industry. 
Using frequency analysis, the master’s degree was the single largest degree that in the 
opinion of the participants best prepared them to use statistical industry data. As shown in 
Table 12, only two of the six participants, or 33% that has doctorates noted that this level 
of qualification prepared them to use statistical industry data. Overall, the participants 
seemingly do not possess the appropriate qualification to use the deposit industry data. 
This finding on the educational capacity coupled with the soft opinions on the 
organizational training/preparatory programs may be contributory factors to the 





Respondents’ First Ranking of Educational Degrees That Best Prepare Them to Use 
Data 
Bachelor’s Master’s Post Master’s Doctorate 
Qty % Qty % Qty % Qty % 
8 36% 9 53% 4 36% 2 33% 
22 17 11 6 
 
The survey incorporated open-ended questions to incorporate participants’ 
suggestions outside of the closed-ended questions. These factors include; (a) other 
statistical industry data other than the variables tested in the research hypotheses that 
could be used to compute the coverage limit, (b) other modes of organizational training to 
use data to compute the coverage limit, (c) the actions pursued with the actual statistical 
industry data related to the coverage limit, and (d) the limiting factors that restricts the 
organization’s capacity to use statistical industry data.  
The alternative data sets to compute the deposit insurance coverage limit that the 
participants suggested are disclosed in Figure 1. The major factors outside of the 
aggregate bank risk, fund size, aggregate values of insured deposit and the premium levy 
include the bank deposit data on the type of depositor-group, the number of deposit 
accounts and the total value of deposits among others. It may be that that the participants 
held the view that different depositor groups may reveal the dispersion of the currency-
holdings of depositors and perhaps can be used to discriminate which group the emphasis 
of coverage should be placed and by extension the amount of the coverage limit. The 
number of deposit accounts appears too abstract on its own and may be used with another 
factor such as the total value of deposits. The types of deposit instruments may be worthy 
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of consideration since deposit insurance systems tend to cover some deposit instruments 
such as domestic deposits and not foreign currency deposits (IADI, 2014). 
 
Figure 1. Alternative data required to compute DIs coverage limit. 
The participants’ consideration for organizational training focused on three main 
areas namely statistics, outreach programs and economics as illustrated in Figure 2. The 
computation of the coverage limit may necessitate the application of regression, time 
series and other statistical methodologies to industry data which is seemingly lacking 
within the deposit insurance systems. The outreach programs appear to be a mechanism 
that deposit insurance systems can use to perhaps discuss the possible practical 




Figure 2. Modes of training/experience required to compute coverage limits. 
The FDIC is one of the few deposit insurance systems that perform the functions 
of both bank regulator and deposit insurer and by virtue of this combined effort is 
legislatively empowered to receive a broad range of statistical industry data on the US 
banking system. In other instances, some deposit insurance systems may not have that 
same level of access to the wide range as is the case of the FDIC. In light of the 
differences in access to data, the survey participants were asked to comment on their use 
of statistical industry data, whether limited or broad. 
Analysis of the coverage limit level was the major activity concerning the use of 
the statistical industry data as shown in Figure 3, accounting for 53%. This is followed by 
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Research and Board Reports which stood at 13% in each instance. Assessing bank risk 
for provisioning funds, submissions to the bank supervisor and guiding the investment 
portfolio make up the balance of the uses of the data with each recording a 7% usage 
factor. These findings are notable on two points. One, it suggests that some level of use is 
made of the data by some deposit insurers perhaps by those systems that have more 
access than others. Alternatively, while the Fund Managers may use the data to analyze 
coverage limits, it seems that the data is neither used to computer nor change the levels. 
Arguably, while some deposit insurance systems such as those that operate under a Risk 
Minimizer business model (IADI, 2014), for example the FDIC in the USA, little or no 
effort appears to be put towards using the data to influence the coverage limit.  
 
Figure 3. Uses of statistical industry data. 
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The participants identified several factors that contributed to their lack of data use 
to compute their coverage limits as shown in Figure 4. The restricted access to bank 
financial data held by the bank regulator, legislation that limits the deposit insurers’ 
power to use data, and the unreliability of the quality of bank data appears to be the major 
factors that perhaps have constricted deposit insurers to use data to compute their 
coverage limits. Other contributory factors include cost, outdated data and the lack of 
institutional skill to engage statistical and financial modelling. With respect to restricted 
data access, in some jurisdictions, the data on banks are held by the bank regulator, which 
may be a separate legal entity than the deposit insurance system that exists in Jamaica 
where the Bank of Jamaica is the bank regulator (Section 34A of the Bank of Jamaica 
Act) and the Jamaica Deposit Insurance Corporation is the deposit insurance system. The 





Figure 4. Limiting factors that constrain DI data usage. 
Within the European Union, the deposit insurance coverage limits for each 
jurisdiction within the Union is determined by the European Union Directive 
2014/49/EU. This directive seeks to protect depositors of all credit institutions that 
emphasize a harmonized coverage limit level across the Union. At the establishment of 
the Directive the coverage limit was €100,000.00. This form of legislative intervention, in 
the opinion of the European participants, may limit their fund managers’ authority to 
influence the coverage limit within their respective jurisdictions in the European Union 
and by extension their opinions on the use of statistical industry data. As shown in Figure 
5, the IADI members who belong to the European Union that responded to the survey 




Figure 5. IADI Regional Committees. 
Deposit insurance systems are categorized into four groups as defined by the 
IADI namely the paybox, the paybox plus, the loss minimizer and the risk minimizer 
(IADI, 2014). These groups are graded by extent of their legislative powers to engage in 
bank resolutions’ methodologies, including deposit insurance payouts (IADI, 2014). 
These groupings, and by extension their legislative powers, may also influence the level 
of access to statistical industry data and the use of such data. The paybox system 
generally has a very narrow mandate and as such may not have access to statistical 
industry data. The Table 13 shows that only three of the participants were from this group 
and may have had some minimal impact on the absence of statistical significance related 










Valid Paybox 3 10.3 10.3 10.3 
Paybox plus 15 51.7 51.7 62.1 
Loss 
minimizer 
7 24.1 24.1 86.2 
Risk 
minimizer 
4 13.8 13.8 100.0 
Total 29 100.0 100.0  
 
Summary 
The findings of the pilot study were statistically significant for the predictor 
variables namely aggregate currency value of insured deposits, premium levy and 
aggregate bank risk indicated statistical significance which is less than the α = .05. The 
DIF size, however, appears to demonstrate no significance. The correlation analysis for 
aggregate currency value of insured deposits, premium levy and aggregate bank risk 
showed reasonable strength for inclusion in a data set to compute coverage limits. Except 
for the DIF size, the pilot study results were not consistent with the findings of the four 
research questions in the survey of the IADI members none of which showed statistical 
significance. This conflict seems to be influenced by externalities such as lack of access 
to: (a) the statistical industrial data due to restrictions associated either with legislation or 
bank regulation, and (b) the appropriate training and or experience in the use of data to 
compute coverage limits. In Chapter 5, I will highlight the factors that require attention to 
address these limitations given the import link in contributing to financial stability. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Following the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, the FSB (2012) reached out to 
financial regulators, including deposit insurance systems, about using industry statistical 
data to make their deposit insurance coverage limits more reflective of the jurisdictional 
financial and economic circumstances. The purpose of this cross-sectional study was to 
examine the relationship between deposit insurance coverage limits and key data 
variables, the aggregate bank risk, the size of the DIF, the premium levy, and the 
aggregate currency value of insured deposits of deposit insurance systems within the 
international arena, using IADI members as the data source. The pilot study component 
was adopted to test the four predictor variables using FDIC statistical industry data with 
the dependent variable, coverage limits, during the period 1934 to 2019. In the survey 
segment of the study, I used a slightly modified version of Sheboy’s (2006) 
administrators’ data use survey (ADUS) with a 5-point Likert scale to survey the IADI 
members from the eight IADI geographical regions: (a) Africa, (b) Asia-Pacific, (c) 
Caribbean, (d) Eurasia, (e) Europe, (f) Latin America, (g) Middle East and North Africa, 
and (h) North America (IADI, 2014). The IADI members were invited to participate via 
the online SurveyMonkey audience pool. The survey spanned 109 days (March 7, 2020 
to June 23, 2020) and received 36 responses, which in the cleaning process was adjusted 
to 29. The extended period allowed for this survey was due to the COVID-19 pandemic 
remote-work measures implemented by the officers of the IADI member deposit 
insurance systems. The research used the same four predictor data variables in the pilot 
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study: (a) aggregate bank risk, (b) DIF size, (c) DIF premium levy, and (d) DIF aggregate 
currency value of insured deposits. The dependent variable was the deposit insurance 
coverage limit. Given the exploratory nature of this study, I included three additional 
predictor variables. 
The nature of the pilot study was to use a quantitative nonexperimental cross-
sectional study of the FDIC to seek out relationships between the aggregate bank risk, the 
DIF size, the aggregate currency value of insured deposits, and the premium levy on the 
dependent variable coverage limit. Multiple regression analysis was used in the pilot 
study coupled with a correlation analysis, which unveiled statistical significance in 
explaining the relationship between three of four independent variables and the coverage 
limit. The relationships between the independent variables aggregate bank risk, the 
aggregate currency value of insured deposits, and the premium levy and the dependent 
variable coverage limit indicated that these three variables could be considered as 
possible inclusions in a statistical or financial model to compute or change the deposit 
insurance coverage limits of deposit insurance systems. 
The main study was a quantitative nonexperimental cross-sectional study of the 
deposit insurance systems in the global environment. I surveyed members of the IADI to 
seek out relationships between the participants’ opinions on the use of aggregate bank 
risk, the DIF size, the aggregate currency value of insured deposits, and the premium levy 
on the dependent variable, coverage limit. A 5-point Likert scale was used in the survey 
and ordinal regression analysis was applied in the pilot study. The findings revealed no 
statistical significance for the possible effect of the four independent variables on the 
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coverage limit. These relationships indicated, in the opinion of the participants, these four 
variables could not be considered as possible inputs to compute or change the deposit 
insurance coverage limits of deposit insurance systems. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The deposit insurance industry appears to be lacking in the area of using industry 
statistical data to compute deposit insurance coverage limits, which is done in life and 
health insurance industries (Valentino, 1954). The lack of statistical industry data at the 
DIF institutional level weakens the factual representation of the coverage limit and may 
contradict Diamond & Dybvig’s (1983, as cited by Hogan & Luther, 2014) perspective 
that deposit insurance can mitigate depositors’ panic behavior but support the alternative 
view of increasing moral hazard and consequently bank failures as espoused by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002, as cited by Hogan & Johnson, 2016). Based on the 
findings, each depositor may instinctively hold to the Merton’s (1977) put option 
ideology and exercise their option to withdraw their deposits at a time when there is an 
apparent exposure of loss.  
The impact of data-driven decision-making on the performance of organizations 
has taken precedence to incentivize organizational leaders to adopt an evidence-based 
approach in the conduct of their business affairs (West, 2019). Although there is 
increasing support for the use of data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, and 
data-driven decision making in the field of education, there is momentum for a similar 
philosophy in organizations (Bishop, 2018). The coverage limit in such circumstances 
would not reflect an optimal level supported by data consistent with the efficient frontier 
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in the Markowitz (1952) modern portfolio theory (as cited by Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, 
2016).    
This study examined the use of four variables namely aggregate bank risk, the 
DIF size, the aggregate currency value of insured deposits and the premium levy on the 
dependent variable, coverage limit. The FSB made an intervention in its 2012 peer 
review following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis for deposit insurance systems to 
make use of industry data to enhance their capacity to respond to financial crises (FSB, 
2012). Notwithstanding the fact that data usage to compute deposit insurance coverage 
limits has been under researched, reference was made to research within the realm of 
DDDM concept.  
The independent variables identified in the four hypotheses for the pilot study of 
the FDIC except for the DIF size showed statistical significance. The Pearson correlation 
in the pilot study supported the predictability with the aggregate currency value of 
insured deposits illustrated the strongest. The study of the IADI members association 
indicated that their opinions do not support the use of the same four variables which were 
inconsistent with the findings of the pilot study on the FDIC which was part of the 
sampled survey respondents. The findings of the survey, except for that associated with 
the variable the DIF size, are inconsistent with the findings of the pilot study. 
The findings of the ordinal logistical regression on the DDDM segments of the 
survey showed no statistical significance. These findings suggest that the DIF managers 
do not use statistical industry data for decision making including those related to 
computing their deposit insurance coverage limits. The lack of use is based on restricted 
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access to data that is being held by the bank regulator, legislative constraints, and the 
unreliability of the data produced by the DIF member banks.   
The inconsistency between the findings of the pilot study and main study of the 
IADI participants may be influenced the participants’ lack of access to data held by the 
bank regulator and the legislative factors such as those experienced by DIFs in the EU.  
DIFs that operate with a paybox mandate had either limited or no access to statistical 
industry data. This restriction would inhibit the fund managers of paybox and perhaps 
paybox plus systems to use data to compute coverage limits. 
Another limiting factor was the dated and poor quality of the data. The statistical 
industry data on the banking system is prepared by the member banks of the deposit 
insurance systems but such data is submitted to the bank regulator that is not timely.  
While the survey did not identify the specific factors that contributed to the poor quality 
of the data, the bankers’ emphasis on meeting their business objectives may not always 
align with data requirements of the bank regulator. Given the fact that bank regulators 
appear to be the main repository of data on the banking system, one of the key statistical 
industry inputs that can be used to compute coverage limits, the BCBS (2012) bank 
regulation theory apparently does not fully support the deposit insurance systems to use 
the data at this time. 
Neither the four different types of DIFs as defined by their mandate types 
(paybox, paybox plus, loss minimizer and risk minimizer) nor the DIFs geographical 
location within the IADI defined jurisdictions does not seem to have an influence with 
regards to the use of the statistical industry data to compute and or change the coverage 
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limit. The pilot study that incorporated the FDIC, which is a risk minimizer, did not 
consider the use of statistical industry data. Occasionally, mention was made of 
monitoring trends in the inflation rate along with trends in the coverage limit since its 
inception in 1933. The FDIC as a risk minimizer does collect statistical industry data but 
showed no indication of using it to either establish or change it during its 84-year history 
(which was changed 8 times since its inception in 1934).  
Limitations of the Study 
The number of responses to the survey was small which was affected by remote 
working policies adopted by organizations including deposit insurance systems due to the 
COVID-19 virus that is affecting the world. The IADI population comprised 91 deposit 
insurers’ members (now 86) and the initial G*Power of 74 members was adjusted down 
to 23 members. A total of 35 were received and after the cleaning process 29 were 
deemed usable.  
While the influence of legislation such as the EU Directive sets a coverage limit 
for the European Union, this study does not consider the type and level of data used that 
were used by the appropriate authorities to establish the coverage limit of €100,000.00. 
The same principle applies to deposit insurance systems which may have limited 
resolution powers and by extension access to and usage of statistical industry data. This 
study does not consider whether any and if yes to data use, what specific statistical 
industry data by the other authorities outside of the European Union region including the 




I investigated four variables for possible inclusion in the determination of the 
coverage limit. There may be other variables which may require the intervention of 
actuaries to examine these and other possible variables that can be used to compute 
coverage limits. The banking industry is a one area that represents a good starting point to 
locate the relevant data.   
Recommendations 
At the organizational level, there is a need to lobby the financial authorities to get 
their buy-in to the philosophy/concept of data collection, data analysis, data interpretation 
and data driven decision making a the DIF institutional level to compute and or change 
the coverage limit. In instances where the deposit insurance system is limited by 
legislative powers with regards to access to and usage of statistical industry data, some 
authority within the bank regulatory realm should be empowered to collect, analyze and 
interpret the data as well as provide the appropriate outputs for decision making 
particularly with regards to the coverage limits.  
During the 2007/2008, some governments around the world opted to increase 
their coverage limits to 100% of the value of eligible deposits in their respective banking 
systems (Bitros, 2015; Calomiris & Jaremski, 2016). This reaction, although may have 
calmed depositors to avoid large simultaneous withdrawals of deposit funds, the 
strategy’s real success cannot be evaluated. Such a measure carried then, and still carries 
now, huge risks associated with: (a) depositors’ expectations post crisis when the 
coverage limits are adjusted downward or back to their precrisis levels, and (b) 
depositors’ expectations when financial crises arise in the future crises. The application 
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of data could potentially restrict the usage of such risky, ad hoc, ill-informed measures to 
stymie the anxiety in the financial markets.  
I explored four possible data sets for computing and or changing deposit 
insurance coverage limits. This investigation does lay the base for future research in more 
possible data sets and the development of financial and or mathematical models similar to 
those used in the life and general insurance industry. There is sufficient literature in the 
life and general insurance industry to support such exploratory work.  
Organizational emphasis on training and skills development in the area of the use 
of industry is another intervention that this study recommends. Collecting, analyzing, 
interpreting and using the data to inform decisions are the basic elements of ADUS 
principle. To optimize the benefit of the data usage, however, can really be exploited 
when the appropriate skill sets are available which should be present within the bank 
regulatory function assuming it is too costly to execute in the deposit insurance arm of 
the financial safety net.  
Further research is required to explore the four variables used in this study as well 
as other variables that can be used to compute coverage limits. The policymakers should 
acknowledge the findings of the FSB 2012 Peer review and take the appropriate actions 
to execute the recommendations associated with deposit insurance systems.  
Implications 
This study offers potential for positive social change at the jurisdictions’ 
governance, organization, employee and depositors’/consumers’ levels. Jurisdictions at 
the governance level seem to have a preference to make alterations to the coverage levels 
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without the use of the DIFs application, or understudy, of the data. This is inconsistent 
with Madhani (2017) resource-dependent governance theory that advocates the 
requirement for boards to collect data and build relationships to move the organization in 
to the realm of maximum performance. The acceptance or full embrace of the DDDM 
concept is important for policymakers at all levels of the financial services sector. The 
decisions to change or compute coverage limits that are backed by the use of statistical 
industry data can result in positive fiscal outcomes with less downside risks. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the FDIC functions collectively as both a bank regulator 
and deposit insurer, the adoption of statistical industry data use to derive the deposit 
insurance coverage limits can enhance bank regulation (BCBS, 2017). 
At the organizational level, the purpose of the DIF can be strengthened when the 
product that is being offered, deposit protection at a certain coverage limit, can be duly 
supported by application of statistical industry data. Such an organizational framework or 
practice, can also build consumer and depositor interest in how they save and allocate 
their funds between the various savings’/investment institutions that make up the 
financial services sector. The literature on statistical and mathematical models does exist 
and simply requires further research to explore the appropriate models for the coverage 
limit. 
The IADI can also benefit through the enhancement of international standards for 
determining the coverage limit. The current IADI standard, Core Principle - Coverage – 
offers general guidance on the banks that should be covered, the volume of depositors, 
the credibility of the system and its limited value among others (IADI, 2014). The 
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principle does not include the use of the industrial statistical data that would inform the 
level or the limit of the coverage in value terms. This study could reshape this form of 
thinking and set the framework for developments in valuing the coverage limit. 
The investment in training and build-up of the appropriate skills and 
competencies would create opportunities for employees within the DIFs to execute work 
in the area of computing the coverage limit. The possible application of the ADUS 
principle on the employees of the DIF may result in more positive responses related to 
the importance of data, the importance of data tasks, the importance of deposit insurance 
administrative preparation programs and the requisite skills. 
This study would build on the literature in the field of deposit insurance, 
particularly in the specific area of the determination of coverage limits. The deposit 
insurance field in general is under researched and this springboard to put deposit 
insurance on a stronger footing in the field of academia. Greater research work has the 
potential to provide the field with more recognition and importance to policymakers 
going forward. 
Conclusion 
In my study, I investigated the use of industrial statistical data namely the 
independent variables aggregate bank risk, the DIF size, the aggregate currency value of 
insured deposits and the premium levy by deposit insurers in the international arena on 
the dependent variable, coverage limit. This investigation was executed following a pilot 
study of the FDIC using the same variables for the period 1934 to 2019. In the pilot 
study, I utilized multiple regression analysis coupled with correlation analysis. The four 
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variables showed statistical significance and positive correlation with the independent 
variable, the coverage limit.  
The findings of my study on the IADI members’ opinions regarding the use of the 
same four variables in the pilot study were in direct contradiction of three from the pilot 
study, which revealed no statistical differences. The null hypotheses were accepted 
indicating that the IADI members opined that the four variables did not have any 
influence on the computation of coverage limit. The participants also opined that the use 
of data was not an important factor to consider in the determination of the coverage limit 
and there were constraints they encountered in applying the data including limited 
training, legislative hurdles, and regulatory restrictions. 
Despite the contradictions in the findings between the pilot study and the survey 
of the IADI members with regards to the use of statistical industry data, my study 
revealed that three of statistical industry data is key to compute and or change deposit 
insurance coverage limits. It supports the need for future research on other variables 
including three of the four used in this study to derive deposit insurance coverage limits. 
The future research could also be expanded to include statistical, mathematical and or 
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Appendix A: IADI Fund Managers Survey Instrument 
 
Sheboy Modified: Data Use: Deposit Insurance Administrators Perspective 
Deposit Insurance System/Scheme/Fund Administrator Data Use Survey – modified 
(Sheboy, 2006) 
Directions 
Thank you for taking time to complete this survey that should only take 20 minutes of 
your time. 
 Participation in the study is voluntary and all of your responses will be 
anonymous and will be kept completely confidential. 
 You will be asked to indicate the extent of your perceptions regarding data use 
data tasks, your formal preparation to use data and which skills should be taught 
in preparation programs. 
 Please record your response by clicking on the choice that best represents the 
extent of your perception regarding data use. The choices include: 1 – strongly 
disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – neither disagree or agree, 4 – agree, or 5 – strongly 
agree. 
 The demographic information near the end of the survey will be used for data 
analysis purposes only and not for identification. 
 At the end of the survey, there will be 4 open response questions asking for your 
input regarding data use. 
Data Use: The importance of data 
1. I believe that deposit insurance systems which effectively use data to improve 
staff/institutional performance/achievement are better able to become high 
performing deposit insurance systems. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree
 strongly agree 
 
2. I believe that one of the most important tools for improving staff/institutional 
performance/achievement is data use. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
3. I believe that data use is important to helping all staff/institution achieve. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
4. I believe that data use is important to closing staff/institutional 
performance/achievement gaps. 




5. I believe that data use has become more important for staff/institutional 
performance/achievement over the past 5 to 7 years. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
Data Use: Data Tasks 
For your reference: 
 Data analysis is the manipulation and examination of data to identify patterns, 
trends, or relationships; 
 Statistical analysis applies statistical techniques to numerical data analysis; 
 Data interpretation is to explain or make meaning of the findings from the data 
analysis to determine the implications, significance, priorities and next steps. 
 
6. In my current position, I work with fellow-staff to analyze statistical industry 
assessment data to develop prescriptive plans for improvement. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
7. In my current position, I interpret data frequently. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
8. In my current position, I interpret data from industry/institutional sources. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
9. In my current position, I analyze data from industry/institutional sources. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
10. I believe that data use has become more important for staff/institutional 
performance/achievement over the past 5 to 7 years. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
 
Data Use: Assessment of Deposit Insurance Administrative Preparation Programs 
For your reference: 
 Data analysis is the manipulation and examination of data to identify patterns, 
trends, or relationships; 
 Statistical analysis applies statistical techniques to numerical data analysis; 
 Data interpretation is to explain or make meaning of the findings from the data 




11. I believe that my organizational training / preparation in deposit insurance 
administration prepared me for analysis of data from industry/institutional sources. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
12. As part of my organizational training / preparation in deposit insurance 
administration, I learned to use a statistics software program to analyze data. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
13. I believe that my organizational training / preparation in deposit insurance, prepared 
me to effectively use data for computing the deposit insurance coverage limit. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
14. As part of my organizational training / preparation in deposit insurance 
administration, I learned to interpret data reports from industry/institutional sources. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
15. I believe that my organizational training / preparation in deposit insurance 
administration prepared me for the data analysis interpretation and communication 
challenges in deposit insurance/coverage limits brought about by the IADI standards 
and/or the FSB Peer Review post the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
16. I believe that my organizational training / preparation in deposit insurance prepared 
me to effectively use data for planning. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
17. I believe that my organizational training / preparation in deposit insurance prepared 
me to communicate data analysis to multiple constituencies/stakeholders. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
18. I believe that in order to meet the data use (analysis, interpretation, and 
communication) requirements of my current position, I had to learn on the job. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
19. I believe that my organizational training / preparation in deposit insurance 
administration required that I take coursework in statistics and/or data analysis. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
20. As part of my organizational training / preparation in deposit insurance 
administration, I took one or more courses in statistics and/or data analysis. 




Data Use: Requisite Skills 
For your reference: 
 Data analysis is the manipulation and examination of data to identify patterns, 
trends, or relationships; 
 Statistical analysis applies statistical techniques to numerical data analysis; 
 Data interpretation is to explain or make meaning of the findings from the data 
analysis to determine the implications, significance, priorities and next steps. 
 
21. The following skill should be taught in deposit insurance administration preparation 
programs – statistical analysis for deposit insurance coverage limit evaluation. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
22. The following skill should be taught in deposit insurance administration preparation 
programs – data analysis for deposit insurance coverage limit evaluation. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
23. The following skill should be taught in deposit insurance administration preparation 
programs – data use for deposit insurance coverage limit evaluation. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
24. The following skill should be taught in deposit insurance administration preparation 
programs – communication of data analysis for deposit insurance coverage limit 
evaluation. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
25. The following skill should be taught in deposit insurance administration preparation 
programs – presentation of data analysis for deposit insurance coverage limit 
evaluation in multiple formats (e.g. written reports, graphs). 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
26. The following skill should be taught in deposit insurance administration preparation 
programs – data use for deposit insurance coverage limit planning. 
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
Data Use: Computing/Changing Deposit Insurance Coverage Limits 
The following focuses only on the computation/derivation of the value of the 
coverage limit as the legislative power to change the limit may reside in a higher 




27. Based on my current position and experience, the following statistical deposit 
insurance statistical industry datum, the aggregate risk profile of the fund member 
banks, can be used to compute and/or change the deposit insurance coverage limit:  
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
28. Based on my current position and experience, the following statistical deposit 
insurance statistical industry datum, the size of the deposit insurance fund, can be 
used to compute and/or change the deposit insurance coverage limit:  
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
29. Based on my current position and experience, the following statistical deposit 
insurance statistical industry datum, the aggregate domestic currency value of 
insured deposits, can be used to compute and/or change the deposit insurance 
coverage limit:  
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
30. Based on my current position and experience, the following statistical deposit 
insurance statistical industry datum, the premium levy rate, can be used to compute 
and/or change the deposit insurance coverage limit:  
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
31. Based on my current position and experience, the following statistical deposit 
insurance statistical industry datum, the modal domestic currency value of insured 
deposits (the deposit value that appears the most frequent across the fund 
member banking system), can be used to compute and/or change the deposit 
insurance coverage limit:  
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
32. Based on my current position and experience, the following statistical deposit 
insurance statistical industry datum, the average domestic currency value of 
insured deposits (the total domestic currency value of insured deposits divided 
by the associate number of accounts to arrive at an average domestic currency 
value of insured deposits), can be used to compute and/or change the deposit 
insurance coverage limit:  
Strongly disagree disagree neither disagree or agree agree strongly agree 
 
Demographic Information 
Please answer as many questions as you feel comfortable. The demographic 
information will be used for data analysis purposes only and not for identification in 




33. Indicate your job title in your deposit insurance organization? 
Director 
Chief Executive Officer / General Manager 
Head, Research and Development 
Other (please specify) 
 
 





35. Which organization’s ownership and or control type best describes your deposit 
insurance system? 
Privately established and administered 
Government legislated and administered 
Government legislated and privately administered 
Central Bank administered 
Other (please specify) 
 
 





Other (please specify) 
 
 
37. How many years of work-experience do you have (including this year) with your 





21 or more 
 





Specialist (post-Masters) or second Masters 
Doctorate 
 
39. What type of deposit insurance funding does your deposit insurance system uses? 
Ex Ante 
Ex Post 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
40. Which primary IADI Regional Committee does your deposit insurance system 









41. Please rank your educational degree(s) in the order that represents the best 
preparation to use data with 1 being the best, 2 the second best, etc. 
Bachelors 
Masters 
Specialist (post-Masters) or second Masters 
Doctorate 
 
42. Who is primarily responsible for analyzing deposit insurance coverage data in your 
organiation?  
Director 
Chief Executive Officer / General Manager 
Head, Research and Development 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
43. Since the legal establishment of your deposit insurance system, how many times has 
the deposit insurance coverage limit been changed?  
Times 
 







45. Who is primarily responsible for interpreting deposit insurance coverage data in your 
organization?  
Director 
Chief Executive Officer / General Manager 
Head, Research and Development 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
Open Response Questions 
Please consider providing additional, specific feedback regarding data use in deposit 
insurance. Thank you in advance for your willingness to provide additional 
information and thank you for taking time to complete this survey. 
46. Considering the use of data to compute and or change deposit insurance coverage 
limits, what other specific statistical industry data do you think deposit insurance 
administrators need to know more about or to use to compute their deposit insurance 
organization’s coverage limits? State only 5 industry data sets. 
 
Data set 1. 
Data set 2. 
Data set 3. 
Data set 4. 
Data set 5. 
 
47. In addition to your formal deposit insurance administrative preparation program/(s), 
what other modes of training or experiences (educational, professional or personal) 
contributed to your preparation to use data to compute your deposit insurance 
organization’s coverage limit? State only 5 training programs or experiences. 
Training Program/Experience 1. 
Training Program/Experience 2. 
Training Program/Experience 3. 
Training Program/Experience 4. 
Training Program/Experience 5. 
 
48. At your deposit insurance organization, what is done with statistical industry data 




What is done with statistical industry data:  
How are they used: 
 
49. What are the limiting factors, if any, that restricts or constrains your organization’s 
capacity and your ability to use statistical industry data to compute your 
organization’s deposit insurance coverage limit? Identify 5 limiting factors, should 
these exist. 
Limiting Factor 1. 
Limiting Factor 2. 
Limiting Factor 3. 
Limiting Factor 4. 















Appendix D: Approval for Survey Instrument Use 
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